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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the value relevance of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
and the effect of the financial crisis on European financial firms. The empirical work is divided 
into two parts. The first part examines the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption and of the financial 
crisis on the value relevance of accounting information. For a sample of financial firms listed in 
the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland over 1998-2012, the results indicate that 
the combined value relevance of book value of equity and earnings has increased following 
mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005, thereby supporting the view that IFRS adoption improves the 
quality of accounting information. In addition, the findings suggest that the value relevance of 
book value of equity increases while that of earnings decreases as the financial crisis evolves. 
Moreover, during the crisis period the value relevance of equity book value appears greater for 
firms operating in countries with weak institutional environment as well as for firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms. The results are consistent for the whole sample of financial 
firms and a sub-sample of banks. 
The second empirical part of this thesis evaluates the value relevance of fair value hierarchy under 
IFRS 7 that requires firms to classify fair value measurements into three levels based on the 
valuation inputs. Using a sample of listed financial firms in the EEA and Switzerland over 2009-
2012, the results show that the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values is greater than 
the value relevance of fair values at level 3, although the difference is significant only for level 
1. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the value relevance of level 3 fair values is lower for 
firms domiciled in countries characterised by a weak institutional environment and for firms with 
weak corporate governance mechanisms.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Over the last few decades and under the globalisation of markets and politics, there has been a 
growing interest in harmonising accounting standards worldwide. To satisfy the information 
needs of international investors in the rapidly expanding globalised financial markets, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was established in 1973, with the aim of 
introducing a set of harmonised financial reporting standards across national borders, named 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). In 2001, IASC was restructured to form the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). IASB has the responsibility of issuing largely 
principle-based accounting standards called the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) after adopting the existing accounting standards, IAS. The main objective of IASB is to 
develop a single set of high quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted 
international financial reporting standards (IASB, 2013). Since IASB was formed, the adoption 
of IFRS has gained considerable momentum in many countries around the world. By the end of 
2014, over 120 countries and financial reporting jurisdictions were required or permitted the use 
of IFRS to prepare the financial statements of listed firms (Pacter, 2015).  
The impact of IFRS adoption on accounting information quality has been extensively studied in 
the accounting literature. One of the attributes used in the literature to measure the quality of 
financial statement information is value relevance. Value relevance is defined as the ability of 
accounting information to capture or summarise information that affects the market value of 
equity (Francis and Schipper, 1999). Previous studies investigating the effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting information have 
produced inconclusive results. Some of these studies report an increase in the value relevance of 
accounting information (e.g. Devalle et al., 2010; Filip, 2010; Clarkson et al., 2011; Liu et al., 
2011), whereas others show empirical findings suggesting no significant change or even a 
2 
 
decrease in the value relevance of accounting information following IFRS adoption (Gjerde et 
al., 2008; Morais and Curto, 2008; Dobija and Klimczak, 2010; Chalmers et al., 2011; 
Karampinis and Hevas, 2011; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). The majority of these studies use samples 
of firms from a wide spectrum of industries. Hence, there is a need for research to evaluate the 
impact of IFRS adoption on the accounting information quality of a single industry, because each 
industry has specific characteristics that are likely to affect the value relevance of accounting 
information (Barth et al., 1998a; Anandarajan et al., 2011). Additionally, due to their distinct 
characteristics, a large stream of previous research excludes financial firms from their samples 
when evaluating the impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting information 
(e.g. Oliveira et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). 
Under IFRS, financial statements are required to be issued including both the balance sheet and 
the income statement.1 These two statements fulfil different roles or at least they provide 
incremental information relative to each other (Watts, 1974; Holthausen and Watts, 2001). For 
valuation purposes, the balance sheet provides information to facilitate loan decisions and the 
monitoring of debt contracts (Barth et al., 1998a); as such, it provides information on the 
liquidation value of the firm (i.e. what is available to firm’s debtholders in case of default). The 
income statement, on the other hand, provides information on abnormal earnings opportunities 
(i.e. unrecognised net assets) used mainly for equity valuation. Since the probability of default 
increases during a financial crisis, investors are likely to place more importance on liquidation 
value information presented by the balance sheet for valuation purposes. In contrast, less 
emphasis would be placed on future growth opportunities reflected in the income statement. This 
is particularly important for financial firms publishing their financial statement in accordance 
                                                          
1 Under IAS1 Presentation of Financial Statements, four financial statements are required to be prepared by the 
reporting entity: a statement of financial position (the balance sheet), a statement of profit and loss and other 
comprehensive income (the income statement), a statement of changes in equity, and a statement of cash flows 
(IASB, 2014a). 
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with IFRS, given that in periods of crisis fair value (market-based) measures reflect the 
liquidation values more than future payoffs (Allen and Carletti, 2008). In this context IFRS 
require many financial instruments, widely held by financial firms, to be recognised at fair value 
in the balance sheet prioritising the market prices over other inputs used to measure fair values. 
IASB has developed several accounting standards to expand the use of fair value measurements 
and enhance the disclosure about fair value amounts, such as IAS 39 and IFRS 7. Effective for 
the fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2009, IASB issued amendments to IFRS 7 
requiring financial instruments recognised at fair value to be disclosed by levels based on 
valuation inputs. Level 1 fair values are those measured on the basis of quoted prices in active 
markets. Level 2 fair values are those determined by indirectly observable inputs, other than those 
included in level 1 (using, for instance, quoted market prices of comparable or related 
instruments). Finally, level 3 fair values are those that are estimated using unobservable inputs 
(i.e. internally generated inputs). The usefulness of fair value information to investors is still 
debated in the financial accounting literature. Advocates of fair value accounting argue that fair 
values imply more value relevant accounting information to investors and represent more 
accurately real volatility (e.g. Laux and Leuz, 2009; Badertscher et al., 2012). This argument is 
based on the premise that market-based fair value reflects the investors’ consensus on the 
expected future cash flows of an asset or liability (Barth and Landsman, 1995; Hitz, 2007). This 
is unassailable when all fair values are measured based on quoted prices of identical assets and 
liabilities traded in complete and perfect markets. At the other extreme, opponents of fair value-
based accounting have questioned the reliability of fair value measurements, especially with the 
absence of active markets for the assets and liabilities under measurement, or when markets are 
illiquid (Nelson, 1996; Landsman, 2007; Penman, 2007). In such cases, fair value measurements 
are less verifiable by investors and more subject to managerial bias and measurement errors, 
resulting in information asymmetries between investors and managers. The greater the 
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information asymmetry associated with unobservable inputs of fair value, the less reliable and 
the less value relevant the fair value information.  
In general, the quality of accounting information, especially when there is room for managerial 
discretion, is explained by firms’ incentives (Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Leuz, 2003; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006; Laux and Leuz, 2009). That is, the way firms use such discretion depends 
to a great extent on their incentives, which in turn are determined by many factors, including the 
institutional environment characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to expect that the strength of institutional environment and corporate governance 
mechanisms have an impact on the value relevance of accounting information. Moreover, given 
the managerial discretion inherent in fair values with unobservable inputs, institutional settings 
and corporate governance factors are expected to play a key role in mitigating the information 
asymmetry problems associated with fair value estimates.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 describes the research aim and objectives. 
Section 1.3 presents the research questions; Section 1.4 shows the motivations for focusing purely 
on financial sector firms; Section 1.5 summarises the contributions this thesis makes to the 
literature; and finally Section 1.6 outlines the structure of the thesis.  
1.2 Research aim and objectives 
To facilitate the process of integration of European financial and banking markets the European 
Commission established that all listed firms had to publish their consolidated financial statements 
in accordance with IFRS from 2005.2 During the IFRS adoption period two economic crises have 
occurred: the global financial crisis that engulfed European countries from 2008 and the European 
sovereign debt crisis which started in 2009. Financial institutions were hit the most by the crises, 
                                                          
2 Also in Norway, a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), listed firm are required to use IFRS to prepare 
their financial statements since 2005. In the same line, all listed firms in Switzerland are required to use IFRS or the 
US GAAP since 2005. 
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and thereby the European governments heavily injected capital to the large financial firms. In this 
setting, the main aim of this thesis is to investigate the value relevance of IFRS and the effect of 
the financial crisis3 on European financial firms. In doing so, the thesis addresses several research 
objectives. First it assesses the change in the value relevance of financial statement information, 
namely book value of equity and earnings,4 before and after mandatory IFRS adoption by 
European financial firms. Second, it investigates the changes in the value relevance of book value 
of equity and earnings when the crisis hit. Third, the thesis examines the value relevance of the 
three levels of fair value as disclosed under IFRS 7.  
To achieve these objectives, the thesis includes two empirical parts. The first part addresses the 
first two objectives. Specifically, it investigates the influence of IFRS adoption on the value 
relevance of accounting information by focusing on a sample of listed financial firms operating 
in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland over the period 1998-2012. The sample 
period is divided into two distinct phases: pre-IFRS adoption (1998-2004) and IFRS adoption 
(2005-2012). The first part also examines the value relevance of equity book value and earnings 
pre-crisis (2005-2007) and during the crisis (2008-2012). All tests are carried out for financial 
firms (including banks) and for the subsample of banks separately (for more details see Section 
3.2.5 in Chapter 3). 
The second part addresses the third research objective, which focuses on the fair value hierarchy 
under IFRS 7 effective since 2009. Specifically, it investigates the value relevance of the three 
levels of fair value disclosed in accordance with IFRS 7 for a sample of financial firms in the 
EEA and Switzerland over 2009-2012. 
                                                          
3 Throughout the thesis the terms “the crisis” and “the financial crisis” are used interchangeably to refer to the 
period from 2008 to 2012. This includes both the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. 
4 The terms “net income” and “earnings” are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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1.3 Research questions5 
As noted above, the empirical analyses in this thesis are divided into two parts: the first part 
addresses the impact of IFRS adoption and the financial crisis on value relevance of accounting 
information, and the second part focuses on the value relevance of fair value hierarchy.  
1.3.1 The impact of IFRS and the crisis on value relevance 
The first empirical part seeks to answer four research questions. IASB has developed 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with the aim of providing accounting 
information that better reflects the economic position and performance of reporting entities 
compared to local accounting standards. Along with the comparability benefits associated with 
the increasing adoption of IFRS throughout the world, IFRS reduce allowable accounting 
alternatives, and hence limit managerial discretion (Barth et al., 2008). Thus, regulators as well 
as market participants expect substantial economic benefits around IFRS adoption. In general, 
IFRS adoption has received special consideration in the literature; yet there is relatively little 
attention paid to financial sector firms which are more exposed to fair value accounting relative 
to other sectors. Therefore, the first part of this thesis concentrates in providing answers to the 
following research question: 
1A. Does the value relevance of accounting information increase following mandatory 
IFRS adoption by financial firms? 
As discussed above, reporting entities are required to prepare both a balance sheet and an income 
statement under IFRS. These two statements fulfil different valuation roles: the former provides 
information on firm liquidation values,6 while the latter gives information about the firm’s 
unrecognised net assets. Previous studies (e.g. Barth et al., 1998a; Davis-Friday et al., 2006) show 
that the value relevance of the book value of equity increases, while that of net income decreases 
                                                          
5 Chapter 3 includes the hypotheses, which correspond to the research questions listed in this chapter. 
6 Liquidation values are the amount of net assets that are available in case of default (Barth et al., 1998). 
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when a firm’s financial health deteriorates or during an economic crisis. Given the increased 
exposure to fair value accounting, the shift in the valuation roles from the income statement to 
the balance sheet in the times of crisis is likely to become apparent for financial firms. Therefore, 
the second research question is formulated as follows: 
2A. Does the value relevance of equity book value increase, while that of net income 
decrease for financial firms as the financial crisis hits? 
Prior research suggests that country-level institutional environment as well as firm-level 
corporate governance mechanisms can play a complementary role in explaining the quality of 
financial reporting. This is particularly true during a financial crisis, as shown in prior studies 
such as Choi et al. (2011) and Vyas (2011). That is, the value relevance of the balance sheet and 
the income statement in times of a crisis are expected to be affected by both the strength of the 
institutional environment, and the quality of corporate governance practices at firm level. Thus, 
the first part also seeks to answer the following two research questions: 
3A. Does the value relevance of equity book value increase and that of net income decrease 
for firms operating in countries characterised by a weak institutional environment7 in 
times of financial crisis? 
4A. Does the value relevance of equity book value increase and that of net income decrease 
for firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms in times of financial crisis? 
 
1.3.2 Value relevance of fair value hierarchy 
The second empirical part addresses the value relevance of fair value hierarchy under IFRS 7 
through answering three research questions. The accounting literature suggests that fair value 
accounting information is typically value relevant to investors and the value relevance of fair 
value information varies with its reliability. The disclosure requirements under IFRS 7 to 
                                                          
7 Section 3.2.4. describes the variables that are used in this thesis to measure the strength of institutional environment 
and corporate governance.  
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categorise the inputs to the fair value measurements offer a powerful setting to assess whether 
the value relevance of more reliable fair value amounts (i.e. level 1 and level 2) is different from 
that of less reliable fair value estimates (i.e. level 3). Therefore, the first question to be answered 
in the second part is: 
1B. Is the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values higher than the value relevance 
of level 3 fair values? 
The following two questions concern the impact of both the institutional environment and firm-
level corporate governance on the value relevance of fair value hierarchy. These questions are 
motivated by the greater subjectivity and information asymmetry problems associated with fair 
value estimates in the absence of active markets. Recalling that the characteristics of the 
institutional environment and corporate governance mechanisms are likely to have an influence 
on the reliability concerns of fair value estimates, the second and third questions in the second 
part are stated as follows: 
2B. Does the institutional environment have a greater impact on the value relevance of 
level 3 fair values than on the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values? 
3B. Do corporate governance mechanisms have a greater impact on the value relevance 
of level 3 fair values than on the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values? 
  
1.4 Financial firms 
Financial firms facilitate business environment and firms financing. Therefore, the failure of such 
firms is more likely to cause greater harm to the whole economy compared to other, non-financial, 
entities (Jorian, 2009; Acharya and Richardson, 2009; Beatty and Liao, 2014). Yet they are often 
excluded from studies that test the changes in the value relevance of accounting information 
following IFRS adoption. This thesis aims to help fill this gap by focusing on financial firms for 
several important reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, the fair value accounting underlying 
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IFRS, as opposed to historical cost accounting, makes the financial sector potentially more 
exposed to changes in accounting practices following mandatory IFRS adoption compared to 
non-financial firms. For many EEA countries, mandatory IFRS adoption represented a substantial 
shift in financial reporting (Barth et al., 2014), given the fair value emphasis of IFRS compared 
to local accounting standards applied prior to 2005. This is of particular relevance to financial 
firms since they tend to hold a considerable proportion of their assets and liabilities in the form 
of financial instruments recognised at fair value under IFRS. Secondly, financial institutions that 
engage in traditional banking activities are required to report loan loss provisions (LLPs) which 
are considered as a key accounting choice that may affect reported earnings significantly.8 It is 
expected that those firms (i.e. banks) would be specifically affected by IFRS requirements for 
LLPs compared to those stipulated in many European countries before IFRS adoption (Gebhardt 
and Novotny-Farkas, 2011).9 Thirdly, the differences in accounting standards across countries 
may decrease the comparability of firms’ financial performance. This is especially true for 
financial institutions as their financial statements are typically more opaque compared to those 
of non-financial firms (Anandarajan et al., 2011; Beatty and Liao, 2014). 
Furthermore, as discussed above, one of the key aims of this thesis is to employ a sample of 
financial firms to examine the impact of the financial crisis on the valuation roles of the balance 
sheet and the income statement. In this context, it seems reasonable to expect that the industry-
specific characteristics will have some effect on the value relevance of financial statement 
information: as observed by Barth et al. (1998a), changes in the valuation coefficients of book 
value of equity and earnings could be driven by growth, risk, earnings persistence and accounting 
practices that are associated with a specific industry. Compared to other industries, financial firms 
                                                          
8 LLPs represent the excepted loan losses as estimated by bank management. For a more detailed explanation of 
LLPs and its accounting treatment, see Rayan (2007: 97-100). 
9 Specifically, IAS 39 requires an incurred loss model to report LLPs in comparison to forward looking model 
stipulated in Europe prior to IFRS adoption (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011).  
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hold more financial assets and liabilities; and fair value accounting results in more volatile income 
numbers in comparison to the timely recognition of balance sheet items. Hence, their balance 
sheets are expected to be of increasing importance for valuation purposes (i.e. become more value 
relevant), which is likely to be apparent during times of crisis. Besides, financial firms were 
severely affected by economic crises. In fact, European financial institutions, especially those in 
the Eurozone, were hit twice over the study period: first during the global financial crisis from 
2008 onwards, and then during the European sovereign debt crisis that started at the end of 2009.  
In the same vein, this thesis focuses on financial firms in testing the value relevance of the three 
levels of fair value hierarchy under IFRS 7. The disclosure of the fair value hierarchy is not 
specific to any particular industry; however, financial firms tend to have significant amounts of 
financial instruments measured at fair value. Consequently, the relevance of fair value hierarchy 
disclosures is expected to be more pronounced for financial firms than for firms from other 
industries. 
1.5 Research contribution 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways.  
Concerning the first empirical part which focuses on the capital market consequences of 
mandatory IFRS adoption and the financial crisis for a sample of European financial firms, it is 
possible to identify a number of key contributions. The first part provides empirical evidence on 
the impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting information of a single 
industry, namely financial firms. In contrast, when investigating the changes in the value 
relevance of accounting information following IFRS adoption prior research typically uses 
samples that include firms from a wide spectrum of industries and often exclude financial 
institutions (e.g. Gjerde et al., 2008; Devalle et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Tsalavoutas et al., 
2012). It might be difficult to find conclusive evidence by combining different industries with 
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various characteristics in a single sample. This warrants further research to examine the effect of 
IFRS adoption on financial firms.  
This study contributes to the literature (e.g. Agostino et al., 2011) also by extending the study 
period to cover eight years after IFRS adoption rather than only early years of adoption. The 
change in the quality of accounting information as a result of IFRS adoption might be more 
noticeable in the medium to long-term rather than in the early years of IFRS adoption (Callao et 
al., 2007; Houqe et al., 2012). Interestingly, Kvall and Nobes (2010) and Kvall and Nobes (2012) 
show that firms in IFRS transition period continue their pre-IFRS national accounting traditions.  
In addition, this thesis contributes to the existing studies on the changes in the valuation roles of 
the balance sheet and income statement figures as a function of financial health. In particular, it 
revisits the distinctive valuation roles of the balance sheet and the income statement in the context 
of the most recent financial crisis. Also, it contributes to the ongoing discussion on the impact of 
fair value accounting during the time of financial crisis, given that the financial statements of 
firms under study are prepared under fair value-oriented accounting standards (IFRS), along with 
that fact that financial firms are relatively more exposed to fair value accounting than other 
industries. 
Moreover, in contrast to prior studies measuring the quality of country-level corporate 
governance (such as Davis-Friday et al., 2006; Daske et al., 2008; Anandarajan et al., 2011; 
Houqe et al., 2012), the present thesis employs a measure for firm-level rather than country-level 
governance quality. Previous studies report that there is a wide variation in firm-level corporate 
governance practices within a country (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnex and Kim, 2005). So, 
even with the same institutional settings, firms adopt different corporate governance mechanisms 
to mitigate agency problems, which might result in differences in the valuation characteristics of 
financial statements across firms.  
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Concerning the second part on the value relevance of fair value hierarchy under IFRS 7, the thesis 
also contributes to a large body of literature on fair value accounting. Prior studies have explored 
the value relevance of fair value hierarchy under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 157 (SFAS No. 157)10 for firms listed on the US markets (i.e. Kolev, 2009; Song et al., 2010; 
Goh et al., 2015), with no evidence, as far as I am aware, from other contexts . This study extends 
previous research by providing empirical evidence for a sample of financial firms listed on the 
EEA and Switzerland stock markets, of which many are considered less developed than those in 
the US. It also examines the association between the strength of the institutional environment, in 
addition to firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, and the value relevance of fair values. 
This responds to the call for research to examine whether the relevance and reliability of fair 
values vary across countries (Landsman, 2007). Interestingly, the results suggest that country-
specific institutional features affect the value relevance of financial instruments measured at fair 
value with no active markets (i.e. level 3 fair value). Again, this thesis investigates the impact of 
corporate governance practices at firm level, rather than at country-level in prior studies (see, for 
example, Daske et al., 2008; Anandarajan et al., 2011), on the value relevance of fair value levels. 
This is because the value relevance of fair value estimates across firms is likely to be influenced 
by the different corporate governance mechanisms at firm level, adopted to mitigate information 
asymmetry problems. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The reminder of the thesis proceeds as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the existing body of research relevant to the main scope of this 
study, and is divided into two main parts corresponding to the two empirical parts in the thesis. 
Part I includes a survey of previous studies on the impact of IFRS adoption and of the financial 
crisis on the value relevance of accounting information. Specifically, it reviews the accounting 
                                                          
10 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 was issued by Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) in the United States (US) requiring fair value hierarchy disclosure since 2008.  
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literature concerning mandatory IFRS adoption distinguishing between single and multi-country 
studies. Also, it gives an account of the literature on the value relevance of accounting 
information in times of financial crisis, and of the literature that addresses the impact of 
institutional environment and corporate governance factors. In Part II, the focus is shifted to prior 
research that addresses the value relevance of the fair values for financial instruments. It starts 
with the literature on fair value accounting before SFAS No. 157 and IFRS 7, and then it analyses 
the recent studies on fair value disclosure requirements under SFAS No. 157 and IFRS 7, and 
those that shed light on the impact of institutional environment and corporate governance on the 
quality of fair value information.  
Chapter 3 details the research methodology adopted in this study. The chapter is divided into two 
parts corresponding to the two empirical parts included in this thesis. For each part, the chapter 
presents the relevant hypotheses, and then provides a description of the models that will be used 
to test the stated hypotheses empirically, in addition to the sample selection procedures. Also, the 
chapter includes a description of the institutional environment and firm-level corporate 
governance variables that are employed in the study.  
Chapter 4 provides the descriptive statistics and discusses the findings of the first empirical part. 
It first presents the findings on the changes in the value relevance after mandatory IFRS adoption, 
and on the impact of the financial crisis on the value relevance of the balance sheet and income 
statement numbers. Finally, it addresses the impact of country-level institutional characteristics 
as well as firm-level corporate governance mechanisms. 
Chapter 5 provides and discusses the descriptive statistics and the empirical findings of the 
second empirical part. It starts with the results of testing the value relevance of fair value 
hierarchy, after which the effects of both the institutional environment and corporate governance 
factors are addressed. 
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Chapter 6 offers a summary of the thesis along with the main conclusions based on the results 
from testing the research hypotheses. It discusses the implications and limitations of the thesis 
and presents some avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Accounting information is considered value relevant when it has a statistical association with 
equity market value or return. Operationally, the value relevance of accounting information is 
measured by the explanatory power from a regression of share price (hereafter the “price model”) 
or return (hereafter the “return model”)11,12 against accounting information. Such measure can 
capture the relevance and reliability of accounting information (Francis et al., 2004), the two 
major features of information in the financial statements under the IASB’s conceptual framework 
applied up to 2010 (IASB, 2001).13 Consistent with the objectives of financial reporting within 
that framework, the value relevance is considered as a direct proxy for decision usefulness. 
Specifically, it reflects the role of accounting information in providing investors with the relevant 
information for valuation purposes. Furthermore, the theoretical background of value relevance 
models depends largely on a definition of value relevance as “the ability of financial statement 
information to capture or summarise information, regardless of source, that affects share values” 
(Francis and Schipper, 1999: 327). Such underlying definition matches the general purpose of 
financial reporting in providing “information to help existing and potential investors, lenders and 
other creditors to estimate the value of the reporting entity”, as stated in the most recent IASB 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting issued in September 2010 (IASB, 2010: A22). 
The empirical evidence shows that differences in accounting practice imply variations in the 
value relevance of financial statements to investors both at national and international level (see, 
e.g., Barth and Clinch, 1996, 1998; Dobija and Klimczak, 2010; Barth et al., 2008). This might 
                                                          
11 For a detailed explanation of the development of the price and return models see Section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3. 
12 The estimated coefficients from the price and return models are also used to measure the value relevance of 
accounting numbers. 
13 In the new IASB Conceptual Framework, for the financial information to be useful, it must be relevant and 
faithfully represent what it purports to represent. 
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be one reason why changes in the value relevance of accounting information due to IFRS 
adoption have been investigated extensively in prior studies. 
Over the past few decades there has been a considerable shift in financial reporting toward more 
fair value-based financial statements. In this context, the accounting literature has also examined 
the decision usefulness of fair value information to investors. A relatively large number of studies 
investigate the value relevance of fair value information. An accounting amount is considered 
value relevant when it has a statistical association with equity market value or return (Barth et 
al., 2001; Barth and Clinch, 2009). That is, if a recognised or disclosed fair value amount has a 
valuation coefficient that is statistically different from zero (after controlling for other financial 
statement information), this amount is considered relevant and reliable enough to be reflected in 
equity market value. Financial institutions typically hold large proportion of financial assets and 
liabilities in their financial statements (compared to non-financial firms); hence, much of the fair 
value research focuses on financial sector firms. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. Part I (Section 2.2) provides a detailed survey of the 
published literature on the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption and the financial crisis on the 
value relevance of accounting information. Specifically, Section 2.2.1 provides a review of 
previous studies concerning mandatory IFRS adoption. To this end, a distinction is made between 
studies that focus on a single country and studies that are carried out in a multi-country context 
as well as studies relating to IFRS adoption by financial firms. Section 2.2.2 focuses on published 
studies on the value relevance of accounting information surrounding the financial crisis. Section 
2.2.3 and 2.2.4 review previous literature on the association between accounting information 
quality and institutional environment factors as well as corporate governance mechanisms, 
respectively. Finally, Section 2.2.5 offers a summary and critical discussion of the studies 
reviewed in Part I. 
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Part II of this chapter (Section 2.3) reviews the fair value accounting literature corresponding to 
the second empirical part carried out in this thesis on fair value hierarchy. Specifically it presents 
and discusses the empirical evidence from prior studies concerning the value relevance of fair 
value recognition and disclosure. The focus is centred on the fair value of financial assets and 
liabilities as the fair value hierarchy disclosure requirements under IFRS 7 are limited to financial 
instruments. The review starts in Section 2.3.1 with the literature that empirically investigates the 
value relevance of fair value information prior to SFAS No. 157 (issued by FASB) and IFRS 7 
(issued by IASB). A distinction is made between the studies conducted in the United States (US) 
context, which are dominant in the fair value literature, and those in non-US (or multi-country) 
context. Section 2.3.2 presents the prior literature on fair value disclosure requirements based on 
SFAS No. 157 and IFRS 7. Then, Section 2.3.3 reviews the empirical studies that shed light on 
the impact of institutional environment and corporate governance on the quality of fair value 
information. Section 2.3.4 provides a summary and critical discussion of the reviewed literature 
in Part II. 
Finally, Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.  
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PART I 
2.2 Literature review on the impact of IFRS and the crisis on value relevance 
2.2.1 Value relevance of IFRS  
With the increasing number of countries requiring listed firms to prepare their financial 
statements under IFRS, the accounting literature has investigated the impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on the value relevance of financial statement information. In reviewing this literature, a 
distinction is made between single-country (in Section 2.2.1.1) versus cross-country studies (in 
Section 2.2.1.2). In addition, Section 2.2.1.3 reviews prior literature that addresses the impact of 
IFRS adoption on the accounting information quality of financial firms.  
2.2.1.1 Single-country studies 
Focusing on Norwegian firms, Gjerde et al. (2008) analyse whether the financial statements of 
2004 are more value relevant when restated in accordance with IFRS rather than local accounting 
standards. Based on a sample of 145 firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange, they employ both the 
return and the price models. The analysis reveals little evidence of increasing value relevance of 
accounting information after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005.  
Similarly in Portugal, Morais and Curto (2008) use a sample of 34 Portuguese listed over 1999-
2006. Based on the explanatory power of the price model, they document a decrease in the value 
relevance of accounting information over the two years of IFRS (2005-2006) compared to the 
period of domestic accounting standards (1995-2004). 
In Sweden, Paananen (2008) uses a sample of 376 firms for two years before IFRS adoption 
(2003-2004) and two years of mandatory IFRS adoption (2005-2006). Using the price model, the 
results show a decrease in the value relevance of accounting information – although it is not 
statistically significant – following IFRS adoption. 
In Romania, where listed firms were mandated to report their financial statements under IFRS 
since 2001, Filip (2010) examines the impact of such adoption on the value relevance of 
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accounting information. The study employs the return model for a sample of 280 firm-year 
observations (related to 48 firms) over the period from 1997 to 2004. The empirical analysis 
shows that the value relevance of accounting information is significantly higher in the period of 
IFRS adoption (2001-2004) compared to pre-IFRS adoption period (1997-2000). 
In Poland, Dobija and Klimczak (2010) investigate the changes in the value relevance of 
accounting information over two events, the new Polish accounting regulation introduced in 2000 
and the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. After excluding financial sector firms they use a 
sample of 856 firm-year observations over 1997-2008. Employing the return model with a 
dummy variable for IFRS adoption, the results show that there is no improvement in the value 
relevance of accounting information following the two periods of interest (i.e. the new Polish 
accounting standards and IFRS adoption).  
 In the Portuguese context, Oliveira et al.’s (2010) findings suggest a decrease in the value 
relevance of earnings compared to no effect on that of equity book value following the 
implementation of IFRS in 2005. Using the price model as the baseline model, the study is 
conducted based on a sample of 354 Portuguese non-financial listed firms over 1998-2008. 
Using Australian data over the period from 1990 to 2008, Chalmers et al. (2011) find weak 
evidence of an increase in the value relevance of financial reporting after the mandatory IFRS 
adoption in 2005. They conduct the study using the price model for 20,025 firm-year 
observations.  
Concerning the impact of IFRS adoption in highly regulated market, Liu et al. (2011) evaluate 
whether the quality of accounting information has increased after mandatory IFRS 
implementation in China since 2007. They use a sample of 870 non-financial firms over 2005-
2008. Based on both the price and return models, their findings indicate an increase in the value 
relevance of financial statement information following the mandatory adoption of IFRS in China.  
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In Greece, Karampinis and Hevas (2011) investigate the changes in accounting quality after IFRS 
adoption in 2005. The value relevance, measured based on both the price and the return models, 
is used as one of their proxies for the quality of accounting information. The study covers the 
period from 2002 to 2007 for a sample of 869 firm-year observations. The analysis shows that 
IFRS adoption has no significant impact on the value relevance of accounting information. 
Consistent with Karampinis and Hevas (2011), Tsalavoutas et al.’s (2012) empirical findings 
indicate no significant change in the value relevance of financial reporting in the post IFRS 
adoption period (2005-2008) compared to local accounting standards period (2001-2004) in 
Greece.They employ both the price and return models for a sample of 1,861 non-financial firm-
year observations.  
Many factors may affect the quality of accounting information rather than accounting standards 
such as incentives, enforcement and ownership structure (Ball, 2006; Holthausen, 2009). In this 
context, the studies reviewed above rely on one country sample, allowing them to control for 
internationally different and confounding factors. This in turn enhances the power of the tests and 
improves the reliability of findings. However, the results of single country study are less 
generalisable to other country contexts. In the present research, the relatively small number of 
financial firms in most EEA countries does not provide sufficient number of observations to carry 
out reliable single-country studies.  
2.2.1.2 Multi-country studies 
Moving to multi country studies, Morais and Curto (2009) conclude that the value relevance of 
financial statements over the first year of mandatory IFRS adoption is higher in comparison to 
those reported in the period of domestic Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
They use a large sample of 6,977 European listed firms from 14 different countries in the EEA 
over 2001-2005.The study is conducted based on the price model. In a further analysis they 
evaluate the impact of institutional environment on the value relevance of accounting information 
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after IFRS adoption. The results suggest that in the countries where accounting and tax are clearly 
separated financial statement information tends to be more value relevant. Surprisingly, the value 
relevance of financial reporting appears to be higher for firms listed in countries characterised by 
weaker legal enforcement mechanisms. 
Similarly, Devalle et al. (2010) investigate whether there has been any improvement in the value 
relevance of accounting information following the mandatory introduction of IFRS. They use 
data for 3,721 companies listed on five European stock exchanges, Frankfurt, Madrid, Paris, 
London, and Milan, over the period from 2002 to 2007. Employing both the price and return 
models for the entire sample shows that there has been an increase in the value relevance after 
IFRS adoption. Comparing the pricing coefficients suggests that value relevance of net income 
has increased in comparison to a decrease in value relevance of book value of equity.  
Focusing on the first year of IFRS adoption, Aubert and Grudnitski (2011) study the impact of 
IFRS adoption in 13 EEA countries and Switzerland. Based on a sample of 3,530 firms, the stock 
return is regressed on the reported earnings. The results show a positive association between 
earnings and stock return for the entire sample and in the countries of Belgium, Finland, France, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). However, 
adding a dummy variable for IFRS adoption shows an insignificant change in the value relevance 
of accounting information when it is prepared in accordance with IFRS rather than domestic 
GAAP.  
Likewise, Clarkson et al. (2011) assess whether the value relevance of book value of equity and 
net income has changed for the financial statements issued in 2004 under local GAAP and their 
IFRS comparative figures reported in 2005 (i.e. the first year of IFRS adoption). For a sample of 
3,488 firms in 14 EEA countries and Australia they employ the price model. The countries under 
study are classified into two groups, common law and code law countries, according to the 
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characteristics of their legal systems. Based on the explanatory power of the price model, the 
findings suggest no improvements in the value relevance for both sub-samples of code law and 
common law countries.  
2.2.1.3 IFRS adoption and financial firms 
The studies surveyed in the previous sections use samples including firms from a broad spread 
of industries. Industry-specific characteristics, such as growth, risk, earnings persistence and 
accounting practices, can have an influence on the value relevance of accounting information 
(Barth et al., 1998a; Anandarajan et al., 2011). Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, the literature 
on the impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting information often excludes 
financial firms due to their distinct characteristics (e.g. Oliveira et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011; 
Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). Taken together, there is a clear need for research to evaluate the impact 
of IFRS adoption on the value relevance as a proxy for accounting information quality of financial 
firms.  
A stream of studies uses earnings management, as a proxy of financial statement quality, to 
investigate the impact of IFRS adoption specifically on the banking industry. Earnings 
management occurs when managers exercise their discretion in financial reporting and/or in 
structuring transactions to “either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999: 368). In terms of the key literature, Gebhardt 
and Novotny-Farkas (2011), for example, investigate whether there is any change in the use of 
loan loss provisions (LLPs) as a tool for earnings management and capital management after 
IFRS adoption. The variable LLPs is regressed on non-performing loans, regulatory capital, and 
earnings before tax and LLPs. They also include several other explanatory variables, namely, 
changes in non-performing loans and changes in total loans. All the independent variables are 
interacted with a dummy variable for IFRS adoption. The analysis is conducted for a sample of 
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90 banks listed in 12 European countries over the period from 2000 to 2007. The results suggest 
that the introduction of IFRS in 2005 results in less earnings management behaviour of European 
banks. Interestingly, this effect is less pronounced for banks from countries characterised by 
stricter bank supervision, widely dispersed bank ownership and for banks that are cross-listed in 
the US. In another 2011 study, Leventis et al. report consistent results where IFRS adoption 
period appears to result in a decline in earnings management behaviour by European banks. The 
authors regress loan loss provisions on earnings before tax and LLPs, regulatory capital ratio and 
a set of control variables, interacted with the IFRS adoption dummy variable. Their study is 
conducted using a sample of 910 bank-year observations related to 91 European banks over 1999-
2008.  
Relatively few studies have focused exclusively on financial firms in examining the changes in 
the value relevance of financial statement as a result of IFRS adoption. Agostino et al. (2011) 
evaluate the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on financial institutions listed in 15 countries in 
the EEA over 2000-2006. They use the price model with an interaction dummy variable for IFRS 
adoption to evaluate the impact of IFRS adoption on the valuation coefficients of book value of 
equity and earnings separately. Agostino et al. also compare the explanatory power of the price 
model between the two periods of interest, pre-IFRS adoption and IFRS adoption. Their findings 
suggest that the value relevance of earnings has increased following IFRS adoption for a sample 
of 1,201 financial firm-year observations. For equity book value, the results are less clear-cut. 
Moreover, the model explanatory power (R-squared), as a measure of the combined value 
relevance of book value of equity and net income, tends to be higher after IFRS adoption 
suggesting an increase in the value relevance following the implementation of IFRS. In addition, 
they run the price model for five countries, namely Denmark, Italy, France, Germany and the 
UK. The largest increase in the value relevance of earnings reported for Germany and Italy and 
the smallest for the firms in the UK. They interpret these results by suggesting that IFRS require 
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more disclosure in comparison to local GAAP in continental European countries than in common 
law countries; and the quality of financial statements reported under the UK GAAP is at least as 
high as that of financial statements prepared based on IFRS. However, the subsample of Danish 
banks shows an opposite direction to the entire sample results as the value of book value of equity 
(earnings) has increased (decreased) following the mandatory introduction of IFRS. 
Similarly, a more recent study by Manganaris et al. (2015) assesses the change in the value 
relevance of equity book value and earnings as a result of IFRS adoption. The sample comprises 
of 2,223 firm-year observations related to 178 financial firms listed in 15 European countries (in 
the EEA) over 1998-2011. They employ the price model where accounting information is 
interacted with a dummy variable for IFRS adoption. The study shows that there is a significant 
increase in the value relevance of earnings and a significant decrease in that of equity book value 
after mandating IFRS. In a further analysis, they investigate the influence of the legal origin and 
the level of legal enforcement at country level on the post-IFRS value relevance. The findings 
suggest that IFRS adoption has not resulted in a significant change in the value relevance of the 
French and German-origin groups, while it has a positive (negative) impact on the value relevance 
of book equity book value and earnings of Scandinavian (English) group. Firms in countries with 
high level of enforcement present greater value relevant book value of equity and earnings 
following IFRS adoption. It is worth mentioning that Manganaris et al. do not address the change 
in the combined value relevance of book value of equity and earnings following IFRS adoption. 
The next section reviews published studies examining the changes in the accounting information 
quality during the crisis period.  
2.2.2 Value relevance and the financial crisis 
An early study by Barth et al. (1998a) evaluates the impact of firms’ financial health on the 
valuation coefficients of equity book value and net income. The study is conducted based on a 
sample of 396 US firms that filed for bankruptcy and delisted over 1974-1993. Firstly, they run 
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a regression of market value on both equity book value and reported net income for each of the 
five years before bankruptcy. The results show that the valuation coefficient of equity book value 
increases over the period of five years. At the other extreme, the estimated coefficient on net 
income appears to decrease over the same period. Second, using a larger and pooled sample of 
17,966 firm-year observation in the US, they test the value relevance of the balance sheet and 
income statements conditional on firm’s financial health. The price model includes an interaction 
dummy variable coded one for firms with lower financial health (based on actual or effective 
bond ratings) and 0 otherwise over 1988-1993.The findings indicate that for less financially 
healthy firms the coefficient on interaction between the dummy variable and book value of equity 
is positive and significant, while the corresponding interaction with net income is negative and 
significant. Overall, firm’s financial health appears to have an impact on the valuation role of 
book value of equity (increase) and reported net income (decrease). 
Graham et al. (2000) examine the incremental value relevance of book value of equity and net 
income as a result of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Based on a sample of 8,116 quarter-firm 
observations in Thailand, the authors run a regression of firms’ market value on book value of 
equity and net income then the market value on each of them separately. They decompose the 
explanatory power of the main regression (i.e. that includes book value and earnings) into the 
incremental component attributable to equity book value, that attributable to net income and the 
component common to both equity book value and net income. That is, the incremental value 
relevance of equity book value (net income) is calculated by subtracting the relative value 
relevance of net income (equity book value) from the total value relevance. The study covers the 
period from the third quarter of 1992 to the first quarter of 1998. To study the impact of financial 
crisis, they apply the study to a sub-period of the four quarters before July 1997 (pre-crisis period) 
and to the four quarters after July 1997 (crisis period) with a total sample of 2,947 observations. 
Whereas the incremental value relevance of equity book value increases, that of net income 
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decreases when the Asian financial crisis hit. The results, thus, support the prediction of different 
valuation roles of equity book value and net income figures surrounding the financial crisis.  
Similarly, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) examine the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the value 
relevance of equity book value and net income in four countries. The study employs a sample of 
158 listed firms in Indonesia, 217 in South Korea, 271 in Malaysia and 389 in Thailand. The 
firms’ data are collected for two years, 1996 as pre-financial crisis year and 1997 as the year of 
Asian financial crisis. The market value is regressed on the book value of equity and net income 
with an interaction dummy variable for the financial crisis. Furthermore, The authors evaluate 
the crisis effect after including variables to measure country-level institutional environment as 
well as the type of accounting regime (investor-oriented versus tax-based financial reporting 
standards). Their results indicate different effects of financial crisis in different countries. More 
specifically, during the financial crisis in Indonesia and Thailand, the value relevance of earnings 
decreases, whereas the value relevance of book value increases. Moving to Malaysia, the 
estimated coefficients on both earnings and book value decreased when the crisis hit. In Korea, 
there is not a significant impact of the financial crisis on the valuation coefficients of book value 
of equity and reported earnings. Further analysis shows that country-specific institutional factors 
play a role in the extent of changes in the value relevance of equity book value (decrease with 
weak investor protection), but not earnings. Finally, they found that accounting system, classified 
either inventor-oriented or tax-based, affects the extent of changes in the value relevance of equity 
book value as a result of crisis.  
One of the limitations in Davis-Friday et al.’s study is that the country-level variables, on one 
hand, and the accounting and market variables, on the other hand, are from different periods. 
Firms’ financial statements information and market values are for 1996 and 1997, whereas 
country-level variables are drawn from the work of La Porta et al. (1998) and Saudagaran and 
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Diga (1997) using data from different time periods.14 This is expected to result in a less powerful 
test of the effect of country-level institutional environment on the value relevance of book value 
of equity and net income. The present thesis addresses this concern by using data on country-
level variables from the same period of accounting and market data. In addition this thesis extends 
the work of Davis-Friday et al. (2006) by using corporate governance measures that vary at firm 
level and might have an effect on the value relevance during the financial crisis (see Section 
3.2.4). 
A branch of studies questions whether a financial crisis affects the value relevance of specific 
components of the balance sheet and income statement. Fen et al. (2010), for example, reports a 
significant decrease in the value relevance of net income components (the valuation gain/loss on 
financial instruments, and net income number after the deduction of valuation gain/loss). The 
results for book value are less clear-cut as it varies based on industry classification. Using the 
price model with an interaction dummy variable for the crisis period, the study covers the period 
from the first quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2009 using a sample of 4,102 firm-quarter 
observations in Taiwan. The valuation gain/loss on financial instruments is added as independent 
variables after deduction from the net income; the same is applied to unrealised gain/loss on 
financial instruments and equity book value.  
In the same spirit, Choi et al. (2011) investigate the changes in the value relevance of reported 
net income and its components around the Asian financial crisis 1997-1998. The analysis is 
conducted by a regression of stock return on the different components of earnings with an 
interaction dummy variable representing the crisis period. They run the study models for a sample 
of 10,406 firm-years related to firms listed in nine Asian countries15 from 1995 to 2000. In the 
period of financial crisis, the empirical evidence reveals a significant decline in the value 
                                                          
14 For example the rule of law from La Porta et al. (1998) is calculated using data from 1982-1995. Saudagaran and 
Diga (1997) report country level audit reporting quality based on sources from 1995. 
15Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
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relevance of discretionary accruals but no significant change in that of non-discretionary 
earnings. Based on La Porta et al.’s (1997) legal enforcement score they found that the decrease 
in the value relevance of discretionary accruals over the crisis period was more severe for the 
firms listed in the countries with low enforcement level. Additionally, at firm level, the results 
indicate a greater decline in the value relevance of discretionary accruals and operating cash flows 
for firms with high information asymmetries than for firms with low information asymmetries. 
In addition to using only one proxy to measure the institutional business environment, another 
limitation of Choi et al.’s study is that the institutional variable data are from different period of 
the accounting and market information.  
Another stream of accounting literature investigates the impact of the financial crisis on the 
quality of accounting information through earnings management. For instance, Filip and 
Raffournier (2012) investigate the impact of financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 on the accounting 
information quality of European firms. They use a sample of 8,266 firms in 16 European countries 
in the EEA and Switzerland over 2006-2009. Two metrics of income smoothing coupled with 
three accrual quality measures are used in the study. Compared to the pre-crisis period, the 
findings suggest a decrease in earnings management during the financial crisis. However, this is 
not the case for all the countries represented in their sample. Also, the findings suggest that 
country-specific factors (institutional and market factors) are associated with income smoothing 
metrics, but that is not the case with accrual quality measures. 
In addition to earnings management, Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) examine whether there has been 
any change in the value relevance during the period surrounding the financial crisis in Europe. 
Their analysis is focused on firms audited by a Big 4 auditor16 and listed in five European 
countries, namely Greece (138 firms), Ireland (44 firms), Italy (242 firms), Portugal (46 firms), 
and Spain (112 firms) over the period from 2005 to 2011. Earnings management is measured 
                                                          
16 Big 4 auditors are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and KPMG.  
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based on discretionary accruals and value relevance based on the explanatory power of the price 
model. For both measures of accounting quality, the results are not conclusive and tend to vary 
across countries. For instance, Portuguese and Greek firms reported lower value relevant 
financial statements in the crisis years compared to the pre-crisis period. In contrast, the value 
relevance of financial reporting tends to be higher after the crisis hit in Ireland, Italy and Spain.  
An area for accounting discretion during the time of financial crisis is the timing of financial 
firms’ actual write-downs of assets. Vyas (2011) introduces a measure to capture the timing of 
actual write downs, and then compares it to the devaluation that is implied in exposure-specific 
credit indices such the ABX. For a sample of 66 US financial firms that reported write downs in 
the period 2007-2008, the author reports that actual write-downs are generally less timely 
compared to the devaluation implied by credit indices; and in general the timeliness of write-
downs tend to vary across banks. In line with the notion that there is an association between 
corporate governance and accounting information quality, the study shows that firms with strong 
corporate governance mechanisms tend to report more timely write downs. 
Focusing also on financial firms, Cohen et al. (2014) study the earnings management behaviour 
by banks during the financial crisis. The study is conducted based on a sample comprising of all 
listed banks in the US during the 1997 through 2009.The overall sample consists of 4,112 bank-
year observations. The main model is the regression of crash risk17 on the level of earnings 
management with an interaction dummy variables representing the period of financial crisis. 
Earnings management is measured by its two components, LLPs and securities gain/loss 
management. Their findings suggest that earnings management by banks has little effect on 
downside risk during pre-crisis period, but appears to have a big impact in times of financial 
crisis.  
                                                          
17 Crash risk is assigned a value of 1 if in any week in that year the firm-specific return is less than −3.09 times the 
bank-specific standard deviation. 
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In part of their study, Beccalli et al. (2015) investigate earnings management behaviour using 
LLPs by European banks. The study is conducted using a sample of 487 bank-quarter 
observations related to 55 banks domiciled in 13 EEA countries and Switzerland over 2004-2008. 
The level of earnings management is measured by the residuals from a regression of LLP on the 
business activities that determinate LLPs (previous LLPs, bank performance and capital 
regulation, in addition to several environmental factors). The empirical analysis shows that banks 
tend to engage in earnings management activities via LLPs before the crisis but not in the crisis 
period. In particular, they find that earnings management activities are positively associated with 
higher probability of meeting or beating analyst consensus only for the pre-crisis period. 
Furthermore, the study documents no statistical association between earnings management 
activities and cumulative adjusted returns. 
2.2.3 Value relevance and institutional environment 
The value relevance of the summary measures of the balance sheet versus the income statement 
might vary across countries according to the characteristics of legal and institutional business 
environment. A stream of literature classifies accounting system based on the characteristics of 
legal systems, mainly into two groups, common law and code law (see, for instance, Joos and 
Lang, 1994; Leuz et al., 2003; Barth et al., 2012). In the countries where the legal system is 
classified as common law, such as the UK and the US, financial reporting practices are mainly 
determined by private sector bodies; and shareholders are the main sources of financing through 
regulated markets. The purpose of accounting standards therefore is to satisfy the information 
needs of existing and potential investors. On the other hand, banks and government are the main 
providers of capital in code law countries, like for example France and Germany. Thus, 
accounting standards are set to provide information mainly for taxation purposes since investors 
often have access to private information with less reliance on financial statements. 
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Common law countries are characterised by strong protection for outsiders compared to their 
code law counterparts. Thus accounting standards are expected to be of higher quality in common 
law countries. Based on this argument, Black and White (2003) examine the variation in the 
relative value relevance of equity book value and net income across countries, namely, Germany, 
Japan and the US. After excluding the financial institutions, the study sample consists of 36,143 
firm-year observations for firms listed in the countries under study over the period from 1986 to 
1998. The empirical results indicate that book value of equity seems to be of more value relevant 
relative to net income in Germany. For the US firms net income appears to be more value relevant 
for positive earnings and large firms, while for Japanese firms the results are less clear-cut. 
A number of previous studies classifies countries into common law and code law in investigating 
the impact of IFRS adoption on the quality of accounting information. IFRS are largely developed 
based on accounting standards in common law countries (Bartov et al., 2005; Barth et al., 2014). 
IFRS are therefore expected to have more positive influence on the value relevance of code law 
countries (Bartov et al., 2005, Armstrong et al., 2010). In line with this expectation, Prather-
Kinsey et al. (2008) find a stronger effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the value relevance of 
accounting information as well as cost of capital for code law group in comparison to common 
law group. They employ the price model for a sample of 157 companies from 15 EAA countries 
and Switzerland in 2004 and 2006.  
A similar study by Lourenço and Curto (2008) uses a sample of 348 firms listed in France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. Their study covers the period of two years 
pre-IFRS adoption (2003-2004) and first two year of mandatory IFRS adoption (2005-2006). By 
employing the price model, the empirical evidence indicates that the quality of accounting 
information tends to be higher in common law countries before the mandatory introduction of 
IFRS. Also, the results suggest an increase in the value relevance of accounting information after 
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IFRS adoption in all countries with the exception of Germany and Italy characterised by low level 
of shareholder protection.  
Clarkson et al. (2011) assess the changes in the value relevance of accounting information 
following IFRS adoption for a sample of 3,488 firms in 14 EEA countries and Australia, where 
countries are divided into two groups, common law and code law countries. Based on the price 
model, the results show that there has been no improvement in the value relevance for both sub-
samples of code law and common law countries. However, country-by-country analysis shows 
mixed results.  
Overall, the studies reviewed about emphasise the importance of considering country-specific 
factors when studying the value relevance of financial statement information. 
A line of research investigates whether the institutional environment characteristics are associated 
with accounting quality of financial firms. Fonseca and Gonzàlez (2008), for instance, examine 
the determinants of income smoothing using LLPs for a sample of 3,221 bank-year observations 
from 40 countries, including both developed and developed countries. LLPs are regressed on 
previous LLPs, earnings before taxes and LLP, change in total loans, loan-losses allowance, bank 
capital and GDP in addition to the explanatory variables of interest. The study documents that 
the level of income smoothing is determined by investor protection (measured by rights of 
minority shareholders, creditor rights and legal enforcement from La Porta et al. (1998)), 
disclosure quality, bank regulation and supervision, financial structure and financial 
development. The analysis shows that lower income smoothing is associated with the strength of 
investor protection, the quality of accounting disclosure, official and private supervision and 
restrictions on bank activities. In contrast, a higher level of income smoothing is associated with 
market orientation and the development of the financial system at country level. 
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More relevant to this thesis, Anandarajan et al. (2011) study the impact of institutional 
environment and firm-specific characteristics on the value relevance of accounting information. 
They use the following country-level measure: the role of transparency, corporate environment, 
legal environment (as common law or code law), financing environment, economic environment, 
market competitive environment, accounting standards, bank regulatory and governance 
environment. The firm-level characteristics are size, risk, non-traditional activities and 
multinational status. Their study is conducted based on a sample of 813 financial firms from 38 
countries from both developed and developing economies over 1993-2004. Anandarajan et al. 
use the explanatory power as well as the coefficients on the independent variable from value 
relevance models (where market value is regressed on book value of equity and then on net 
income and finally on both book value of equity and net income using quarterly data) as a proxy 
for the extent of value relevance. This proxy then is regressed on different country-level as well 
as firm-level characteristics. Their results suggest that transparency has a significant impact on 
the value relevance of both earnings and book value, and on the combined value relevance. 
Similar results are reported for corporate environment. Book value of equity and net income tend 
to be more value relevant in common law countries. Another significant impact on value 
relevance of accounting information is the accounting standards followed. At firm level, the 
organisational form and risk appear to have the most impact. Furthermore, book value of equity 
tend to have greater explanatory power for firms in bank-based, code law countries, whereas 
reported earnings have more explanatory power in common law countries with marked-based 
economies.  
In a more recent study, Curico and Hasan (2015) report differences in the use of LLPs by banks 
across Eurozone versus non-Eurozone banks. The analysis is mainly carried out for a sample of 
491 banks in Europe over the period from 1996 to 2006. The main model is similar to that adopted 
by the study of Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011), reviewed above. Overall, the results show 
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that LLPs reported by banks reflect the changes in the expected quality of loan portfolio. LLPs 
are used for earnings management purposes for Eurozone banks, but not for non-Eurozone banks. 
Banks in non-Eurozone use LLPs to convey private information to outsiders, while this is not the 
case for those in Eurozone. Also, restrictions on bank activities as well as stronger creditors’ 
protection are found to help in reducing income smoothing. In a further analysis, they investigate 
the banks’ behaviour regarding the use of LLPs for a subsample of 195 banks over the financial 
crisis period. They report some evidence that for banks in Eurozone LLPs become pro-cyclical 
and are not used for the purpose of income smoothing. In contrast, their counterpart banks in non-
Eurozone tend to use LLPs for income smoothing but not for capital management or to signal 
private information to the market participants. 
2.2.4 Value relevance and corporate governance 
A large stream of existing accounting research has investigated whether firm-level corporate 
governance factors has an influence on earnings management behaviour, which is likely to affect 
other measures of accounting information quality.18 For instance, Frankel et al. (2002) evaluate 
whether there is an association between auditor fees and earnings management. After excluding 
financial firms, the study is conducted based on a sample of 3,074 US firms in 2001. The findings 
indicate a significant positive relation between non-audit fees and the likelihood of reporting a 
small earnings surprise. Furthermore, they find that there is a negative association between audit 
fees and the level of earnings management.  
 Similarly but focusing on the characteristics of board of directors and audit committee, Klein 
(2002) examines the relationship between the percentage of independent directors in both the 
board of directors and the audit committee, on one hand, and the level of earnings management, 
on the other hand. The chosen sample includes 692 US non-financial firm-year observations from 
                                                          
18 Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) report that firms with more earnings management are associated with lower value 
relevance of earnings as well as lower combined value relevance of book value of equity and earnings. Moreover, 
they find an increase in the value relevance of book value of equity when the value relevance of net income decreases. 
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the firms listed on the S&P 500 in 1992 and 1993. The result suggests a negative association 
between audit committee independence and earnings management. In the same line, there is a 
negative relation between the percentage of independent directors in the board and the level of 
earnings management. In the same spirit, Xie et al. (2003) find that more independent directors 
in the board as well as the presence of corporate executives and investment bankers on audit 
committees are likely to be associated with lower level of earnings management. Furthermore, 
the analysis shows that the number of both board and audit committee meetings is also associated 
with a reduced extent of earnings management. They use a sample of 282 US firm-year 
observations for firms from the S&P 500 index over three years: 1992, 1994 and 1996. 
 In the Canadian context, Park and Shin (2004) examine the impact of board composition on 
earnings management behaviour. Using a sample of 539 firm-year observations over 1991-1997, 
the empirical findings suggest that the higher percentage of non-executive directors does not 
appear to reduce the level of earnings management. Yet firms with non-executive directors from 
financial firms (i.e. financially sophisticated directors) are found to engage less in earnings 
management. Likewise, the board representation of active institutional shareholders tends to be 
associated with lower earnings management. Therefore, they conclude that the presence of 
independent directors by itself may not result in lower earnings management. This is particularly 
true for firms with highly concentrated ownership. 
The impact of firm-level corporate governance practices on the value relevance of accounting 
information is typically investigated focusing on specific financial statement items, such as fair 
values. Yet there is little evidence from the impact of corporate governance on the valuation of 
equity book value and earrings. A study by Larcker et al. (2007) investigates the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics of a firm and the value relevance of accounting 
information measured by the explanatory power of the price model. Larcker et al. evaluate the 
association between the use of a large set of corporate governance factors and various accounting 
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and economic measures. The study is conducted using a sample of 2,106 US firms, including 
both financial and non-financial firms, between June 2002 and May 2003. The results report a 
very mixed set of associations between the governance factors used and different accounting 
quality measures. In terms of value relevance, the percentage of affiliated directors in the board 
of directors and audit committee is associated with lower value relevance, while the existence of 
directors over 70 years old is associated with higher level of value relevance.  
In a more recent study focusing on earnings management, Kent et al. (2010) analyses the 
association between the characteristics of the board of directors and the audit committee, on one 
hand, and earnings management, on the other. The sample comprises of 392 firm-year 
observations in Australia over 2001-2005, and the corporate governance data is based on 2004 
annual reports. The corporate governance variables include the percentage of independent 
directors serving on the board of directors, Chief Executive Officer duality, and the percentage 
of independent directors in the audit committee, the number of audit committee meetings and the 
proportion of audit committee members with professional accounting qualifications. The results 
show that strong corporate governance is associated with higher quality earnings. 
Finally, in a study relevant to this thesis, Verriest et al. (2013) examine the association between 
first time IFRS adoption quality and disclosure, on one hand, and corporate governance strength, 
on the other. The study uses a sample of 223 European firms, 71 of which are financial firms, 
located in 15 countries (14 EEA countries and Switzerland) and adopted IFRS in 2005 for the 
first time. The first time IFRS adoption properties are measured in three ways. Firstly, it is 
measured by companies’ transparency regarding the reconciliations from local GAAP to IFRS. 
Then it is measured by the amount and type of information firms provide in their financial reports 
with respect to specific IFRS, including IAS 39. Finally, it is represented by the flexibility 
exercised in early adopting versus postponing the adoption of IAS 39. The corporate governance 
data are drawn from the Risk Metrics corporate database. In a further analysis, Verriest et al. 
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emphasise three specific corporate governance characteristics at firm-level derived from the same 
database: the functioning of the board of directors, the independence of the board of directors and 
the effectiveness of the audit committee. By regressing IFRS adoption quality and disclosure 
measures on corporate governance factors, they found that firms characterised by stronger 
corporate governance mechanisms seem to provide more transparent reconciliation information. 
In addition, the strong corporate governance results in more extensive information disclosure on 
both mandatory and voluntary adoption items. Regarding IAS39 adoption, the results show that 
firms tend to be opportunistic in adopting that standard: they appear to postpone the adoption 
when there is bad news. Again, strong corporate governance results in early adoption of IAS 39 
in the case of bad news. Furthermore, firms with more board independence and effective audit 
committee appear to provide higher quality accounting information.  
2.2.5 Discussion and summary on the impact of IFRS and the crisis on value relevance  
Value relevance is considered as the ability of accounting information to capture or summarise 
information, regardless of source, that has an effect on market value of equity (Francis and 
Schipper, 1999). Operationally, the value relevance is measured by the statistical association 
between market value of equity and accounting information (Barth et al., 2001). Previous studies 
find evidence that differences in accounting practice can cause differences in the value relevance 
of financial statement to investors both at the national and international level (see, e.g., Dobija 
and Klimczak, 2010; Barth et al., 2008).  
Accordingly, the accounting literature investigates the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
accounting information quality through the changes in the explanatory power of the value 
relevance models. In a single country context, some of these studies report an increase in the 
value relevance of accounting information following the mandatory introduction of IFRS, for 
instance, Filip (2010) in Romania and Liu et al. (2011) in China. Other studies show empirical 
findings of little increase or no significant changes in the value relevance. Example of these 
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studies are Gjerde et al. (2008) in Norway, Paananen (2008) in Sweden, Dobija and Klimczak 
(2010) in Poland, Chalmers et al. (2011) in Australia, and Karampinis and Hevas (2011) as well 
as Tsalavoutas et al. (2012) in Greece. Interestingly, Morais and Curto (2008) document a 
decrease in the value relevance after IFRS adoption in Portugal. Oliveira et al. (2010) report a 
decrease in the value relevance of earnings compared to no effect on that of equity book value 
following the implementation of IFRS by Portuguese firms in 2005. 
This suggests that many factors may affect the quality of accounting information rather than 
accounting standards such as incentives, enforcement, and ownership structure (Ball, 2006; 
Holthausen, 2009). The studies reviewed above are conducted using a single country sample, 
allowing them to control for internationally different and confounding factors. This in turn 
enhances the power of the test and improves the reliability of their findings. However, the results 
of a single country study are less generalisable to other countries context. In this thesis, the 
relatively small number of financial firms in many of the countries under study does not offer 
sufficient number of observations to conduct single country studies.  
Moving to multi-country studies, Devalle et al. (2010) provide evidence that there has been an 
increase in the value relevance after IFRS adoption in 2005 for firms listed on five European 
stock exchanges. However, the empirical findings by Aubert and Grudnitski (2011) indicate an 
insignificant change in the value relevance of accounting information when it is prepared in 
accordance with IFRS rather than domestic accounting standards based on a large sample of listed 
firms in 14 EEA countries and Switzerland. Similarly, Clarkson et al. (2011) report no 
improvements in the value relevance following IFRS adoption using a sample of 3,488 firms in 
14 EEA countries and Australia. 
Previous research provides mixed evidence regarding the impact of IFRS adoption on the value 
relevance in both single and multi-country studies. Notably, most of them include firms from a 
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wide spectrum of industries in their selected samples (e.g. Gjerde et al., 2008; Devalle et al., 
2010; Aubert and Grudnitski, 2011; Chalmers et al., 2011), which might explain some of these 
ambiguous results, as observed by Anandarajan et al. (2011). In addition, many previous studies 
exclude financial firms from their sample due to their distinct characteristics, such as Oliveira et 
al. (2010), Liu et al. (2011) and Tsalavoutas et al. (2012). Taken together, this motivates this 
thesis to shed the light on the impact of IFRS adoption on a single industry, namely financial 
firms. 
A stream of accounting studies investigates the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) under IFRS 
regime (i.e. IAS 39) compared to the local accounting standard. Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas 
(2011) and Leventis et al. (2011) report a decline in the use of LLPs as a tool of earnings 
management of European banks following the mandatory introduction of IFRS in 2005. 
Reviewing the literature shows few studies that exclusively focus on financial firms in 
investigating the impact of IFRS adoption on the overall value relevance of book value of equity 
and earnings. Based on the early years of adoption, a study by Agostino et al. (2011) suggests an 
increase in the overall value relevance of financial statement information following IFRS 
adoption for a sample of financial firms in the EEA. Moreover, they find that the value relevance 
of earnings increases following IFRS, whereas for equity book value the results are less clear-
cut. Consistently, a more recent study by Manganaris et al. (2015) using a longer time horizon 
reports an increase in the value relevance of earrings in comparison to a decrease on that of book 
value of equity after IFRS adoption by a sample of financial firms in the EEA. While their results 
suggest a shift in the value relevance of equity book value and net income with IFRS adoption, 
Manganaris et al. have not tested the changes in the overall value relevance of book value of 
equity and earnings as a result of IFRS adoption, which is the focus of this study. 
This research contributes to the existing literature by extending the study period to cover eight 
years after IFRS adoption rather the early years of adoption, as for example in Agostino et al. 
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(2011). The change in the quality of accounting information as a result of IFRS adoption might 
be more noticeable in the medium to long-term rather than in the earlier years of adoption (Callao 
et al., 2007; Kvall and Nobes, 2010; Kvall and Nobes, 2012; Houqe et al., 2012). Also, it might 
be interesting to evaluate whether there has been any change in the value relevance of financial 
statement information during the most recent financial crisis. Hence, this thesis further 
investigates the influence of the financial crisis on two summary measures of financial 
statements: book value of equity and earnings.  
The financial crisis is expected to have an impact on the value relevance of accounting 
information; an early study by Barth et al. (1998a) finds that the valuation coefficient of equity 
book value increases over the period of five years preceding bankruptcy, while that of net income 
tends to decrease over the same period for a sample of US firms. Graham et al. (2000) document 
that whereas the incremental value relevance of equity book value increases, that of net income 
decreases following the Asian financial crisis for a sample of listed firms in Thailand. In a multi-
country context, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) report that the effect of financial crisis on the value 
relevance of equity book value and earnings varies across Asian countries. 
A branch of studies questions whether the financial crisis affects the value relevance of specific 
items in the balance sheet and income statement. Fen et al. (2010), for instance, document a 
significant decrease in the value relevance of net income components, while the results for book 
value components are less clear-cut and vary across industries in Taiwan. In the same line, Choi 
et al. (2011) provide empirical findings that there is a significant decline in the value relevance 
of discretionary accruals but no significant change in that of non-discretionary earnings 
components for a sample from nine Asian countries. 
Filip and Raffournier (2012) show a decrease in earnings management during the financial crisis 
using a sample of listed firms in 16 European countries in the EEA and Switzerland. However, 
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Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) document that the effect of financial crisis on the accounting 
information quality, measured by earnings management and value relevance, varies across five 
European countries. Focusing on financial firms, Cohen et al. (2014) shows that US banks 
showing earnings management behaviour before a financial crisis are more likely to experience 
downside risk during a crisis period. However, the study of Beccalli et al. (2015) finds that banks 
in Europe tend to engage in earnings management activities via LLPs before the crisis but not in 
the crisis period. Examining the accounting discretion in terms of write-downs, Vyas (2011) 
report that write-downs of assets by US financial firms tend to be less timely than a benchmark 
developed using the devaluation implied by credit indices.  
The value relevance of equity book value and earnings might vary across countries owing to the 
differences in their legal and institutional environment. A long line of accounting research 
classifies an accounting system based on the origin of the legal system in its home country into 
common law versus code law systems (e.g. Joos and Lang, 1994; Leuz et. al., 2003; Barth et al., 
2012). This common versus code law distinction is based on the view that the purpose of 
accounting standards in the former is to satisfy the information needs of existing and potential 
investors, while in the later to provide information mainly for taxation purposes. Consistent with 
this argument, Black and White (2003) report a variation in the value relevance of equity book 
value and net income across three countries, namely, Germany, Japan and the US in 1997.  
A number of previous studies classifies countries into common law and code law in investigating 
the value relevance of accounting information. An example is the literature on the impact of IFRS 
adoption on the quality of accounting information. Since IFRS have been largely developed in 
common law countries, it is expected that IFRS adoption to have more significant impact on the 
financial reporting in code law countries (Bartov et al., 2005, Armstrong et al., 2010; Barth et al., 
2014). Prather-Kinsey et al. (2008) document results in line with this expectation for a sample of 
European firms. Lourenço and Curto (2008) report an increase in the value relevance of 
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accounting information after IFRS adoption in European countries with the exception of 
Germany and Italy characterised by low level of shareholder protection. However, the results of 
Clarkson et al. (2011) suggest no improvement in the value relevance for both sub-samples of 
code law and common law countries.  
A line of research investigates whether the institutional environment characteristics are associated 
with accounting quality of financial firms. For example, Fonseca and Gonzàlez (2008) find that 
earnings smoothing activities using LLPs are associated with investor protection, disclosure 
quality, bank regulation and supervision, financial structure and financial development. More 
relevant to this thesis, Anandarajan et al. (2011) use a sample of 813 financial intermediaries 
from 38 countries over the period 1993-2004. They find that institutional environment and firm-
specific characteristics have an impact on the value relevance of accounting information. In a 
recent study, Curico and Hasan (2015) report differences in the use of LLPs by banks across 
Eurozone versus non-Eurozone banks. Interestingly, they find that for Eurozone banks LLPs 
become pro-cyclical and are not used for the purpose of income smoothing during the financial 
crisis. In contrast, LLPs are used for income smoothing but not for capital management or to 
signal private information to outsiders in the crisis period for banks in non-Eurozone. 
As with institutional factors, corporate governance practices are expected to have an influence on 
the value relevance of book value of equity and net income surrounding financial crisis. In fact, 
a large stream of previous accounting research examines whether firm-level corporate 
governance factors have an impact on accounting information quality, with special emphasis on 
earnings management.19 For instance, Frankel et al. (2002) find a negative association between 
audit fees and the level of earnings management. In the same context, Klein (2002) reports a 
negative association between the percentage of independent directors in both board of directors 
                                                          
19 Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) find an association between the level of earnings management and the value 
relevance of accounting information.  
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and audit committee and the level of earnings management. Xie et al. (2003) document that more 
independent directors in the board as well as the presence of corporate executives and investment 
bankers on audit committees are likely to be associated with lower level of earnings management. 
However, for a sample of Canadian firms, Park and Shin (2004) find that the presence of 
independent directors by itself may not result in lower earnings management, and that is 
particularly true for firms with highly concentrated ownership. A more recent study by Kent et 
al. (2010) in Australian context suggests that strong corporate governance mechanisms are 
asscoiated with higher quality accruals. 
The literature typically investigates the impact of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms 
on the value relevance of specific financial statement items, such as fair values; yet there is little 
research that addresses the impact on the valuation of equity book value and earrings.  
A study by Larcker et al. (2007) investigates the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the value relevance of accounting information, measured by the explanatory 
power of the price model. In their study, the afflicted positions of director in the board of directors 
and audit committee are found to be associated with lower value relevance, while the existence 
of old directors is associated with higher level of value relevance. 
Verriest et al. (2013) document that firms characterised by stronger corporate governance seem 
to provide more transparent IFRS restatements in the first year of IFRS adoption. Also, the results 
show that firms tend to be opportunistic in adopting IAS 39: they appear to postpone the adoption 
when there is bad news. Again, strong corporate governance results in early adoption of IAS 39 
in case of bad news. In terms of accounting discretion in the timing of write-downs, Vyas (2011) 
finds that financial firms with strong corporate governance report more timely write downs of 
assets during the financial crisis.   
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PART II 
2.3 Literature review on value relevance of fair value hierarchy 
2.3.1 Fair value studies before SFAS No. 157 and IFRS 7 
2.3.1.1 US literature 
Over the last three decades, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has issued and 
developed several accounting standards20 to expand the use of fair value measurements and 
enhance the disclosure about fair value estimates. The majority of these standards address 
financial assets and liabilities (financial instruments) that are widely held by financial firms. The 
accounting literature investigates whether disclosed fair value estimates provide investors with 
incremental value relevant information relative to the book value of financial instruments based 
on historical cost (amortised cost). Early studies investigate the voluntary disclosure of fair value 
estimates of investment securities (prior to the mandatory disclosure in accordance with SFAS 
No. 107 effective in 1992). For example, Barth (1994) examines whether the disclosed fair value 
estimates as well as fair value gains and losses, in comparison to historical cost, of banks’ 
investment securities are reflected in the market value of equity. Over the period from 1971 to 
1990 and for a sample of 100 US banks, equity market value is regressed on the book value of 
equity (decomposed into book value of equity before investment securities and historical cost of 
investment securities) and the disclosed fair value of investment securities. Similarly, stock 
returns are regressed on the change in net income (before investment securities), securities gains 
and losses based on historical costs and unrecognised fair value securities gains and losses. The 
results suggest that fair value estimates of investment securities are positively associated with 
equity market value. For fair value gains and losses of securities, the results are mixed. This might 
be because of the measurement errors associated with the estimates of fair value gains and losses. 
Another explanation could be the correlated unrecognised gains and losses which could have 
                                                          
20Namely, SFAS No. 105, SFAS No. 107, SFAS No. 115, SFAS No. 119, and SFAS No. 133. 
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hedged the fair value gains and losses for investment securities. Another study by Barth et al. 
(1995) uses the same time period to confirm the impact of measurement errors in the analysis 
when it reports that fair value components of net income are more volatile than the part of 
historical cost, and stock price does not reflect this incremental volatility. Interestingly, Ahmed 
and Takeda (1995) support the view of omitted correlated gains and losses of other net assets. 
Using the same model for a sample of 3,276 bank quarterly observations over the period 1986-
1991, they control for the effects of other (on-balance sheet) net assets due to changes in interest 
rate. The results reveal a significant and positive association between unrecognised gains and 
losses and firm’s share return.  
Effective since 1992, FASB issued SFAS No. 107 Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial 
Instruments which requires the mandatory disclosure of fair value estimates for all financial assets 
and liabilities, whether on- or off-balance sheet. Three studies examine the decision usefulness 
of fair value disclosure based on this standard, namely, Nelson (1996), Eccher et al. (1996) and 
Barth el al. (1996). In particular, the value relevance is evaluated separately for five groups of 
financial assets and liabilities: loans, investment securities, long-term debt, deposits and off-
balance sheet items. 
Starting with Nelson (1996), she examines the fair value disclosure based on SFAS No. 107. In 
the first model, the market value of equity is regressed on book value of equity plus the difference 
between fair value estimates and book value of investment securities, net loans, deposits and 
long-term debt as well as off balance sheet financial instruments. In the second model, the stock 
return is regressed on the changes (gains and losses) in the fair value estimates. Based on a sample 
of 146 (133) US banks in 1992 (1993), the findings of the study suggest that only the fair value 
of investment securities contains value relevant information to investors.21  
                                                          
21 When other control variables for future profitability, namely return on equity and growth in book value are 
included, the fair value estimates of investment securities become value irrelevant. 
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In a similar study, Eccher et al. (1996) find that the fair value of investment securities are value 
relevant for a sample of around 300 US bank holding companies in 1992-1993. They use a model 
where the market value of equity is regressed against the difference between disclosed fair values 
and book values of available for sale and trading securities, investment securities, net loans, 
deposits, long-term debt as well as the fair value of off balance sheet items. Furthermore, the fair 
value estimates of some financial instruments provide value relevant information in limited 
settings. Specifically, the fair value estimates of net loans have a weaker association with equity 
market value in comparison to the fair value of securities, and their valuation coefficient are 
significant only in limited settings. The off balance sheet items are also value relevant in limited 
settings. Finally, the fair values of deposits are not value relevant. 
In comparison to Nelson (1996) and Eccher et al. (1996), Barth el al. (1996) find that the fair 
value estimates of net loans are value relevant to their recognised book values. In terms of 
methodological settings, they use a more powerful research design. More control variables are 
included in their model to account for the factors that might affect the value relevance of fair 
value disclosure, including non-performing loans, as well as interest-sensitive assets and 
liabilities. The market value of equity is regressed on the difference between the fair value 
disclosures based on SFAS No. 107 (for investment securities, loans, deposit, long-term debt and 
off balance sheet instruments) and reported book values. They also include in their model two 
groups of control variables, namely variables related to non-SFAS No. 107 assets and liabilities 
and variables that are potential competitors to SFAS No. 107 variables. Similarly to Nelson and 
Eccher et al., the sample consists of 136 US banks over two years: 1992 and 1993. The findings 
suggest that the fair value disclosures of investment securities, loans and long-term debt are value 
relevant to investors, but this is not the case for deposits and off-balance sheet items. Interestingly, 
the study reports that investors tend to discount the fair value estimates of loans for less 
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financially healthy banks. This can be explained by the incentive for managers of less financially 
healthy banks to overstate (understate) unrealised gains (losses).  
In sum, the reviewed studies show that the disclosed fair values of investment securities for 
financial firms, including banks, are typically found to be value relevant to investors. Investment 
securities tend to have quoted prices in active markets. However, the results regarding the other 
items are inconclusive. In relation to net loans numbers, which are largely based on estimates 
with absence of established markets, Nelson (1996) reports that estimated fair values of loans are 
not value relevant, while Eccher et al. (1996) show that these fair value estimates are value 
relevant in limited settings. Barth et al. (1996) document value relevant fair values of loans after 
including more control variables in the model. These mixed results about the fair values of loans 
raise concerns regarding the reliability of fair value estimates when active markets do not exist 
for the financial instruments. 
Another branch of fair value accounting literature examines the value relevance of expanded fair 
value disclosure on derivatives based on SFAS No. 119 Disclosure about Derivative Financial 
Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments using samples of US financial firms. The 
disclosed fair value of derivatives is considered value relevant to investors if it has a significant 
association with market value of equity (after controlling for fair values of the primary on-balance 
sheet numbers). Venkatachalam (1996), for instance, examines the value relevance of fair value 
disclosures of derivatives as off-balance sheet items. The study is conducted based on a sample 
of 99 US bank holding companies that used off-balance sheet financial derivatives over the two 
years 1993 and 1994. The results show that the fair value disclosures for derivatives explain the 
cross-sectional variation in the market value of equity for the sample of banks under investigation. 
Put differently, they provide value relevant information to investors. 
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Using a different model specification, Seow and Tam (2002) examine the disclosed fair value of 
derivatives based on SFAS No. 107 and SFAS No.119. Their model is based on a regression of 
share price returns on reported earnings in addition to variables for the recognised and disclosed 
amounts of derivatives. The sample comprises of 106 US firm-year observations over the period 
1990-1996. Regarding the fair value disclosure on derivatives, the empirical findings indicate 
that the disclosure is value relevant to investors as it is significantly associated with stock returns.  
Focusing on mutual funds, Carroll et al. (2003) evaluate the value relevance of fair value 
investment securities relative to historical cost. Using a sample of 143 US closed-end mutual 
funds over the period 1982-1997, they run a regression of market value of equity on book value 
of equity (other than investment securties) and fair value of investment securities in addition to 
their book values. Similarly, the stock returns are regressed on the fair value securities gains and 
losses after controlling for historical cost amounts in the changes specification. The results report 
a significant and positive association between market value of equity (stock return) and the fair 
value of investment securities (fair value securities gains and losses). In a further analysis, the 
authors examine whether the degree of association varies across different fund types. They find 
that even for investment securities traded in thin markets, the fair value provides value relevant 
information to investors.  
In a more recent study with a sample including data for the period of fair value recognition of 
derivatives based on SFAS No. 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities (where their fair values are disclosed before the adoption date), Ahmed et al. (2006) 
find that only the recognition, but not the disclosure, of derivative fair values provide value 
relevant information to investors. The study is conducted based on a sample of 146 US banks 
over the period 1995-2000.The specification adopted is the regression of market value of equity 
on the recognised and disclosed fair values of derivatives and the recognised values of other assets 
and liabilities in the balance sheet, in addition to a set of control variables (namely non-
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performing loans and domestic deposits minus time deposits).The analysis shows that the 
valuation coefficients on the recognised derivatives are significantly positive, whereas the 
corresponding coefficients on the disclosed derivatives are not statistically different from zero. 
As such, the study supports the view that the accounting information disclosure and recognition 
are not substitutes. 
Again, the reviewed studies show that the disclosed and recognised fair values of derivatives 
provide useful information to investors for valuation purposes. These findings contrast with 
previous studies showing that the disclosed fair values of off-balance sheet items are not value 
relevant (Nelson, 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Barth el al., 1996), which might be attributed to 
ambiguities in the fair value disclosures before SFAS No. 119 and SFAS No. 133. In addition, 
even for those traded in thin markets, Carroll et al. (2003) find that the fair values of investment 
securities provide value relevant information to investors. 
2.3.1.2 Non –US studies  
Fewer studies have investigated the relevance of fair value information to investors in a non-US 
context. An early study by Bernard et al. (1995) analyses the mark-to-market accounting practices 
in Denmark, where bank regulators have required banks’ regulatory capital to be measured using 
mark-to-market for a long period of time. In particular, the study examines the reliability of mark-
to-market accounting for loan loss provisions and price adjustments on investments and some 
off-balance sheet items. The variables under study are regressed on their lagged values, so 
correlated values over time are considered as a sign of accounting manipulation. The sample 
includes 1,035 Danish bank-year observations over the period from 1976 to 1989. The empirical 
findings reveal some evidence of manipulating loan loss provisions, but not for price adjustments 
of investments and off-balance sheet items. However, no evidence of using mark-to-market 
accounting to manipulate regulatory capital reported. Interestingly, in a further analysis Bernard 
et al. compare the mark-to-market net assets and market value of equity in two countries, 
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Denmark and the US as US banks did not use mark-to-market over their study period. The results 
suggest that, in comparison to the US, the mark-to-market net assets reported by Danish banks 
are more reliable estimates of market value of equity.  
The mandatory adoption of fair value-oriented accounting standards (i.e. IFRS) since 2005 in 
Europe allows accounting scholars to evaluate the impact of fair value accounting in a multi-
country setting. For example, Drago et al. (2013) evaluate whether the fair value estimates of 
banks’ loans provide incremental value relevant information relative to their book values (based 
on amortised cost). Using a sample of 83 listed banks in EEA countries between 2005 and 2008, 
the market value of equity is regressed on: the book value of equity, reported net income, the 
difference between book value and estimated fair value of loans, and a set of control variables 
(dummy variables for bank size, ownership, the financial crisis and country). The results indicate 
that the valuation coefficient on the difference between the book values and fair value estimates 
of loans is negative and statistically significant. In other words, the estimated fair values of loans 
disclosed in the footnotes of European banks are incrementally useful to investors beyond the 
book values of loans measured under amortised cost.  
A working paper by Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2014) examines the value relevance of three 
categories of financial instruments recognised at fair value in accordance with IAS 39, namely: 
held for trading, those that were designated at initial recognition at fair value through profit or 
loss, and available for sale. The authors argue that, compared to the other categories, financial 
assets and liabilities designated at initial recognition at fair value through profit or loss are 
considered less reliable given that they are more subject to managerial discretion and 
measurement error due to greater use of unobservable valuation inputs. Also, Fiechter and 
Novotny-Farkas investigate how country-level characteristics might affect the value relevance of 
the three categories of financial instruments. Their study uses a sample of nearly 1,000 bank-year 
observations for listed firms in 50 countries over the period 2006-2009. The model adopted is the 
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regression of market value of equity on the three categories of financial instruments under study 
after controlling for other financial statement information. The countries are classified into two 
categories, market-based and bank-based; and banks are divided based on their information 
environment.22 The empirical findings reveal lower value relevant financial instruments 
designated at initial recognition at fair value compared to those held to maturity. Bank-based 
countries are found to be associated with lower value relevance of fair values, which might be 
explained by lower enforcement level and higher measurement errors (or bias). Finally, the results 
indicate that firms characterised by high quality information environment have higher value 
relevant financial instruments designated at initial recognition at fair value through profit or loss. 
Focusing on the first year of IFRS adoption for a sample of listed firms in 14 EEA countries and 
Switzerland, Barth et al. (2014) examine the value relevance of the net income reconciliations 
from local GAPP to IFRS for both financial and non-financial firms (276 and 925, respectively). 
The findings reveal a significant positive valuation coefficient on the reconciliations from GAAP 
to IFRS for both types of firms suggesting that the disclosed reconciliations are value relevant. 
Interestingly, the findings indicate that reconciliations related to IAS 39 are value relevant only 
for financial firms but not for non-financial firms.  
Overall, in line with US studies, the main non-US literature indicates incremental value relevance 
information provided by fair value disclosure and recognition of financial assets and liabilities; 
and the value relevance of fair value measures tends to vary with the reliability of fair value 
information. Moreover, both country-level as well as firm-level characteristics seem to play a 
role in determining the value relevance of fair value estimates. 
                                                          
22A bank has a strong information environment if it has both above median analysts following and above median 
market value of equity weighted by the percentage share of dispersed ownership. 
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2.3.2 Literature review on fair value hierarchy  
2.3.2.1 Literature review on SFAS No. 157 
The US accounting standard setter, FASB, issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 157, Fair Value Measurements in 2006 (FASB 2006), effective for fiscal year starting after 
15 November 2007. In particular, SFAS No. 157 requires firms to disclose fair value assets and 
liabilities by levels that reflect the valuation inputs used to estimate fair values: level 1 is 
measured using quoted prices for identical instruments traded in active market, level 2 is 
measured based on observable market inputs other than those used in level 1 (e.g. quoted price 
for comparable financial instruments), and level 3 is estimated using non-observable inputs 
(mark-to-model). This accounting standard provides an opportunity to investigate whether the 
value relevance of fair value measures varies with the reliability of the information.  
Three recent studies examine the value relevance of fair value hierarchy under SFAS No. 157: 
Kolev (2009), Song et al. (2010) and Goh et al. (2015). In all of these US studies, the market 
value of equity is regressed on the three levels of fair values after controlling for other non-fair 
value financial statement information (i.e. non-fair value net assets as well as net income).The 
value relevance of a fair value level is measured by the valuation coefficient on that level.  
Starting with Kolev (2009), he evaluates the differences in the value relevance of fair value levels 
disclosed under SFAS No. 157. The study is conducted using a sample of 349 US financial firm-
year observations over the first two quarters of 2008. The analysis indicates that the valuation 
coefficients on fair value at level 2 and 3 are lower than the corresponding coefficient on level 1 
fair values; however, the difference is significant only for level 3 fair values. Moreover, the study 
shows lower valuation coefficients on level 2 and 3 fair values for firms characterised by having 
fewer financial experts on the audit committee and lower equity capital, as well as for those 
internally estimating their mark-to-model fair values.  
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Song et al. (2010) conduct a similar analysis to the valuation coefficients on the three levels of 
fair values for a sample of 1,260 US financial firm-year observations over the first three quarters 
of 2008. The empirical findings report higher value relevant level 1 and 2 fair value measures in 
comparison to those at level 3. Also, they find no significant difference between the valuation 
coefficients on fair values at level 1 and level 2. Furthermore, they evaluate the impact of firm-
level corporate governance mechanisms on the value relevance of fair values. In particular, six 
measures of corporate governance are used, namely the percentage of independent directors in 
the board of directors, the percentage of financial expertise serving in the audit committee, the 
number of audit committee meetings, the total percent of share held by institutional investors, the 
size of audit engagement office and whether there is a material control weaknesses problem based 
on Sarbanes-Oxley Act 302 or 404. The results support the view that strong corporate governance 
mechanisms can mitigate the information asymmetry problems associated with fair values 
classified at level 3. This, in turn, increases the reliability and the value relevance of level 3 fair 
values.  
Over a longer time span, Goh et al. (2015) investigate the value relevance of the three levels of 
fair value under SFAS No. 157. The study covers the period from 2008 to 2011 for a sample of 
6,893 firm-quarter observations for financial firms listed on the US stock markets. The empirical 
results show that the coefficient on level 3 fair values is significantly lower than those on level 1 
and 2. Moreover, the differences between the valuation coefficients tend to reduce over time (i.e. 
when market conditions improve), concluding that there is a greater concern about the liquidity 
and information risk of level 3 fair value measures during the financial crisis. Finally, 
incorporating banks capitalisation levels in the model show that lower capital adequacy ratios are 
associated with lower value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values.  
Some of marginal differences between the results of three studies reviewed above on the value 
relevance of fair value hierarchy under SFAS No. 157 might be attributed to the different samples 
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and time periods as well as some differences in the models employed (i.e. using net fair value 
assets rather than fair value assets and liabilities separately).  
Managers might use their discretion over accounting choices to engage in earnings management 
activities such as big bath accounting,23 and hence affect the quality of financial statement 
information. Consistent with this view, Fiechter, and Meyer (2010) find that managers tend to 
exercise the discretion inherent in level 3 fair values for the purpose of big bath accounting in 
times of financial crisis. Their study is conducted using a sample of 552 U.S. bank holding 
companies over the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009. They estimate 
first the nondiscretionary level 3 gains or losses by the regression of the sum of net unrealised 
gains or losses on recurring level 3 positions plus non-recurring gains or losses on a set of 
determinants24 of changes in level 3 fair values. The residuals are considered as the discretionary 
level 3 gains or losses. Then the sample is divided based on the firms’ performance (using net 
income numbers). The results show that poor pre-managed performance banks seem to report 
higher level of discretionary level 3 losses. In the subsequent period, these banks tend to switch 
from non-managed negative earnings to reported positive earnings (i.e. evidence of big bath 
accounting).  
Another branch of accounting literature sheds some light on the economic consequences and 
information risk of fair value accounting information. In this context, and focusing on the cost of 
capital, Riedl and Serafeim (2011) investigate whether level 3 fair value assets are associated 
with greater information risk and, hence, higher cost of capital, in comparison to level 1 and 2 
fair values. The information risk for each fair value level is estimated by asset-specific implied 
betas (cost of capital). The sample comprises 952 US financial firm-quarter observations from 
                                                          
23 Big bath accounting is when managers under-report earnings (overstate losses) in bad times, in order to report 
higher earnings in the future and hence increase their bonuses (Healy, 1985). 
24 The determinants are: level 3 net assets, market to book ratio, relative rank of total assets, debt to assets ratio, loan 
loss provisions before gains or losses on level 3, non-interest income before gains or losses on level 3, and time and 
sub-industry fixed effect.  
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the second quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2008. The findings indicate that the estimated 
betas for level 3 fair values are significantly higher than those for either level 1 or 2 fair values, 
implying a higher cost of capital related to level 3 fair values. In an additional analysis, the main 
sample is partitioned into firms with higher-quality information as opposed to lower-quality 
information environments based on four proxies.25 They find that firms’ information environment 
plays a critical role in decreasing the differences in information risk across the levels of fair value 
hierarchy.  
Another study by Liao et al. (2013) investigates the association between the three levels of fair 
value hierarchy based on SFAS No. 157 and information asymmetry. They use bid-ask spread as 
a proxy for information asymmetry for a sample of 2,856 US bank-quarter observations spanning 
through Quarter 1 2008 to Quarter 4 2009. The bid-ask spread26 is regressed on the three levels 
of fair values with a set of control variables. The results show a positive association between bid-
ask spread and fair value net assets, and the extent of the association varies across the three levels 
of fair value hierarchy. In particular, the association is found to be the lowest for fair values 
classified at level 1 and the highest for those at level 3. Also, they report a decrease in bid-ask 
spread after SFAS No. 157 adoption. In sum, the study reveals that the disclosure of fair values 
hierarchy provides investor with useful information, but information uncertainty varies with the 
three levels of fair value.  
Similarly, Huang et al. (2015) examine the association between cost of equity capital27 and the 
three levels of fair value. The model specification is the regression of cost of capital on the three 
levels of fair value in addition to a set of control variables for a sample of 814 US financial firm-
                                                          
25 The four proxies are: analyst following, market capitalisation, analyst forecast error, and analyst forecast 
dispersion. 
26 This is calculated as the difference between the daily closing ask price and the daily closing bid price divided by 
the average value of the daily bid and the ask price. 
27 The cost of capital is calculated using four proxies: (1) price-earnings growth as developed by Easton (2004); (2) 
the abnormal earnings growth by Gode and Mohanram (2003); (3) the modified Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
and (4) Claus and Thomas’s (2001) method. 
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year observations over the two financial years 2008 and 2009. The findings show that firms’ cost 
of capital tends to be positively associated with less verifiable fair value assets (i.e. level 3 fair 
values). Furthermore, the relation between cost of capital and the three levels of fair value is 
investigated as a function of firm-level corporate governance. They use a corporate governance 
score based on the principle component analysis of four variables: the percentage of independent 
directors on the board, the number of audit committee members with financial expertise, auditor 
industry specialisation and whether there is internal control material weakness. The study reports 
that the positive association between level 3 fair values and cost of capital tend to be lower for 
firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms.  
To sum up, previous studies in the US context have shown that the valuation coefficient on less 
reliable fair values (level 3) is lower than that on fair value at level 1. In other words, level 3 fair 
values, based on inputs other than market prices, is less value relevant to investors than level 1 
fair values, based on market observable inputs. Furthermore, it is also found that information 
asymmetry and cost of capital are higher for level 3 fair values. This empirical evidence supports 
the view that the fair value hierarchy disclosure under SFAS 157 provides investors in US 
financial firms with useful information for valuation purposes.  
2.3.2.2 Literature review on IFRS 7 
IASB issued IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures in August 2005 to replace IAS 30 
Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions. IFRS 7 is 
mandated for fiscal years starting on or after 1 January 2007 with the aim of revising and 
enhancing the disclosures about financial instruments. In specific, the main objective of IFRS 7 
is to enhance information disclosure to help information users in evaluating the significance of 
financial instruments to the firms’ financial position and performance. Furthermore, it aims to 
provide disclosure on the nature and extent risks associated with financial instruments and how 
they have been managed by the reporting entities (IASB, 2009a). The disclosure requirements 
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under IFRS 7 are divided into two distinctive sections. In the first section it considers the financial 
assets and liabilities reported in the balance sheet and income statement. The second section 
covers the area of risk disclosure and how firms manage the risks arising from financial 
instruments. With a clear intention of improving the disclosure about financial instruments, IASB 
has amended IFRS 7 several times since 2005.  
In 2009, IASB issued amendments to IFRS 7 requiring more disclosure on the fair value amounts. 
In line with the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No 157 issued by Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the US, the new amendments require that reporting firms 
to classify their fair value measurements into hierarchy, reflecting the significance of the 
valuation inputs used in determining the measurements. The fair value hierarchy includes the 
following three levels: 
Level 1: fair values measured based on quoted prices in an active market for identical assets or 
liabilities; 
Level 2 : fair values measured based on inputs other than quoted prices included in level 1 that 
are observable for financial assets and liabilities, either directly (i.e. direct prices for identical 
instruments traded in inactive market), or indirectly (when it is derived from quoted prices of 
similar instruments in active markets); and 
Level 3: fair values measured based on unobservable inputs (i.e. internally generated inputs) 
(IASB, 2009b).  
IASB considers enhancing the disclosure on financial instruments via fair value hierarchy as a 
response to the financial crisis, especially for financial instruments that are not traded in active 
markets (IASB, 2009a). Given that the new disclosure requirements provide information on the 
relative reliability of fair value amounts reported by firms, it is more likely to increase the 
comparability between reporting firms regarding their fair value measurements. Furthermore, 
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these requirements are one step toward more convergence between IFRS and the US GAAP. 
This, in turn, would increase the comparability between firms reporting under the two regimes.  
The disclosure about fair value hierarchy is required for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 
January 2009. In 2011, the requirements of fair value hierarchy disclosure were transferred from 
IFRS 7 to IFRS 13 with more detailed guidance, especially for level 3 fair values. IFRS 13 is 
mandatory for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2013. Given that the present analysis 
covers the period up to the end of fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2012, the fair value 
hierarchy disclosure for financial firms under study is disclosed under IFRS 7.  
There is scant evidence on the changes in the accounting information quality as a result of the 
enhanced disclosure requirements under IFRS 7. As far as I am aware, there is only one study by 
Bischof (2009) that examines whether there has been any improvement in disclosure quality after 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS 7. Based on a sample of 171 banks operating in 28 European 
countries (the EEA and Switzerland) for the first year of mandatory adoption (2007), the author 
measured disclosure quality both quantitatively, using the length of financial statements as well 
as risk reports, and qualitatively via the content analysis of these reports. The analysis indicates 
that there has been an improvement in the disclosure quality in both financial statements and in 
risk reports; however, the focus of disclosures has shifted from market risk exposures to credit 
risk exposures. More relevant to the present thesis, the results suggest a variation in disclosure 
quality between European countries. They explain that by looking at the differences in the 
enforcement level as well as the interpretation of IFRS 7 across the countries under study.  
2.3.3 Institutional environment, corporate governance and fair value  
Opponents of fair value accounting question its reliability because of the associated information 
asymmetry problems and measurement errors. The reliability concerns are particularly true for 
assets and liabilities with no established active markets. In such cases, it can be difficult to 
disentangle the fair value of asset or liability from its value-in-use to the entity (Landsman, 2007). 
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An example can be the estimated fair value of a swap derivative not traded in active market, 
which is more likely to be associated with the other assets and liabilities in the balance sheet of a 
financial firm. With the absence of an active market, managers use less verifiable inputs to 
estimate the fair value of financial instruments (and the changes in their fair values). These 
estimates therefore can be subject to measurement bias. Similarly for these instruments, managers 
use considerable judgment to estimate their fair values, making them susceptible to a relatively 
high level of measurement error. As such, it has been argued that estimating fair values for 
financial assets and liabilities, for which active markets do not exist, can introduce bias or/and 
noise, which in turn leads to lower accounting information quality (Landsman, 2007; Penman, 
2007). In this line, a stream of accounting literature studies the impact of managerial opportunism 
on the reliability and relevance of fair value estimates.  
Beaver and Venkatachalam (2003), for example, investigate the valuation coefficients on the 
different components of loan fair values. Particularly, the disclosed fair values of loans are 
disaggregated into non-discretionary, discretionary, and noise components. In their model, the 
fair values of loan is regressed on proxies for discretionary and non-discretionary factors. To 
identify the nondiscretionary component they use loan losses, nonperforming loans, and interest 
gap. One-year-ahead future net income and regulatory capital ratio are used to proxy for the 
discretionary component, as the former is a proxy for the signalling and the latter is for 
opportunistic discretion. Finally, the residuals reflect noise, which might be due to measurement 
error and/or “unmodelled” factors of disclosed fair values of loans. The main model is the 
regression of market values of equity on the components of loan fair values after controlling for 
other accounting information in the financial statements for a sample of 869 US bank-year 
observations over the period 1992-1995. The results suggest that the value relevance of disclosed 
fair values of loans differ across the three mentioned components. The pricing coefficients on 
nondiscretionary components are positive and statistically significant. The discretionary 
60 
 
component that is deemed for signalling purposes is positively priced and statistically significant. 
Conversely, the estimated coefficient on the discretionary component associated with 
opportunism is negative and statistically significant. Lastly, the pricing coefficient on noise is 
statistically insignificant.  
Another strand of accounting literature focuses on the use of private information by managers for 
option pricing model inputs, and how this might affect the information provided to investors. 
Such studies are of particular interest to the present thesis since they provide insight into the 
impact of managerial discretion, in terms of inputs for stock options valuation models, on the 
reliability of accounting information. With a great deal of similarity, the managerial discretion 
over the inputs of fair value estimates might affect the reliability of level 3 fair values. A study 
by Aboody et al. (2006) addresses the stock-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 
123 and evaluates whether firms tend to underestimate the option value through their discretion 
over the inputs of valuation models. They identify two incentives for firms to understate the 
values of disclosed option expenses, mainly, increasing shareholder’ perceptions of profitability 
and minimising the perceptions that the compensation paid to executives is excessive. Also, they 
use firms’ corporate governance structure (measured by Investor Responsibility Research Centre 
score for shareholders’ rights) to consider management’s opportunity to understate option 
expense. The study is conducted using a sample of 3,368 US firm-year observations over the 
period 1996-2001. They estimate the option values based on pricing models with inputs following 
the guidelines of SFAS 123 and compare them with the disclosed amounts. The analysis shows 
a significant negative relation between the calculated and the understatement of disclosed option 
expenses, concluding that option expense is higher for firms having greater incentives as well as 
opportunity to do so. Also, the level of understatement tends to increase with the stock option 
based compensation and weak corporate governance and to a lesser extent with the excessiveness 
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of executive pay. These results are stronger for input assumptions subject to greater managerial 
discretion.28  
Similarly, Bartov et al. (2007) conclude that managers opportunistically use the inherent 
discretion by SFAS No. 123 to understate disclosed option expenses. They conduct the analysis 
based on a large sample of 9,185 firm-years observation from 1996 to 2004. Their empirical 
findings indicate that while firms seem to use both historical and forward-looking information in 
the estimation of stock options (i.e. to estimate the expected volatility) as required by SFAS 
No.123, the importance of each type of information in estimating the volatility inversely relates 
to their relative values. In a further investigation, they find that this behaviour (i.e. understating 
stock option expense) is highly associated with managerial incentives and/or ability to do so.  
The study of Hodder et al. (2006) confirms the conclusion that firms tend to exercise a 
considerable discretion over the model valuation inputs, however, it shows that a large proportion 
of firms in their sample exercises value-increasing discretion when they value stock option 
expenses under SFAS 123. The empirical analysis is conducted based on sample of 1,748 firm-
year observations over the period 1995-1998. The aggregate effect of discretion is measured by 
the difference between the disclosed option expenses and estimated expenses based on the 
guidelines of SFAS 123. Yet, it should be noted that the conclusion of Hodder et al. (2006) is 
drawn from a relatively short sample period compared to Aboody et al. (2006) and Bartov et al. 
(2007).  
There is little research that investigates country-level factors that might affect the value relevance 
and reliability of fair value estimates. Country-level characteristics might play a role in mitigating 
measurement bias and noise inherent in fair value estimates. In his study of the disclosure quality 
under IFRS7, Bischof (2009) reports a variation in disclosure quality between European 
                                                          
28 For expected option life and expected stock price volatility input assumptions compared to the interest rate and 
expected dividend yield input assumptions. 
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countries. He explains that by differences in the enforcement level as well as the interpretation of 
IFRS 7 by country banking supervision. The study was conducted based on a sample of 171 banks 
operating in 28 European countries for the first year of mandatory adoption (i.e. 2007). Similarly 
in the study of Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2014), countries are classified into two categories, 
market-based and bank-based, expecting that in the latter the level of behavioural bias towards 
fair values is likely to be higher. Based on a sample of nearly 1,000 bank-year observations listed 
on 50 countries over the period 2006-2009, market value of equity is regressed on the three 
categories of financial instruments under study (held for trading, those that were designated at 
initial recognition at fair value through profit or loss, and available for sale) after controlling for 
other financial statement information. The results show that bank-based countries are found to be 
associated with lower value relevance of fair values which might be explained by the lower 
enforcement level and higher measurement errors (or bias) in comparison to market-based 
countries. 
The literature also examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of 
fair value information. For instance, Song et al. (2010) find that firms characterised by strong 
corporate governance tend to have more reliable and value relevant level 3 fair values compared 
to those with weak corporate governance.  
The study reviewed above by Verriest et al. (2013) shows that firms are opportunistic in adopting 
IAS 39; they appear to postpone the early adoption of IAS 39 when there is a bad news. Again, 
in this case strong corporate governance results in early adoption of IAS 39. The analysis is 
carried out for a sample of 223 European firms, of which 71 are financial firms; and the corporate 
governance data are drawn from the Risk Metrics corporate database. The focus is centred on 
three corporate governance characteristics at firm-level derived from the database: the 
functioning of the board of directors, the independence of the board of directors and the 
effectiveness of the audit committee. 
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A working paper by Bhat (2013) examines the association between the value relevance of fair 
value gains and losses, risk management disclosure and corporate governance. The argument here 
is that risk disclosures have the potential to reveal information regarding the fair value estimation 
process, and hence regarding the quality of the fair value information. The disclosure quality is 
proxied using 14 disclosures items in the annual reports on the management of market, credit and 
operational risks; and a measure for corporate governance provided by the Institutional 
Shareholder Services. They use a sample of 176 listed US banks over the period 2001-2009 for 
the two tests, the relation between corporate governance strength and disclosure level, as well as 
the effect of both corporate governance and disclosure on fair value estimates quality (i.e. its 
association with stock market return). The results suggest that there is a positive association 
between the strength of corporate governance and the level of risk disclosure and between the 
level of disclosure and the market pricing of fair value gains and losses. Moreover, this positive 
association is stronger for banks during the financial crisis period, for those with risky assets as 
well as for those with poor performance. As such, investors seem to consider the fair value gains 
and losses for firms with a high level of risk disclosure and strong corporate governance as more 
reliable and value relevant. 
A recent study, reviewed above, by Huang et al. (2015) reports that the positive association 
between level 3 fair values and firms’ cost of capital is lower for firms with strong corporate 
governance. Moreover, the differential impact between level 3, on one hand, and level 1 and level 
2 fair values, on the other hand, is smaller for firms characterised by strong corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
In sum, the literature reviewed above reports that information asymmetry increases when fair 
values are measured based on management’s expectations and projections, which affects the 
quality of fair value information. Measurement bias and error problems are particularly high for 
level 3 fair values and other fair value estimates based on unobservable inputs. In this context, 
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previous studies show that the relevance and reliability as well as disclosure quality of fair values 
tend to vary across countries suggesting that institutional factors might have an influence on the 
quality of fair value information. Similarly, strong corporate governance practices are found to 
play an important role in mitigating bias and error problems associated with the fair value of 
financial instruments with no established markets.  
2.3.4 Discussion and summary on the value relevance of fair value 
The value relevance is typically measured by the statistical association between accounting 
information, and herein disclosed and/or recognised fair values, and market value of equity. Prior 
research in the US shows that disclosed and recognised fair values of financial assets and 
liabilities are value relevant to investors and provide incremental value relevant information 
relative to their historical cost (amortised cost). In specific, previous empirical findings confirm 
that the fair values of investment securities are indeed value relevant to investors, even for those 
traded in thin markets (Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1995; Ahmed and Takeda, 1995; Nelson, 1996; 
Eccher et al., 1996; Barth el al., 1996; Carroll et al., 2003). Several studies show similar results 
for the disclosed fair value estimates of derivatives (Venkatachalam 1996; Seow and Tam, 2002). 
Other studies, however, report that the valuation coefficients on fair values of off-balance sheet 
items, including derivatives, are not statistically significant (Nelson, 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; 
Barth el al., 1996), which might be attributed to ambiguities in the disclosed fair values. 
Interestingly, Ahmed et al. (2006) find that the valuation coefficients on recognised fair values 
of derivatives are statistically significant compared to insignificant corresponding coefficients on 
disclosed derivatives. With respects to financial instruments with no established markets such as 
loans and long-term debt, the results are mixed (see Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 
1996). For example, net loan numbers are largely based on inputs other than observable market 
prices; and as such their estimated fair values are expected to be less reliable.  
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Fewer studies have investigated the quality of fair value information in a non-US context. A 
Danish study by Bernard et al. (1995) documents some evidence of manipulating mark-to-market 
loan loss provisions. Interestingly, Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2014) report lower value 
relevant financial instruments designated on initial recognition at fair value through profit or loss 
compared to those held for trading. In a more recent study, Drago et al. (2013) find that the fair 
value estimates of net loans by EEA banks provide incremental value relevant information. Barth 
et al. (2014) document that the reconciliations from local accounting standards to IFRS related to 
financial instruments are value relevant to investors.  
These studies support the view that fair value measures provide investors with useful information 
for valuation purposes. However, the value relevant and reliability of fair values vary with inputs 
used to estimate fair values. The requirements of fair value hierarchy disclosure in accordance 
with SFAS No. 157 (effective since 2007) and IFRS 7 (effective since 2009) allow researchers 
to evaluate the value relevance of fair values across the levels of fair value hierarchy. 
Three studies investigate the value relevance of fair value hierarchy under SFAS No. 157 reported 
by US financial firms, namely Kolev (2009), Song et al. (2010) and Goh et al. (2015). They 
provide evidence that level 1 fair values, based on quoted market prices, are more value relevant 
and reliable than level 3 fair values, based on unobservable inputs. The valuation coefficient on 
level 2 fair value is higher than that on level 3 fair values, however the difference is not always 
significant. Accordingly, Riedl and Serafeim (2011), Liao et al. (2013) and Huang et al. (2015) 
show that level 3 fair values are associated with higher cost of capital and greater information 
asymmetry. Fiechter, and Meyer, (2010) document that managers tend to use the discretion 
afforded by level 3 fair values for the purpose of big bath accounting in times of financial crisis. 
Yet there is scant research that assesses the changes in the quality of financial reporting as a result 
of the enhanced disclosure requirements under IFRS 7. As far as I am aware, there is only one 
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study by Bischof (2009) that reports an improvement in the disclosure quality in both financial 
statements and in risk reports of European banks following IFRS 7 adoption. 
It has been argued that fair value estimates of financial assets and liabilities, for which active 
markets do not exist, can introduce bias (management discretion) or/ and noise (measurement 
error), which in turn leads to lower accounting information quality (Landsman, 2007; Penman, 
2007). In this context, a branch of accounting research evaluates the impact of managerial 
opportunism on the reliability and relevance of fair value estimates. For instance, Beaver and 
Venkatachalam (2003) find that the pricing coefficient on the discretionary component of net 
loans is negative and statistically significant. Another strand of the literature addresses the use of 
private information by managers for option pricing model inputs. This literature is of particular 
interest to the present thesis since it provides insight into the impact of managerial discretion, in 
terms of inputs for stock option valuation models, on the reliability of accounting information. 
With a great deal of similarity, the managerial discretion over the inputs of fair value estimates 
might affect the reliability of level 3 fair values. Aboody et al. (2006) and Bartov et al. (2007) 
report that managers opportunistically use the discretion inherent in SFAS 123 to understate the 
disclosed option expenses; and weak corporate governance is associated with higher level of 
stock option understatement. Yet, using a shorter sample period, Hodder et al. (2006) find that 
firms exercise value-increasing discretion in the valuation of stock option expenses under SFAS 
123.  
Prior studies show the quality of fair value information seems to vary across countries. Bischof 
(2009) provides empirical evidence of variation in the quality of disclosure under IFRS7 between 
European countries. Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2014) report results suggesting that bank-
based economies compared to market-based economies are associated with lower value relevance 
of fair values, which might be explained by the lower enforcement level and higher measurement 
errors (or bias). Similarly, the accounting literature has also turned attention to whether stronger 
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corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate measurement bias and noise in fair value 
estimates. Kolev (2009) and Song et al. (2010) support this view by documenting that firms 
characterised by stronger corporate governance tend to have higher value relevant level 3 fair 
values. Verriest et al. (2013) show that strong corporate governance results in early adoption of 
IAS 39 in case of bad news. Bhat (2013) finds that strong corporate governance is associated with 
more value relevant fair value gains and losses. Huang et al. (2015) document lower positive 
association between level 3 fair values and firms’ cost of capital for firms with strong corporate 
governance mechanisms. Thus, it can be argued that both the institutional environment and 
corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on the quality of fair value estimates, 
particularly in the absence of active markets for financial assets and liabilities under 
measurement. 
2.4 Conclusions 
Part I in this chapter reviewed accounting studies on the impact of IFRS adoption and of the 
financial crisis on financial reporting quality. Previous studies provide inconclusive results on the 
changes in the value relevance of accounting information as a result of IFRS adoption. In most 
of these studies, the sample comprises firms from a wide range of industries, with little attention 
directed to the distinctive characteristics of each industry, which might explain the inconclusive 
results reported in prior literature. In the same vein, few studies have investigated the impact of 
IFRS adoption on value relevance of financial reporting for financial sector firms. These latter 
are characterised by holding a considerable percentage of their assets and liabilities measured at 
fair values, compared to other industries. To contribute to the existing literature, this thesis 
therefore focuses on financial sector firms, which hit most by the financial crisis, in examining 
the impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting information of financial firms 
in the EEA and Switzerland. 
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Additionally, the financial crisis is expected to have an impact on the value relevance of 
accounting information. Accounting literature shows that in times of financial crisis and the 
higher possibility of default, investors tend to place more weight on balance sheet amounts rather 
than income statement numbers for valuation purposes. This is because balance sheet numbers 
tend to reflect liquidity values, while the income statement reveals the future growth 
opportunities. Building on the findings of prior literature, institutional environment factors as 
well as firm-specific corporate governance practices are expected to influence the valuation role 
of the balance sheet versus the income statement in the crisis. In countries with low level of 
investor protection and for firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms, investors rely 
more upon liquidity value in the balance sheet with less emphasis is placed on income statement 
numbers providing information on future abnormal earnings. As such, this thesis investigates the 
impact of financial crisis on the valuation roles of the balance sheet and income statement 
amounts. Moreover, the valuation roles of the two financial statements during the financial crisis 
are analysed as function of both country-level institutional environment well as firm-level 
corporate governance.  
Part II in this chapter reviewed accounting literature concerning the value relevance of fair value 
information. Previous studies show that disclosed and recognised fair values for financial assets 
and liabilities are value relevant to investors and provide incremental information relative to their 
historical cost (amortised cost). However, the reliability and relevance of fair value measures 
varies with inputs used for fair value estimates. The requirement of fair value hierarchy disclosure 
based on the inputs used in accordance with SFAS No. 157 (effective since 2007) and IFRS 7 
(effective since 2009) allows researchers to evaluate the value relevance of fair values across the 
levels of fair value hierarchy. In this context, prior literature in the US reports empirical findings 
that level 1 fair values, based on quoted market price, are more value relevant than level 3 fair 
values, based on unobservable inputs. Accordingly, it is documented that level 3 fair values are 
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associated with greater cost of capital and information asymmetry. In addition to measurement 
errors associated with level 3 fair values, managers in some cases might opportunistically 
manipulate valuation inputs for fair value estimates. Prior research suggest that the institutional 
environment and corporate governance mechanisms can play a role in mitigating the bias and 
noise inherent in fair value estimates, and thus reduce the reliability concerns. It is expected that 
firms with weak corporate governance and domiciled in a country characterised by low investor 
protection are associated with higher information asymmetry problem; and hence estimated fair 
values are less value relevant. This thesis contributes to the literature by providing empirical 
evidence from non-US markets by investigating whether the value relevance of fair value 
amounts varies across the three level of hierarchy under IFRS 7. Furthermore, it examines 
whether institutional environment factors as well as firm-level corporate governance practices 
affect the value relevance of fair values. 
Based on prior literature reviewed above, the next chapter provides the development of the 
relevant hypotheses in addition to the details of the models employed to test them. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops the research methodology for the empirical analyses conducted in the 
thesis. The chapter is divided into two parts, Part I and Part II, corresponding to the two empirical 
parts in this thesis. 
Part I (Section 3.2) addresses the research methodology to evaluate the impact of IFRS adoption 
and of the crisis on the value relevance of accounting information. It starts with the hypotheses 
development in Section 3.2.1. Then, Section 3.2.2 provides a brief background to the valuation 
model proposed by Ohlson (1995) and used in this thesis as a baseline model. Section 3.2.3 
presents the models used to investigate the effect of IFRS and the crisis on the value relevance. 
This is followed by the interaction models used to test the impact of institutional environment 
and corporate governance factors. Section 3.2.4 describes the measures of country-level 
institutional environment and firm-level corporate governance employed in this thesis. Finally, 
Section 3.2.5 provides a detailed description of the sample selection procedures, as well as of the 
distribution of sample firms by country and specialisation.  
Part II (Section 3.3) provides the details of the research methodology to investigate the value 
relevance of fair value hierarchy under IFRS7. Based on prior literature and empirical findings 
discussed in the previous chapter, Section 3.3.1 develops the research hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 3.3.2 shows the main model adopted to test the value relevance of the three levels of fair 
value, as well as the interaction models to incorporate the impact of institutional environment and 
corporate governance factors. Section 3.3.3 describes the sample selection procedures and the 
distribution of firm-year observations across the countries under study.  
Section 3.4 concludes the chapter.  
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Part I 
3.2 Research methodology for the impact of IFRS and the crisis on value relevance 
3.2.1 Hypotheses development29  
The vast majority of firms listed on stock exchanges in the European Economic Area (EEA) as 
well as Switzerland30 are mandated to prepare their financial statements under IFRS for the fiscal 
years beginning on or after 1 January 2005.31 For many adopters, IFRS presented a substantial 
shift in their financial reporting since IFRS tend to differ significantly from local accounting 
standards that were required before 2005 (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Armstrong et al., 2010; 
Barth et al., 2014). In this context, it has been argued that financial statements prepared under 
IFRS provide higher quality information to investors in comparison to most local financial 
reporting standards (local GAAP) (e.g. Ball, 2006; Daske and Gebhardt, 2006). IFRS are seen as 
a set of largely principle-based accounting standards requiring accounting measures to better 
reflect a firm’s economic performance and position, which is expected to increase the quality of 
accounting information (Barth et al., 2008). For instance, IFRS restrict managers’ discretion 
through minimising accounting alternatives, resulting in higher quality accounting information 
(Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001). Similarly, accounting harmonisation in European countries is 
considered an essential step in the process of integration of financial and banking markets. This 
can improve the comparability of financial statements and reduce the number of adjustments 
required by investors to address the differences in accounting standards across countries. More 
comparable financial statements are expected to provide investors with information necessary for 
equity investment decisions. Thus, obtaining more value relevant accounting information has 
frequently been associated with IFRS adoption. 
                                                          
29 The hypotheses in this section correspond to research questions 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A listed in Chapter 1. 
30 In Switzerland, listed firms are required to prepare their financial statements using either IFRS or the US GAAP 
since 2005. 
31 Although the voluntary IFRS adoption before 2005 was permitted in some EEA countries, the majority of firms 
adopted IFRS for the first time in 2005 (i.e. when they became mandatory). 
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Yet one set of international accounting standards may not reflect the differences in economies 
across countries (Ball, 2006; Capkun et al., 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Armstrong et al., 
2010). Apart from accounting standards there are several political, social and institutional factors 
which may determine the value relevance of accounting information. Similarly, the enforcement 
level varies across countries, resulting in variation in the effect of IFRS adoption on accounting 
information quality. It has also been argued that limiting managerial discretion in terms of 
accounting alternatives could limit a firm’s ability to report accounting numbers that are more 
reflective of firm’s economic conditions, and thus reduce the quality of accounting information 
(Barth et al., 2008). In developed countries, the high quality accounting information attributed to 
IFRS has been questioned, given that the accounting information environment in those countries 
has developed without the adoption of IFRS (Goeltz, 1991; Jones and Wolnizer, 2003; 
Christensen et al., 2007). Evaluating the impact of IFRS adoption on the quality of accounting 
information is a contested issue among accounting academics and practitioners. Interestingly, 
existing accounting studies provide inconclusive results on whether the value relevance of 
financial reporting has improved following mandatory IFRS adoption (see, for example, Liu et 
al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2010; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). The majority of previous studies use 
samples comprising firms from a wide range of industries. Nevertheless industry-specific 
characteristics are expected to have an influence on the value relevance of financial statement 
information (Barth and Clinch, 1998; Anandarajan et al., 2011). 
The present research contributes to the existing literature by investigating the impact of IFRS 
adoption on the value relevance of financial reporting of a single industry: financial firms. IFRS 
expand the use of fair value measurements and enhance the disclosure about fair value amounts. 
For instance, compared to local accounting standards in several European countries,32 IAS 39 
                                                          
32 For a systematic review of accounting standards in several European countries comparing to IFRS see Bae et al. 
(2008). 
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Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement requires many financial assets and 
liabilities to be measured at fair value in the balance sheet and the changes in fair values to be 
recognised in the income statement (Barth et al., 2014). This is of particular relevance to financial 
sector firms since fair value-related standards prominently target financial assets and liabilities 
widely held by such firms. In addition, financial firms that engage in traditional banking activities 
(i.e. deposit-taking and loan-making) are required to estimate loan loss provisions (LLPs) in order 
to reflect the changes in the expected future loan losses. Compared to firms from other industries, 
banks are more likely to be influenced by IFRS requirements for LLPs which are different from 
those stipulated under local accounting standards in many EEA countries (Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas, 2011; Leventis et al., 2011).33 
Due to their distinct characteristics, financial institutions are systematically excluded in a large 
body of previous research investigating the impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of 
accounting information (e.g. Gjerde et al., 2008; Devalle et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Tsalavoutas 
et al., 2012). The analysis focuses, therefore, on financial sector firms, and the first hypotheses 
can be formulated as follows:  
H1A. The Value relevance of accounting information increases following mandatory IFRS 
adoption by financial firms. 
Financial reporting regimes require the preparation of financial statements including both the 
balance sheet and the income statement. Under IAS1 Presentation of Financial Statements, four 
statements are required to be prepared by the reporting entity: a statement of financial position 
(the balance sheet), a statement of profit and loss and other comprehensive income (the income 
statement), a statement of changes in equity and a statement of cash flows (IASB, 2014a). As 
stated by Watts (1974) and Holthausen and Watts (2001), the balance sheet and the income 
                                                          
33 Specifically, IAS 39 requires an incurred loss model to report LLPs in comparison to forward looking model 
stipulated in Europe prior IFRS adoption (for more details see Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011 and Leventis et 
al., 2011 ). 
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statement fulfil different roles or at least they provide incremental information relative to each 
other. Focusing on valuation purposes, the balance sheet produces information to facilitate loan 
decisions and the monitoring of debt contracts (Barth et al., 1998a). As such, it presents 
information on the liquidation value of the firm (i.e. what is available to the firm’s debtholders 
in case of default). On the other hand, the income statement provides information prominently 
for equity valuation by reflecting the unrecognised net assets or, more generally, the opportunities 
for abnormal earnings. Example of unrecognised intangible asset is the human capital and 
internally generated assets of financial firms. Firms are not allowed to recognise the value of a 
trained workforce in their balance sheets since it does not meet the definition of an asset. Even in 
the case of a substantial amount invested in training, these costs are expensed in the income 
statement. In general, the unrecognised assets are not directly observable, yet their revenues and 
expenses are reflected in the income statement (Barth et al., 1998a; Barth, 2006).  
This view of distinctive roles of the balance sheet and income statement suggests that during a 
financial crisis investors use more the information provided by the former. Taking into 
consideration the higher probability of default in times of financial crisis, the balance sheet 
providing information on liquidation values will increase in importance for valuation purposes. 
The importance of liquidation values is related to the abandonment option held by the 
management. The abandonment is defined as “an option to put assets to outside purchasers at a 
strike price equal to the liquidation, or exit, values of the assets” (Barth et al., 1998a: 4). The 
abandonment option exists when there is a difference between liquidation values versus values 
in use34 for the assets held by the firm; this is the case when there is an incomplete market (ibid). 
However, as financial sector firms have been hit most adversely by the financial crisis in recent 
years, it is expected that the economic values of those firms’ assets are very close to liquidation 
values since the exercise of the abandonment option becomes higher. Moreover, in times of 
                                                          
34 Value in use of an asset is defined as the present value of the future cash flows expected to be derived from the 
asset (IASB, 2014b).  
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financial crisis fair values (market values) of assets, used widely by financial firms, reflect the 
liquidation rather than future payoffs (Allen and Carletti, 2008). Operationally, previous studies 
use the book value of equity, the summary measure of the balance sheet, as a proxy for liquidation 
value, especially when the financial health of the firm deteriorates (see Berger et al., 1996; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collin et al., 1999). 
In contrast, investors are expected to place less importance on the income statement numbers as 
the probability of default increases during a financial crisis. This is because the significance of 
other unrecognised net assets and future growth opportunity, reflected in the income statement, 
for valuation purposes diminishes over the time of crisis. 
Another argument can be put forward here is that part of the effect of a financial crisis on the 
value relevance of the balance sheet and income statement of financial firms is related to fair 
value accounting. In times of financial crisis there is a greater discrepancy between market values 
and the underlying economic values of assets and liabilities in conjunction with a higher 
measurement error and bias (Hellwig, 2009; Plantin et al., 2008; Bhat et al., 2011; Chen et al., 
2013). In this situation, Penman (2007: 41) explains that the negative impact of fair value 
accounting on the value relevance of accounting information will be more pronounced in the 
income statement compared to the balance sheet (i.e. resulting in a “less uninformative income 
statement”).35 That is, fair value accounting might produce less informative income statements 
relative to balance sheets in times of crisis. It is expected, therefore, that the value relevance of 
income statements will be lower compared to that of balance sheets when the financial crisis hits. 
In this study, the book value of equity and net income are employed as summary measures of the 
balance sheet and of the income statement, respectively. Based on the aforementioned discussion, 
the second hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
                                                          
35 Peasnell (2006) explains how the measurement errors of fair values are compounded in the income statement in 
comparison to the balance sheet (the same can apply to the discrepancy between market prices and true economic 
values). 
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H2A. The value relevance of equity book value increases, while the value relevance of net 
income decreases for financial firms as the financial crisis evolves. 
This study also evaluates whether the value relevance of accounting information depends on the 
institutional business environment at country level during the crisis period. La Porta et al. (1999) 
argue that institutional environment characteristics, which determine the level of investor 
protection against opportunistic behaviour, are of cardinal importance in making investment 
decisions. Even though listed firms listed in the EEA and Switzerland prepare their financial 
statements under the same accounting regime, IFRS, financial reporting practices are not 
determined by accounting standards alone (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Ball et al., 2003; Ball, 
2006; Tadesse, 2006). For instance, the institutional environment can affect the managers’ 
flexibility in exercising their discretion when choosing between accounting alternatives. 
Besides, the state of the economy affects the firms’ performance. In periods of financial crisis, 
managers of distressed firms might manipulate accounting numbers or use accounting 
alternatives to shift performance figures upward in order to avoid reductions in their 
compensations due to the deterioration of share prices (Charitou et al., 2007; Kothari and Lester, 
2012). A number of previous studies reports some evidence of a decrease in financial reporting 
quality during a financial crisis (e.g. Choi et al., 2011; Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013). Specifically 
for financial firms in a crisis period, managers could engage in earnings management behaviour36 
using loan loss provision (Cohen et al., 2014) or via less timely accounting write-downs (Vyas, 
2011). However, as argued in Ball et al. (2000); Ball (2006); Hope (2003); Daske et al. (2008) 
and Houque et al. (2012), in presence of strong institutional settings, managers have less 
incentives and opportunities to manipulate accounting information at the expense of shareholders. 
                                                          
36 Earnings management happens when managers exercise their discretion in financial reporting and/or in structuring 
transactions to “either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999: 368). 
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Overall, the institutional environment plays a complementary role in the quality of financial 
reporting, and this is particularly true during a financial crisis. In countries characterised by a 
weak institutional environment it is reasonable to expect that in times of financial crisis investors 
place more valuation weight on the balance sheet numbers and less valuation weight on the 
income statement figures. Therefore, for countries with lower investor protection (i.e. weaker 
institutional settings), the present study predicts that the value relevance of book value of equity 
will be higher, and conversely the value relevance of net income will be lower during the financial 
crisis. The third hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3A. In times of financial crisis, the value relevance of equity book value increases and that 
of net income decreases for firms in the countries characterised by a weak institutional 
environment. 
As indicated in the accounting literature, based on the argument of agency theory, managers 
might not always act in the best interest of firms’ shareholders. Instead, they tend to make sub-
optimal or self-maximisation decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1967; Jensen, 1986). A firm’s 
corporate governance is the mechanism that aims to protect shareholders against managerial 
opportunism. When the interests of both managers and shareholders are perfectly aligned, 
coupled with effective corporate governance practices, accounting information is more likely to 
reflect the economic reality of a firm. On the other hand, given a setting where there is a conflict 
between the interests of managers and those of the shareholders in conjunction with weak 
corporate governance practices, it is likely to observe opportunistic behaviour by managers to 
manage accounting numbers. This results in a decrease in the relevance of accounting information 
for valuation purposes.  
In highly concentrated ownership structures, another agency problem might stem from the 
conflicts of interests between minority and majority shareholders, particularly if the latter are 
involved in the management of the firm (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Thomsen et 
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al., 2006). On one hand, large controlling shareholders have incentives to collect information in 
order to monitor management performance, and accordingly exercise their voting power to force 
managers to act in the best interests of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 
1998; La Porta et al., 2000; Conyon and Florou, 2002; Essen et al., 2013). On the other hand, an 
agency problem arises when large shareholders extract private benefits from their position as 
controlling shareholders at the expense of minority investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Faccio 
et al., 2001; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Liu and Magnan, 2011). It has been argued that 
controlling shareholders have incentives to manage accounting figures in order to mask the firm’s 
economic conditions and to conceal their private benefits at the expense of other investors (Leuz 
et al., 2003). Thus, another purpose of corporate governance is to mitigate the agency conflict 
between the majority shareholders and other investors. 
That is, effective corporate governance plays a critical role in mitigating the agency conflicts 
between management and shareholders as well as between majority and minority shareholders. 
Accordingly, strong corporate governance mechanisms are expected to increase the quality of 
accounting information available to all investors, mainly non-controlling shareholders. In this 
vein, the accounting literature provides some empirical evidence that strong corporate 
governance mechanisms are associated with higher quality financial reporting and disclsoure (e.g. 
Klein, 2002; Park and Shin, 2004; Kent et al., 2010; Ntim et al., 2013; Verriest et al., 2013).  
During a financial crisis the expropriation of shareholders in general becomes more severe. For 
instance, managers tend to engage more with opportunistic behaviour given the drop in the 
expected rate of return on investment. The shareholders thus take into account the weakness in 
corporate governance when making investment decisions (Mitton, 2002). In this context, 
corporate governance practices become more pivotal in determining the value relevance of 
accounting information in times of financial crisis. It is expected that for firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms investors will place more importance on the balance sheet 
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numbers reflecting liquidation value rather than the income statement figures which present 
future growth opportunities. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H4A. In times of financial crisis, the value relevance of equity book value increases and that 
of net income decreases for firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
3.2.2 Model background  
To test the four hypotheses discussed above, this study follows Ohlson (1995) who proposed a 
valuation model that links the market value of a firm to its reported accounting numbers. The 
model has been developed based on three assumptions. Firstly, it fulfils the requirement of 
Dividend Discount Model (DDM)37 that the share price of a firm is equal to the present value of 
expected future dividends per share. Secondly, it assumes the “clean surplus” relation holds (i.e. 
the change in book values of equity between two periods equals the earnings minus dividends 
over the same period).38 Finally, the main contribution of this model is the third assumption of a 
linear information dynamic regarding the stochastic time-series behaviour of residual income.  
Residual income for period t is expressed as: 
 𝑁𝐼𝑡+ 1
𝑎 =  𝑁𝐼𝑡 − (𝑟 ∗ 𝐵𝑉𝑡−1)       (3.1) 
 
and clean surplus relation as  
 𝐵𝑉𝑡 =  𝐵𝑉𝑡−1 +  𝑁𝐼𝑡 −  𝐷𝑡        (3.2) 
 
where 𝑁𝐼𝑡 is the reported net income for the period t, r is the firm’s cost of equity, 𝐵𝑉𝑡−1 is the 
book value of equity at the beginning of the period t, 𝐷𝑡 is the dividends distributed to 
shareholders at time t, and 𝑁𝐼𝑡+ 1
𝑎  is the residual income for the period t+1. 
                                                          
37 Barker (2001: 18) stresses that “any theoretical valuation model must be reconcilable with the DDM, or else it is 
conceptually flawed”. 
38 In addition to clean surplus relation, it requires dividends to be deducted from current book value, but not from 
current earnings. 
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Ohlson (1995) imposes that residual income follows an Autoregressive Process of AR(1) as 
follows  
 𝑁𝐼𝑡+ 1
𝑎  = 𝜔 𝑁𝐼𝑡
𝑎 +  𝑣𝑡 +  𝜀1𝑡+1     (3.3) 
and 
 𝑣𝑡+1 =  𝛾𝑣𝑡 +  𝜀2𝑡+1 (3.4) 
 
𝜀1𝑡+1 and 𝜀2𝑡+1 are disturbance terms with zero mean. Both 𝜔 and 𝛾 are restricted to be non-
negative and less than one. 
This model suggests that residual income at time t+1, 𝑁𝐼𝑡+ 1
𝑎 , is expressed as a linear function of 
two variables; first the lag residual income (i.e. at time t), 𝑁𝐼𝑡
𝑎, and second a variable 𝑣𝑡 for “other 
information” (i.e. other than accounting information) which also satisfies the autoregressive 
process, AR(1), as shown in (3.4).  
Specifically, the term 𝑣𝑡 refers to all relevant factors that may affect the future performance of 
the firm, including future earnings. As explained by Rees (1995), other information might 
include: 
 “macroeconomics activities and their relationship to the company’s activities, 
breakdowns of the company’s activities by industrial and geographical segment, 
knowledge of the company’s relative strength in the markets in which it operates, 
knowledge of patent protections and so on. Some of this information will be available in 
notes to the financial statements but some will not” (Rees, 1995: 234). 
 In the context of Ohlson’s (1995) model, “other information” 𝑣𝑡  can impact future residual 
income independently of current and past residual income. 
Due to its abstract nature, the variable has been dropped in the main stream of accounting studies 
that employ Ohlson’s (1995) model (e.g. Barth et al., 1999; Myers, 1999; Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Balachandran and Mohanram, 2011; Venter et al., 2014). Barth et al. (1999) 
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argue that if the model holds, 𝑣𝑡  has no bearing on parameters estimated for the accounting 
amounts used in the model (i.e. book value of equity and earnings).39 Aligning most closely with 
the view that “other information” can be dropped, Easterday et al. (2011) show empirically that 
omitting “other information” is not important in a relatively long period of time, such as one year. 
Thus this thesis employs valuation models based on Ohlson’s (1995) work after dropping the 
variable “other information” from the models estimated.  
It is worth mentioning that there is no consensus among accounting researchers on the variable(s) 
that should be used to proxy for 𝑣𝑡. Some prior studies adopt models based on the assumption 
that “other information” is single-dimensional, and thus its current value is the only useful factor 
in predicting the future values.40 More specifically, 𝑣𝑡−1 is used as a (noisy) proxy for current 
“other information”, 𝑣𝑡. The studies of Akbar and Stark (2003) and Dedman et al. (2009) are 
examples. Another stream of studies uses analysts’ forecasts as a source of value relevant 
information about future performance (see, for example, Dechow et al., 1999; Ohlson, 2001; 
Cheng, 2005). In these studies, “other information” is confined only to future earnings, and thus 
proxy for rational forecasts using consensus analyst forecasts of earnings.  
Based on the three assumptions mentioned above, Ohlson (1995) derived a valuation model 
where the market value of a firm (𝑀𝑉𝑡) is expressed as a linear function of current reported book 
value of equity (𝐵𝑉𝑡) and current residual income (𝑁𝐼𝑡
𝑎) in addition to other information (𝑣𝑡). 
That is41,  
 𝑀𝑉𝑡 = 𝐵𝑉𝑡 +  𝑏1𝑁𝐼𝑡
𝑎 +  𝑏2𝑣𝑡 (3.5) 
One of the desirable properties of such a model is that it links market value to current accounting 
information. As discussed above there is no consensus in accounting literature on how to proxy 
                                                          
39 They also argue that when accounting data are not related to other information (in this case the model does not 
hold), the estimated parameters for accounting numbers could be affected by the omitted other information from the 
study model.  
40 Additionally, it is assumed that there is no constant term in other information autoregressive equation (AR(1)). 
41 For details, see Appendix 1 in Ohlson (1995: 682). 
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for “other information” or whether it should be dropped from the model. In the studies that drop 
the variable of “other information”, an intercept and an error term are added to the model as 
follows: 
  𝑀𝑉𝑡 = 𝑏0 +  𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑡 +  𝑏2𝑁𝐼𝑡
𝑎 +  𝜀 (3.6) 
Ohlson’s (1995) model assumes that accounting is unbiased (i.e. on average the market value of 
equity equals the book value of equity). Due to conservative accounting, among others, there is 
always a difference between market value of equity and book value of equity in actual setting. In 
this context, Feltham and Ohlson (1995) develop the basic Ohlson’s (1995) model by considering 
conservative accounting practices.42 In the context of the present research, the Ohlson model is 
used to refer to both the original, 1995 model, and its refinement by Feltham and Ohlson. 
The Ohlson model can be restated in terms of current earnings rather than future residual income. 
Substituting the equation of clean surplus accounting (3.2) and the definition of residual income 
(3.1) with (3.5) would yield after some simplifications:  
 𝑀𝑉𝑡 = (1 − 𝑘)𝐵𝑉𝑡 +  𝑘𝜑𝑁𝐼𝑡 − 𝑘𝐷𝑡 +  𝛼2𝑣𝑡       (3.7) 
where 𝜑 =  
(1+𝑟)
𝑟
, 
and  𝑘 = 𝑟 ∗ 𝑎1 =
𝑟∗𝑤
(1+𝑟−𝑤)
 
In this model the market value of equity is expressed as a weighted average of both book value 
of equity and net income (before dividends) multiple in addition to the “other information” not 
captured by accounting figures. From the definition of 𝑘, 𝑘 has a one-to-one relation with 𝑤 (and 
𝑎1). As 𝑤 statisfies the condition 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1 then 𝑘 satisfies 0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 1.  
On the one extreme, if 𝑘 = 𝑤 = 1, in such case a firm generates one-for-one persistent earnings 
(i.e. investors expect the firm to generate the same levels of earnings in future years), then  𝑀𝑉𝑡 =
𝜑𝑁𝐼𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡. In other words, investors will value the equity based on earnings multiple.  
                                                          
42 For details, see Feltham and Ohlson (1995). 
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At the other extreme, when 𝑘 = 𝑤 = 0, in such cases a firm experiences unusually high or low 
earnings because there is a component of reported earnings has very low or even zero persistence 
(i.e. transitory earnings), then 𝑀𝑉𝑡 = 𝐵𝑉𝑡. The market value of a firm is determined only by 
current book value of equity.   
Low persistent earnings imply less valuation weight placed on earnings and more valuation 
weight on book value of equity and vice versa. One implication of Olson’s equity valuation model 
is that a lower valuation coefficient on earnings corresponds to a higher valuation coefficient on 
book value of equity. Previous accounting studies report empirical findings supporting this 
implication (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collins et al., 1997). 
That is, the market value of equity is expressed as a linear function of book value of equity and 
earnings. The empirical version adopted in most accounting studies is the regression of market 
value of equity on the current reported book value of equity and current net income in addition 
to the intercept (𝑏0) and an error term (𝜀), which is known as the “price model”: 
 𝑀𝑉𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑡 +  𝑏2𝑁𝐼𝑡 +  𝜀 (3.8) 
Furthermore, another version of valuation model can be derived from the price model, called the 
“return model”. Based on surplus accounting relation, the change in book value of equity between 
two periods, t and t-1, can be written as a function of net income and dividends (from equation 
(3.2)) as follows: 
 ∆𝐵𝑉𝐸 =   𝑁𝐼𝑡 −  𝑑𝑡 (3.9) 
Taking the first difference of price model (3.8) and substituting (3.9) for ∆𝐵𝑉𝐸 results in the 
following equation:  
 ∆𝑀𝑉𝑡 =  𝑎1 (𝑁𝐼𝑡 −  𝑑𝑡) + 𝑎2 ∆𝑁𝐼𝑡 + ∆𝜀 (3.10) 
84 
 
where ∆ denotes the change in the amount between two periods, t and t-1. Moving 𝑑𝑡 to the left 
hand side and then dividing all the variables by beginning of the year market value yields the 
return model43: 
 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝑏0 +  𝑏1  
𝑁𝐼𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑡−1
+  𝑏2
∆𝑁𝐼𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑡−1
+  𝜀 (3.11) 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the stock return for year t. 
3.2.3 The models employed  
To examine the first hypothesis on the changes in the value relevance of accounting information 
following the mandatory introduction of IFRS, this study adopts the price model that is widely 
used in previous literature such as Collins el al. (1997); Bartov et al. (2005); Barth et al. (2008); 
Balachandran and Mohanram (2011); and Venter et al. (2014). In the price model, the firm’s 
market value is estimated as a function of the book value of equity and net income (as in equation 
(3.8)):44  
 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.12) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share (share price) of a financial firm i three months following 
the end of fiscal year t (e.g. 31 March if the fiscal year ends on 31 December).45 These three 
months are to ensure that the accounting information is published and publicly available to 
investors (Lang et al., 2003; Barth et al., 2008). 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity per share for 
financial firm i at the end of the fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported net income
46 per share of 
financial firm i for the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a year dummy variable for year t. All the variables 
are scaled using the number of outstanding shares in year t to address the econometric concern 
                                                          
43 This model is used as robustness check for the price model in evaluating the impact of IFRS adoption on the value 
relevance of accounting information. 
44 Hereafter EPS is used to refer the net income (NI) divided by the number of outstanding shares. 
45 Some prior studies use the market value of equity six months after fiscal year-end in the price model (e.g. Liu et 
al., 2011; Barth et al., 2012). Therefore, as a robustness check, the main models are re-estimated using six moths 
market value of equity following the end of the financial year (see Section 4.6). 
46 Throughout the terms “net income” and “earnings” are used interchangeably. 
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raised in terms of heteroskedasticity and scale bias in the price model (Kothari and Zimmerman, 
1995). 47  
Financial firms tend to hold a significant proportion of their balance sheet items in form of 
financial instruments that are measured based on fair value or amortised cost. Consistent with 
this, Bischof et al. (2011) report descriptive statistics showing that the majority of the assets and 
liabilities are recognised in the balance sheet at fair value or amortised cost for a global sample 
of financial firms (see their Table 1). Moreover, the majority of fair value assets and liabilities 
are measured based on observable inputs (i.e. level 1 and level 2 fair values, see, for example, 
table 5.1 in this thesis). For fair value amounts determined using observable inputs, the carrying 
amounts in the balance sheet represent market consensus on their underlying economic values. 
Besides, even for those that are marked at amortised historical cost, such as loans and advances 
as well as held-to-maturity investments, their book values will be often close to fair values unless 
the market experiences significant changes in the interest rates (Penman, 2013). Put together, the 
book value of the assets and liabilities reported by financial firms is likely to be close to their fair 
values (i.e. their underlying economic values). Hence, one would expect that investor would 
assign a value to net assets amounts (book value of equity) close to their balance sheet value. 
Therefore, in the price model (equation 3.8), it might be reasonable to expect a valuation 
coefficient on book value of equity (𝑏1) not far from one. 
Since the analysis covers the period from 1999 to 2012, six years before IFRS adoption and eight 
years of IFRS adoption, the study uses panel data models in the first empirical part. By using the 
analysis of panel data, the 𝜀𝑖𝑡 in equation 3.12 is decomposed into two components, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
                                                          
47 A number of previous studies scale all the variables in the price model by the lagged total assets (see, for example, 
Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; O'Hanlon and Taylor, 2007; Manganaris et al., 2015). As a robustness check, the 
main models are re-estimated after scaling all the variables by the lagged total assets (see Section 4.6). The main 
results are also reported in Appendix V using lagged book value of equity as an alternative scaling method following 
some prior research (Lai and Krishnan, 2009; Rees and Valentincic, 2013; Middleton, 2015). 
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where 𝑢𝑖 denotes the unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics of each financial firm, 
and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the normal distributed error component (a random time-varying component). This 
decomposition allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the sample of financial firms. 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation omits the individual characteristics of each firm 
by estimating a single intercept. Omitting relevant unobservable factors, which tend to be 
invariable in the short run, would imply economically misspecified models, and in turn would 
result in biased or inconsistent estimates (Hsiao, 2003). Panel data analysis is conducted using 
either fixed effects models, also known as the within group estimation, or random effects models. 
The assumption behind the former is that the individual characteristic is correlated with the 
independent variables. For random effects models, the firm-specific characteristic or the variation 
across firms is random and uncorrelated with the independent variables. 
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-multiplier is conducted to test for random effects. The null 
hypothesis of Var (𝑢𝑖) = 0 is rejected, suggesting that the individual characteristic is not 0 and 
that pooled OLS estimation in this case will be biased. Hausman test is then employed to test the 
violation of random effect where the independent variables are orthogonal to the fixed effect 
(Hausman, 1978). The test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between unit effect and 
independent variables. The study runs, therefore, the regressions using the fixed effect models of 
panel data.  
In examining the first hypothesis H1A, whether the value relevance of accounting information 
has improved following IFRS adoption, this study tests the significance of differences in the 
explanatory powers between the two periods of interest, pre-IFRS adoption period (1998-2004) 
and IFRS adoption period (2005-2012). Following Agostino et al. (2011: 444), this study uses a 
bootstrapping technique. Specifically, it calculates the Z statistics as follows: 
 
Z statistics = (𝑅2
2 −  𝑅1
2)/√𝜎𝑅22
2 +  𝜎𝑅12
2  
(3.13) 
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where 𝑅2
2 and 𝑅1
2 are the within R squared from the fixed effect regression for the periods of 
interests, IFRS adoption and pre-IFRS adoption, respectively. 𝜎𝑅22
2  and 𝜎𝑅12
2 are the variance of 
coefficients of determinations of the within-group estimator using bootstrap methods. To this 
end, within 𝑅2
2 and 𝑅1
2 are estimated from different samples with replacement extracted from the 
dataset. By repeating this procedure 1,000 times this study can obtain an empirical distribution 
for the within coefficient of determinations which can be used to test the difference between the 
two groups, pre-IFRS adoption and IFRS adoption. Barth et al. (2008) recommend the use of 
bootstrapping since it does not require any prior assumption about the distribution of 𝑅2 and can 
be used for estimators with unknown distribution such as within coefficient of determination.  
To test the second hypothesis (H2A) on the impact of the financial crisis on the valuation 
coefficient of book value of equity and net income following IFRS adoption, this study adopts 
the same model presented in (3.12) with an interaction dummy variable for the financial crisis 
period: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 +  𝑏1Crisis + 𝑏2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3Crisis ∗ 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+ 𝑏5Crisis ∗
 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3.14) 
where Crisis is a dummy variable coded 1 for the years of the crisis (2008-2012) and 0 for the 
pre-crisis period (2005-2007). Appendix III presents the yearly GDP growth as well as the 
changes in the non-performing loans to total loans ratio for the countries under study. These 
indicators are widely used in previous studies as indicators of an economic crisis and its impact 
on financial firms (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Barrell et al., 2010; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2011). Both indicators suggest a continuous adverse effect of the period 2008-2012 on 
the economies and the financial institutions of the countries under investigation, including non-
Eurozone countries. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the crisis period is identified as the 
period between 2008 and 2012 referring to both the global financial crisis and the European 
sovereign debt crisis. The interest is focused on detecting whether the financial crisis causes 
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structural changes in the valuation roles of book value of equity and earnings. To this aim, the 
coefficients 𝑏3 and 𝑏5 reflect whether there has been any change and the direction of the change. 
The coefficient 𝑏1 represents the impact of the crisis period on the market value of equity, while 
𝑏2 and 𝑏4 can be interpreted as the valuation of book value of equity and net income, respectively, 
before the crisis period.  
To test the third hypothesis (H3A), this study employs the price model after including two 
interaction terms: between the strength of institutional environment and book value of equity as 
well as between the strength of institutional environment and earnings over the financial crisis 
period (2008-2012), as follows:  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝑏2 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗
 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(3.15) 
INSRANK is a measure of the institutional settings that includes: Efficacy of corporate boards, 
Strength of auditing and reporting, Protection of minority shareholders’ interests, Regulation of 
securities exchanges, and Judicial independence.48 The study uses the means of institutional 
variables during the period from 2008 to 2012, which implies that the variable INSRANK remains 
the same through the estimation period. Therefore, the institutional environment features are 
captured by the firm-specific characteristics component of composite error in fixed effect 
estimation. The study constructs a standardised score based on the principal-component factor 
analysis of the five aforementioned institutional environment variables, named INSSCORE. 
Based on this score, a decile rank (INSRANK) is created and it ranges from 0, representing the 
highest values of INSSCORE, to 9, associated with the lowest values of INSSCORE, and then 
scaled by 9. It is predicted that the coefficient on the interaction between institutional 
environment (INSRANK) and book value of equity (BVPS) will be positive (i.e. 𝑏2 is positive). In 
contrast, the valuation coefficient on the interaction between institutional environment 
                                                          
48 These measures are explained in the following section.  
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(INSRANK) and net income (EPS) (𝑏4 ) is expected to be negative. In this form of the model, 𝑏1 
and 𝑏3 can represent the valuation of book value of equity and earnings, respectively, for firms 
from countries with strong institutional environment.  
Similarly, this study tests H4A on the impact of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms on 
the valuation coefficients of book value of equity and net income during the time of financial 
crisis. The model employed is: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝑏2 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗
 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(3.16) 
GOVRANK is the constructed empirical measure based on five-firm corporate governance 
variables, namely, number of board meetings (Board meeting), size of audit committee (Audit 
size), number of audit committee meetings (Audit meeting), number of block holder (No of block) 
and audit fees (Audit fee).49 A standardised score, GOVSCORE, is created using the principal-
component factor analysis of the governance variables. The study uses the means of the corporate 
governance variables for the period 2008-2012. Corporate governance practices at firm-level vary 
across countries and can be associated with country-level factors such as investor protection and 
legal enforcement (La Porta et al., 2000). To address this concern, following Verriest et al., 
(2013), firm-level governance score (𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖) is regressed on country dummy variables 
(𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑛) as follows: 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖 =  𝑎0 +  ∑ 𝑏𝑛 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖 
(3.17) 
The residuals from this estimation are used to create a decile governance rank, GOVRANK, which 
ranges from 0, representing the strongest corporate governance mechanisms, to 9, indicating the 
weakest corporate governance mechanisms, and then scaled by 9. That is, GOVRANK represents 
the strength of firm-level corporate governance mechanism after country-level variation is 
                                                          
49 These measures are discussed in detail in the next section. 
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filtered out. The coefficients 𝑏2 and 𝑏4 in the regression (3.16) reflect the change in the valuation 
coefficient of book value of equity and net income as a function of corporate governance 
mechanisms at firm level. If weak corporate governance results in an increase (decrease) in the 
valuation importance of book value of equity (net income) during the crisis period, 𝑏2 (𝑏4) will 
be positive (negative) and statistically significant. Since GOVRANK ranges from strong to weak 
corporate governance, 𝑏1 and 𝑏3 can be interpreted as the valuation on book value of equity and 
earnings, respectively, for firms with strong governance mechanisms.  
All the models presented above are estimated for the entire sample of financial firms as well as 
for the sub-sample of banks separately. Also, as an additional analysis, the impact of mandatory 
IFRS adoption and the financial crisis on the value relevance of accounting information are re-
examined after the main-sample of financial firms partitioned by firm size into: small and large 
firms (using the sample median of total assets). In the same spirit, the sub-sample of banks is 
partitioned into: low and high Tier 1 ratio banks (see Section 4.6). 
It is worth mentioning that the impact of the institutional environment and corporate governance 
mechanisms is investigated during the financial crisis period only. This is because the motivations 
for managers to manipulate accounting figures and use accounting alternatives to shift 
performance figures are greater during the crisis. Hence, the role of institutional environment and 
corporate governance is likely to be more pervasive in times of financial crisis. Also, studying 
the impact of institutional environment and governance characteristics on the value relevance of 
accounting in a tranquil period is beyond the scope of this thesis. Besides, the data for corporate 
governance variables are manually collected from firms’ annual reports and/or corporate 
governance reports over the crisis period. Due to time limitation, no data are collected to test the 
impact of corporate governance on the valuation roles of the financial statements before the crisis 
period. 
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3.2.4 Institutional environment and corporate governance variables  
A number of previous studies focuses exclusively on the characteristics of legal systems by 
classifying countries into common law and code law groups (see, for example, Jaggi and Low, 
2000; Lourenço and Curto, 2008; Anandarajan et al. 2011; Barth et al., 2012). However, a simple 
classification of countries according to the origin of their legal systems might not gauge the 
strength of the legal and institutional environment. Spamann (2010) finds few significant 
differences between common law versus code law countries in terms of one of the widely used 
investor protection measures ‘The Antidirector Right Index’50 developed by La Porta et al. 
(1998). 
In addition, several recent accounting studies use institutional variables, on the one hand, and 
accounting and market data, on the other hand, from two different periods of time (see, for 
instance, Davis-Friday et al., 2006; Anandarajan et al., 2011). This could result in less powerful 
tests for the impact of country-specific characteristics on the value relevance of accounting 
information. Consistent with this view, Kaufmann et al. (2008) report significant changes in the 
country-level institutional variables over time. For this reason, this study uses data from the 
Global Competitiveness Report issued by the World Economic Forum51 for the period 2008-2012, 
which captures country-level characteristics during the financial crisis (i.e. period for which 
accounting and market data are drawn). Specifically, five country-specific variables are used: 
Efficacy of corporate boards, Strength of auditing and reporting, Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests, Regulation of securities exchanges and Judicial independence.  
                                                          
50 La Porta et al. (1998) calculated The anti-director rights index using the following six shareholder right measures: 
(i) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy votes to the firm; (ii) shareholders are not required to deposit 
their shares prior to the General Shareholders' Meeting; (iii) cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (iv) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (v) the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is less than 
or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), and finally (vi) shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can only be 
waived by a shareholders' vote. The index is formed by adding a value of 1 as such it ranges from zero to six.  
51 http://www.weforum.org/ 
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For the five institutional environment variables used in this thesis, World Economic Forum 
(WEF) draws its data using an annual survey called Executive Opinion Survey. Most of the 
questions in the annual survey, including those used in this thesis, ask participants to evaluate 
specific aspects of their operating environment using a scale from 1 to 7. At one end of this scale, 
1 indicates the worst possible situation, while at the other end of the scale, 7 indicates the best. 
For instance, 1 represents the lowest level of protection of minority interests, while 7 shows the 
highest level of minority investors protection. According to WEF, the survey aims to capture 
crucial information that is not otherwise available on a global scale (WEF, 2013). However, 
collecting data via survey has its limitations. Surveys raise some concerns about the reliability of 
the data collected because of lack of knowledge about who and how carefully the respondent 
completes the questionnaire. For example, the survey could be completed by the executive’s 
assistant rather than the executive him/herself. World Economic Forum addresses this concern 
by working with a large set of partner institutes worldwide which are selected based on their 
understanding and expertise of the national business environment as well as their capacity to 
reach out to leading business executives. Their data are collected via a variety of methods 
including face-to-face interviews with business executives, telephone interviews and via an 
online survey. Saunders et al. (2012) posit that sending online surveys to a specifically named 
correspondent can mitigate some of the reliability concerns related to surveys. 
Another reliability concern arises when the respondents have insufficient knowledge or 
experience. Again, partner institutes are selected based on their understanding and expertise of 
the national business environment and thus being able to select the executives that are perceived 
to be able to participate in the survey (WEF, 2013). In general, WEF works closely with its 
partners to increase the reliability of its surveys by ensuring that the survey is conducted 
according to the sampling guidelines and therefore in a consistent and timely manner across the 
globe. 
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In addition, for some dimensions of institutional business environment no cross-country objective 
data exists.  Survey data can capture the crucial difference between de jure and de facto 
institutional characteristics. Interestingly, Kaufmann and Kraay (2016) state that the distinction 
between “subjective” and “objective” measures of governance at country level is mostly a 
superficial one, since nearly all such measures depend to a large extent on judgment and/or legal 
opinions and experiences of respondents in varying degrees. 
Finally, there is no consensus among accounting scholars on the variables that best capture the 
characteristics of the investment institutional environment. Recent accounting studies use a wide 
range of business environment measures at country level, for example, rule of law and regulatory 
quality by Kaufmann and Kraay (2016) and audit quality and accounting enforcement by Brown 
et al. (2014), which are also based on survey data. The selected institutional variables are 
employed in this thesis because of the data availability for a range of countries that cover a 
number of aspects that capture at least some differences across countries in terms of financial 
reporting settings. 
Efficacy of corporate boards measures management accountability to shareholders. Low values 
indicate that management has little accountability to investors, whereas high values suggest that 
investors and boards exert strong supervision of management decisions.52 Efficient boards which 
monitor management behaviour can reduce the agency problem that might arise from divergent 
interests among shareholders and managers (Peasnell et al., 2005; Coles et al., 2008). Previous 
studies report an association between accounting information quality and efficacy of corporate 
boards (see, for instance, Klein, 2002; Verriest et al., 2013). 
Strength of auditing and reporting standards measures the enforcement of auditing and 
accounting standards regarding company financial performance (Huoqe et al., 2012). Ball et al. 
(2003) argue that the adoption of high quality accounting standards can be considered an essential 
                                                          
52At this stage, efficacy of corporate boards can give an indicator on the strength of corporate governance at country 
level. In the analysis, other indicators reflecting firm-specific corporate governance mechanism are used. 
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step to provide high quality financial statements with useful information for a variety of users, 
particularly the investors. However, country-level accounting and auditing standards 
enforcement level plays a critical role in obtaining the high quality financial reporting. In this 
sense, adopting IFRS with weak enforcement mechanisms is more likely to result in a reduction 
in the perceived quality of accounting information under IFRS (Holthausen, 2003). 
Protection of minority interests measures the extent to which the interests of minority 
shareholders are protected by the legal system. La Porta et al. (1999), Ball et al. (2000), Daske et 
al. (2008), and Francis and Wang (2008) document that the legal environment, which determines 
the level of investor protection from opportunistic behaviour, is of cardinal importance in making 
investment decisions. La Porta et al. (1998) emphasise that strong legal environment reduces the 
agency problem between minority and majority shareholders as well as the agency problem 
between shareholders and managers.  
Regulation of securities exchanges assesses the regulation and supervision of securities 
exchanges. A strong enforcement of securities exchanges regulation can deter insiders from 
manipulating accounting figures in order to profit from trading in the firm’s shares (Hope, 2003).  
Judicial independence measures the extent to which the judiciary is independent from influences 
of members of government citizens, or firms. Judicial independence is expected to affect business 
environment. For instance, it is difficult to consider cases where the judicial system performs 
poorly, while there is a strong enforcement of accounting standards and regulation of securities 
exchanges (Huoqe et al., 2012). 
Previous studies report empirical findings supporting the impact of the selected institutional 
factors on financial reporting quality, including value relevance (Jaggi and Low, 2000; Leuz et 
al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Anandarajan et al., 2011; Houqe 
et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2014).  
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At firm level, this study uses a set of five corporate governance variables for several reasons. 
Firstly, a multi-dimensional construct captures a wider sense of corporate governance in a firm 
than a single measure of corporate governance (Vafeas, 1999; Aguilera et al., 2008). In this sense, 
empirical findings suggest that aggregated indices better capture the strength of firm corporate 
governance than single indicators (Davila and Penalva, 2006; Larcker et al., 2007; Verriest et al., 
2013). Secondly, the five variables selected in this study are used to measure the diligence of 
board of directors, diligence and effectiveness of audit committee, the ownership structure, and 
external audit quality. It is worth mentioning here that there is not a well-developed theory about 
the multi-dimensional structure of corporate governance or a well-accepted conceptual basis for 
selecting the variables that measure the underlying characteristics of corporate governance 
(Larcker et al., 2007). Thirdly, the variable selection is also determined by the level of disclosure 
provided by European financial firms. For example, some firms in the sample do not disclose the 
number of audit committee members with financial expertise, which limits the ability to use this 
variable for the purpose of the thesis as the size of the sample decreases. In fact, the data collection 
started with a wide range of corporate governance variables used in prior research including, for 
example, the attendance rate of the board of directors and that of the audit committee; however, 
due to data availability constraints the number of selected variables is reduced.    
One of the concerns in this thesis using a multi-country setting is that there is a considerable 
variation in corporate governance structure for companies in the countries under investigation. 
For example, some countries use two tier board structure (e.g. Germany and Austria) and others 
adopt one tier board structure (e.g. Spain and the UK); while in other European countries firms 
can choose the structure of their boards (e.g. in Italy and France). To mitigate this concern, the 
constructed corporate governance variable is regressed on country dummy variables to filter out 
country-level governance characteristics (see Section 3.2.3 and Section 3.3.2). 
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The thesis employs five corporate governance variables: Board meeting, Audit size, Audit 
meeting, No of block and Audit fee. 
The board of directors has the roles of ratifying and monitoring managerial activities, evaluating 
the management performance and rewarding or penalising such performance (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). This study uses the number of annual board of directors 
meetings (Board meeting) to measure the intensity of board activities. Less frequent meetings 
might be associated with lack of member commitment and/or insufficient time for effective 
monitoring.53 The number of board meetings is widely used in previous studies as a proxy for 
board diligence (see, for example, Larcker et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2007; Ettredge et al., 2011). 
Other characteristics of the board of directors are not employed in this study either because of the 
lack of disclosure in corporate reports, or due to considerable variation in board structure and 
characteristics across the countries under scrutiny (such as two tier and one tier board structure).  
One of the main roles of the audit committee is to ensure the quality of financial reporting. 
Regulators have often expressed their strong preference for an audit committee that meets 
frequently, since this leads to a better communication between committee members and both 
internal and external auditors (Barua et al., 2010). That is, more frequent audit committee 
meetings (Audit meeting) are likely to be associated with a more effective committee in order to 
maintain high quality accounting information. Previous studies report an association between the 
number of annual audit committee meetings held and the disclosure quality (Kent and Stewart, 
2008; Ettredge et al., 2011; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013), and the incidence of financial 
reporting problems (Faber, 2005). 
Another dimension that might be associated with the effectiveness of the audit committee is its 
size (Audit size). It has been argued that a larger audit committee might allow for greater diversity 
and depth of knowledge and experience among the committee members (Karamanou and Vafeas, 
                                                          
53 Boards of directors also tend to meet more frequently when firm faces difficulties and shows poor performance 
(Vafeas, 1999; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). 
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2005; Barua et al., 2010). This, in turn, can increase the effectiveness of audit committee in 
maintaining high quality accounting information.54  
Higher audit quality is expected to lead to higher quality financial reporting, given that auditors 
are less likely to provide incorrect audit opinions. Empirical findings support the view that large 
auditors (such as the Big 4) charge higher audit fees and thus provide higher quality audit 
(Francis, 2004; Francis and Yu, 2009). In this study audit fees (Audit fee) have been used as a 
proxy for external audit quality.55 Similar approach is adopted in previous studies (e.g. Carcello 
et al., 2002; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Mitra, 2007; Bliss et al., 2011).  
Finally, large shareholders have the incentives to monitor management performance and exercise 
their voting power as controlling shareholders to force management to act in the interest of 
shareholders. It is reasonable thus to expect that the higher the number of large shareholders (No 
of block56), the lower the agency problems between managers and shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2000; Essen et al., 2013; Verriest et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, controlling shareholders might extract private benefits from their position as 
controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003; Liu and Magnan, 2011). 
3.2.5 Sample selection procedures 
The BankScope database by Bureau van Djik is used to identify financial firms that are listed in 
the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland57 and issue consolidated financial 
statements under IFRS. Table 3.1 shows the sample selection procedures. The initial population 
includes 308 (230) financial firms (banks) listed in the EEA and Switzerland after 2005 and issue 
                                                          
54 It is worth mentioning that some prior research finds no association between audit committee size and accounting 
information quality (e.g. Abbott et al., 2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). 
55 The majority of the financial firms in this study engage a Big 4 auditor, therefore, audit fees rather than auditor 
size are used to proxy for the quality of audit. 
56 No of block is the number of shareholders who hold more than 5% of voting rights. 
57 In Switzerland, listed firms are required to prepare their financial statements using either IFRS or the US GAAP 
since 2005. 
98 
 
their financial statements in accordance with IFRS. All tests throughout the first empirical part 
of this thesis are carried out for financial firms (including banks) and for the subsample of banks 
separately. Banks differ from other financial intermediaries in that their activities include deposit-
taking and loan-making activities and they are subject to regulatory capital requirements. To 
identify the first year of IFRS adoption, this study uses the annual reports for listed firms 
downloaded either from their websites or through the Thomson One database. For those that do 
not provide annual reports in English, Datastream and BankScope databases are used to identify 
IFRS adoption year. In case there was no consistency about the first year of IFRS adoption 
between the two databases, the most recent year is chosen (i.e. if BankScope shows 2002 as the 
first year of IFRS adoption while Datastream identifies 2003 as the first time when financial 
statements reported based on IFRS for the same firm, then 2003 is chosen).  
Then those firms that adopted IFRS voluntarily before 2005 were excluded. Accordingly, 42 
financial firms including 30 banks were excluded, most of them listed in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland, where firms were allowed to prepare their consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS before 2005.58 This elimination is an essential distinction for this study 
since it avoids the selection bias due to voluntary IFRS adoption when firms are seeking to 
achieve the hypothesised economic consequences (Sodestrom and Sun, 2007) or to meet the 
conditions to be listed on some stock exchanges (Barth el., 2008; Aubert and Grudnitski, 2011). 
Similarly, 4 (3) financial firms (banks) that adopted IFRS after 2005 were eliminated. More 
specifically, firms that prepared their financial statements in accordance with non-EU accounting 
standards before 2005 were allowed to defer IFRS adoption until 2007 in Germany, Norway, 
Poland and the UK. Finally, this study eliminates those firms with no market and accounting data 
for at least two years over the period of pre-IFRS adoption (1998-2004) and four years59 of IFRS 
                                                          
58 For H2A addressing the impact of the financial crisis on the value relevance, those voluntarily adopters were added 
to the sample as a robustness check (see Section 4.6).  
59 Four years after IFRS to allow testing the impact of financial crisis in H2A. 
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adoption period (2005-2008). The final sample comprises of 194 financial firms, of which 148 
are banks. Data were obtained for the five country-level measures of institutional business 
environment from the 2008-2012 Global Competitiveness Report.  
For firm-level corporate governance variables, the data were hand collected from the annual 
reports and/or corporate governance reports published by firms and available online. 
Accordingly, 99 (83) financial firms (banks) are excluded due to data unavailability for corporate 
governance variables. Therefore, the sample consists of 95 financial firms, including 65 banks, 
to test the impact of corporate governance. 
Table 3. 1 Sample selection procedures 
 
 Financial firms (incl. Banks) Banks (only) 
 
The total number of firms (in the EEA + Switzerland) 
that are listed after 2005 and issuing consolidated 
financial statement under IFRS 
 
308 
 
230 
 
Excluding those that voluntarily adopted IFRS before 
602005 
 
(42) 
 
(30) 
 
Excluding those that adopted IFRS after 200561 
 
(4) 
 
(3) 
 
Excluding those with no market and accounting data for 
at least two years over pre-IFRS adoption (1998-2004) 
and four year of IFRS adoption (2005-2008) 
 
(68) 
 
(49) 
 
The main Sample 
 
194 
 
148 
 
Excluding those with no corporate governance data 
 
(99) 
 
(83) 
   
The corporate governance sub-sample 95 65 
Source: BankScope 
Table 3.2 reports the distribution of observations over the years under investigation. Based on the 
exclusion criteria (see above), the final sample comprises 2799 financial firm-year observations 
for the entire study period (1998-2012), divided into pre-IFRS adoption phase (1263 firm-year 
                                                          
60 As a robustness check, those that adopted IFRS voluntarily before 2005 are included in evaluating the impact of 
the crisis, institutional factors and corporate governance, when data available (see Section 4.6). 
61 Germany, UK, Poland and Norway permit companies that are listed on exchanges outside of the EU and prepare 
their primary financial statements in 2005 using a non-EU GAAP (in most cases this would be the US GAAP) to 
delay IFRS adoption until 2007. 
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observations) and IFRS adoption phase (1536 firm-year observations). For those firms with 
corporate governance data available in their financial reports, the sub-sample consists of 470 
financial firm-year observations, of which 320 bank-year observations, to test the impact of 
governance mechanisms. 
Table 3. 2 Firm-year observations distribution62 
 
Main Sample Those with corporate governance data 
year Financial firms (incl. Banks)  Banks (only) Financial firms (incl. Banks)  Banks (only) 
1998 160 
 
123 - 
 
- 
1999 167 
 
128 - 
 
- 
2000 177 
 
134 - 
 
- 
2001 183 
 
139 - 
 
- 
2002 188 
 
143 - 
 
- 
2003 194 
 
148 - 
 
- 
2004 194 
 
148 - 
 
- 
2005 194 
 
148 - 
 
- 
2006 194 
 
148 - 
 
- 
2007 194 
 
148 - 
 
- 
2008 194 
 
148 95 
 
65 
2009 193 
 
147 95 
 
65 
2010 192 
 
146 95 
 
65 
2011 188 
 
142 93 
 
63 
2012 187 
 
141 92 
 
62 
Total 2799 
 
2131 470 
 
320 
Pre IFRS 1263 
 
963 - 
 
- 
Post IFRS 1536 
 
1168 470 
 
320 
Average Pre IFRS63 180 
 
138 - 
 
- 
Average Post IFRS 192 
 
146 94 
 
64 
Table 3.3 reveals the specialisation breakdown of the samples based on the BankScope 
classification. As mentioned above, for all the hypotheses in the first part, the tests are carried out 
for a subsamples of banks (financial firms that engage in deposit-taking and loan-making 
activities). Banks include: bank holding and holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative 
banks, real estate and mortgage banks, saving banks and specialised governmental credit 
institutions. As a further check for those firms classified as banks, firms with average net loan to 
                                                          
62 In addition to the data unavailability and exclusion criteria, the variation in the number of observations from year 
to year might be due to some firms were listed while others delisted or merged over the study period. 
63 Average observations per year. 
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total assets lower than 10% over the period 2005-2012 were excluded from the sub-sample of 
banks. In other words, the subsample of banks includes only those firms with traditional banking 
activities. Accordingly, five firms are excluded from the sub-sample of banks (the majority of 
them originally being classified as bank holding companies by BankScope). 
Table 3. 3 Sample and specialisation breakdown64 
 
The whole sample of  
financial firms 
Those with corporate governance 
data 
Specialisation Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
     
Bank Holding & Holding Companies 33 17.01 20 21.05 
Commercial Banks 79 40.72 37 38.95 
Cooperative Bank 21 10.82 7 7.37 
Finance Companies 5 2.58 2 2.11 
Investment & Trust Corporations 17 8.76 12 12.63 
Investment Banks 10 5.15 7 7.37 
Private Banking & Asset Management Companies 3 1.55 1 1.05 
Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 4 2.06 - - 
Savings Bank 16 8.25 5 5.26 
Securities Firm 6 3.09 4 4.21 
Total 194 100 95 100 
 
Table 3.4 reports the country breakdown of the entire sample of financial firms and the sub-
sample of banks. As can be noticed, 19 (18) countries are represented in the main sample of 
financial firms (the sub-sample of banks).65 For the entire sample of 194 financial firms, UK has 
the largest number of firms in the sample (31) with 452 observations, followed by France and 
Italy, with 425 and 303 observations related to 30 and 21 financial intermediaries, respectively. 
Two countries, Iceland66 and Luxemburg, have been represented by only two firms, with 22 and 
30 observations respectively. For the sub-sample of 148 banks, France (22) and Italy (19) have 
the largest number of firms, with 306 and 275 observations respectively, followed by Denmark 
                                                          
64 Based on BankScope classification. 
65 To test the impact of corporate governance in H4A, the number of countries represented fall down to 18 (17) in 
the entire of financial firms (the subsample of banks) due to data unavailability regarding corporate governance 
variables (see Appendix IV). 
66 It is worth mentioning that Iceland was hit severely by a financial crisis starting in 2008 when the three largest 
banks in the country collapsed and were bought by the government.  
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with 14 banks (204 observations). In addition to Iceland and Luxemburg, Finland has been 
represented by 2 banks with 22, 30 and 30 observations, respectively. 
 
Table 3. 4 Country breakdown67 
 Financial firms (incl. Banks) Banks only 
Country Freq. Obs. Percent Freq. Obs. Percent 
Austria 5 75 2.68 5 75 3.52 
Belgium 3 44 1.57 3 44 2.06 
Denmark 14 204 7.29 14 204 9.57 
Finland 5 73 2.61 2 30 1.41 
France 30 425 15.18 22 306 14.36 
Germany 7 99 3.54 4 54 2.53 
Greece 11 152 5.43 11 152 7.13 
Iceland 2 22 0.79 2 22 1.03 
Ireland 4 60 2.14 4 60 2.82 
Italy 21 303 10.83 19 275 12.90 
Luxemburg 2 30 1.07 2 30 1.41 
Netherland 6 85 3.04 3 40 1.88 
Norway 17 255 9.11 15 225 10.56 
Poland 11 156 5.57 11 156 7.32 
Portugal 4 60 2.14 4 60 2.82 
Spain 9 132 4.72 9 132 6.19 
Sweden 9 127 4.54 5 75 3.52 
Switzerland 3 45 1.61 - - - 
UK 31 452 16.15 13 191 8.96 
 194 2799 100 148 2131 100 
 
  
                                                          
67 This is country breakdown for testing the first hypothesis H1A. The country breakdowns to test H2A, H3A and 
H4A are reported in Appendix IV. 
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Part II 
3.3 Research methodology on value relevance of fair value hierarchy  
3.3.1 Hypotheses development68  
The past few decades have increasingly witnessed a shift in financial reporting toward more fair 
value-based financial statements. Regulators and accounting standards setters, such as FASB and 
IASB, introduced market-based measures as substitutes for historical cost-based measures. Such 
emphasis on market-based measures is motivated by their presumed decision relevance to 
investors. In a complete and perfect market, fair value represents investors’ consensus on the 
expected future cash flows of an asset or liability (Barth and Landsman, 1995; Hitz, 2007). 
Opponents of fair value-based accounting have questioned the reliability of fair value measures, 
especially in the absence of active markets for the assets and liabilities under measurement. In 
other words, reliability concerns are particularly pervasive for assets and liabilities that are 
measured using models highly affected by managerial expectations and projections.  
In the absence of an active market for fair value assets and liabilities, it is reasonable to expect 
that using managers’ estimates would raise the problem of information asymmetries between 
investors and managers. Considering level 3 fair value assets and liabilities, managers might 
obtain private information on the true economic values of assets (or liabilities) to the firm, and 
hence the most appropriate inputs for model-based valuation. Information asymmetry introduces, 
to a certain degree, two different problems, adverse selection and moral hazard (Landsman, 2007; 
Penman, 2007; Song et al., 2010).  
One implication of adverse selection is when two apparently similar, but actually different, assets 
held by two different firms are valued in the same manner for assessing these firms’ equities 
(Landsman, 2007). Given a case when there is no credible and verifiable information, firms 
holding assets with high underlying economic values might sell a portion of their assets. 
                                                          
68 The hypotheses in this section correspond to research questions 1B, 2B, and 3B listed in Chapter 1. 
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Alternatively, firms might be permitted to disclose the high quality underlying valuation 
assumptions, which can be verified by investors and other market participants. This can be 
achieved, for instance, by selecting a high cost external appraisals for asset valuation. Both 
alternatives imply that the credible signal must be costly, yet it is less costly for firms holding 
assets with higher underlying economic values (Landsman, 2007).  
Secondly, the problem of moral hazard arises when managers exploit the private information they 
have on the true underlying economic values of assets and liabilities (and the appropriate inputs 
for model-based valuation) to obtain personal advantages. That is, they manipulate the 
information in the financial reports available to investors and other users. Landsman (2007) 
illustrates that managers reporting under a fair value regime might have incentives to value assets 
upward, which in turn results in higher income numbers and bonus-based compensation. Then, 
they manage the time to recognise any impairment and upward revaluation reversals by choosing 
the point with a minimum effect on their performance-based compensation. This is particularly 
true during a time of financial distress when there is a bonus reduction or even no bonus. 
Consistent with this view, Fiechter and Meyer (2010) provide empirical evidence that US banks 
used the discretion in level 3 fair value measurements for the purpose of big bath accounting 
during the most recent financial crisis. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the managerial discretion inherent in fair value estimates 
allows managers to signal their private information to investors and other accounting information 
users. In this vein, Barth et al. (1998b) show that managers can use their private information to 
provide better estimates of bond fair values. This view presumes that managers use their privately 
accessed information in a natural fashion (Landsman, 2007), rather than for manipulating the 
financial image in order to achieve some private gain.  
Given the adverse selection and moral hazard problems, accounting standard setters and 
regulators should decide the level of managerial discretion allowed under fair value accounting. 
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In other words, they should balance between the benefits of fair value estimates in reducing 
adverse selection problems by revealing managerial private information and the potential moral 
hazard arising from manager opportunistic behaviour associated with such estimates.  
Furthermore, even in the absence of a moral hazard problem, fair value estimates (i.e. level 3 fair 
values assets and liabilities) are still subject to measurement errors. This is because level 3 fair 
values are estimated using expectations and assumptions rather than observable inputs, which can 
be verified by investors, from active markets. 
In predicting how investors weigh different fair value levels to value the firm’s equity, Song et 
al. (2010) identify two factors to be considered: discount rate and cash flows. Investors use higher 
discount rate for fair value numbers with greater uncertainty. In the same line, and to the extent 
that they perceive that reported assets (liabilities) are upwardly (downwardly) biased regardless 
of the nature of such bias, investors will adjust the expected cash flows. Both factors will result 
in lower valuation coefficient for the less reliable fair values (level 3) compared to the more 
reliable fair values (level 1 and 2).  
Archival accounting studies show that information asymmetry and estimation error are associated 
with adverse selection, lower liquidity for trading shares, and greater information risk; this in turn 
results in a higher cost of capital to the firm (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Bartov et al., 1996; 
Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Muller and Riedl, 2002). It is worth mentioning that given a case 
where there is no moral hazard problem, this effect still holds (Song et al., 2010).The higher the 
cost of capital to a firm, the lower the value of its assets and liabilities. Investors associate a 
higher cost of capital, and thus a lower value, to the assets (and liabilities) with less reliable 
valuation inputs. Hence, it is expected that investors place a higher discount rate for level 3 fair 
value assets and liabilities compared to more reliable fair value accounting figures (i.e. level 1 
and level 2 fair value assets and liabilities). 
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Moving to the second downward effect, cash flows, investors perceive management’s estimates 
to be higher (lower) than the underlying future cash flows of an asset (liability). Managers might 
exercise their discretion to overstate (or understate) accounting estimates,69 given the subjective 
nature of such estimates. That is, certain accounting information estimates can be subject to 
managerial bias (Aboody et al. 2006; Hodder et al., 2006; Bartov et al. 2007). Considering the 
greater subjectivity associated with fair value level 3 assets and liabilities estimates, investors 
might adjust such estimates for firms’ equity valuation. If investors perceive the estimated fair 
values as biased, they will adjust downward (upward) the reported level 3 fair value assets 
(liabilities). Furthermore, accounting information provides a mechanism for investors to monitor 
and discipline managerial performance (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Lambert, 2001). Less reliable 
accounting information (e.g. accounting estimates) is less useful for investors to monitor 
managerial behaviour that might have a negative impact on the firm’s performance and its future 
cash flows. In line with this view, previous accounting studies report that the higher quality of 
accounting information is associated with a greater ability of investors to monitor the behaviour 
of management; and thereby leads to an improvement in firm’s performance (e.g. Bens and 
Monahan, 2004; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Hope and Thomas, 
2008; Biddle et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011). When accounting information becomes less reliable 
(i.e. of lower quality), investors will be less able to monitor and discipline managerial behaviour, 
leading to a lower firm’s performance of unaccountable managers and/or to private advantages 
achieved by opportunistic managers. Such cases result in a lower firm value. Compared to level 
1 and level 2 fair value assets and liabilities, level 3 fair values are less observable, making them 
less reliable for monitoring managerial performance (Song et al., 2010). 
Taking into consideration the issues discussed above, investors are expected to decrease the 
weight they place on the accounting information that they perceive to be less reliable (i.e. level 3 
                                                          
69 Overestimation or underestimation could be due to managerial optimism (Martin et al., 2006; Penman et al., 2007). 
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fair value assets and liabilities) for firm valuation (Maines and Wahlen; 2006, Goh et al., 2015). 
In contrast, level 1 and 2 fair values are less likely to be subject to measurement error and 
managerial manipulation (or optimism) since investors can verify the market observable inputs 
used in valuation. The valuation coefficient on level 3 fair value assets and liabilities is expected 
to be lower than the coefficients corresponding to level 1 and 2 fair values. The reliability (as 
well as the information asymmetry) of level 2 fair is likely to fall between those of level 1 and 
level 3 fair values (Song et al., 2010). The present study expects, therefore, the valuation 
coefficient on level 2 fair values to fall between the corresponding coefficients on level 1 and 
level 3. The first hypothesis in the second empirical part is stated in the alternative form as 
follows: 
H1B. The value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values is higher than that of level 3 fair 
values.  
The next hypothesis (H2B) introduces another variable, the institutional environment, which 
might affect the value relevance of fair value assets and liabilities. Information asymmetry 
problems are likely to be higher in a weak institutional environment. This thesis examines 
whether the value relevance of fair value net assets varies as a function of the strength of the 
institutional environment. Since the measurement error and managerial manipulation (and thus 
information asymmetry) are likely to be higher for fair value measurements based on 
unobservable inputs, the strength of the institutional business environment is more likely to be 
more effective at mitigating the information asymmetry problem of level 3 fair value 
measurements compared to level 1 and level 2 fair values.  
Previous accounting studies highlight the importance of firms’ incentives in determining the 
quality and the reliability of accounting information (see, for example, Ball et al., 2000; Ball et 
al., 2003; Leuz, 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Given that fair value estimates require judgment 
as well as the use of private information, they provide firms with substantial discretion. The way 
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the firms use such discretion depends to a great extent on their incentives, which in turn are 
determined by many factors including the institutional environment (Ball, 2006; Daske et al., 
2008). Consistent with this view, Bischof (2009) and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2014) 
provide evidence that the disclosure quality of fair values under IFRS 7 and the value relevance 
of assets designated at fair value through profit or loss vary between countries. 
To the extent that the institutional environment can mitigate the information asymmetry problem 
of level 3 fair values, investors are more likely to consider level 3 fair values as reliable, and thus 
value relevant. Stated in the alternative form, the second hypothesis is: 
H2B. The institutional environment has a greater impact on the value relevance of level 3 fair 
values than on the value relevance of level 1 or level 2 fair values. 
In addition to the country-level institutional environment, firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms are expected to play a vital role at mitigating the information asymmetry problem of 
accounting information. A further analysis, therefore, considers the impact of corporate 
governance practices on the value relevance of fair value measurements. Again, corporate 
governance could become more critical for level 3 fair value measurements relative to level 1 and 
level 2 fair values, since the former involve more managerial discretion (and opportunism). This 
is because strong corporate governance mechanisms can be effective in monitoring financial 
reporting decisions and mitigating the opportunistic behaviour of managers (Klien, 2002; Mitra 
and Cready, 2005). Previous studies support the role of firm-level corporate governance in 
determining the quality of accounting information, especially when accounting standards require 
considerable judgement and the use of private information. For example, Verriest et al. (2013) 
show that strong corporate governance practices result in firms using IAS 39 less 
opportunistically. Aboody et al. (2006) and Bartov et al. (2007) report that firms characterised by 
weak corporate governance mechanisms tend to understate the stock option expenses. Bhat 
(2013) finds that strong corporate governance is associated with more reliable and value relevant 
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fair value gains and losses. In line with this study, Song et al. (2010) document that the value 
relevance of level 3 fair value assets reported under SFAS No.157 is higher for US firms with 
strong corporate governance mechanisms. Similarly, Penman (2007) emphasises the importance 
of the competence and the independence of the monitors in addition to the internal control 
effectiveness in mitigating the bias (caused by managerial discretion) inherent in level 3 fair value 
estimates. This leads to the third hypothesis expressed in the alternative form as follows: 
H3B. The firm-level corporate governance mechanisms have a greater impact on the value 
relevance of level 3 fair values than on the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values. 
3.3.2 The models employed  
This section describes the model used to examine the value relevance of fair value relevance 
hierarchy under IFRS 7. An accounting amount is deemed as value relevant to investors when it 
shows a statistical association with market value of firms’ equity (or return) (Barth el al., 2001). 
Similar to the first empirical part (see Section 3.2.3), this part starts with the price model as the 
baseline specification to test the hypotheses on fair value hierarchy,70 where the market value of 
a firm’s equity is regressed on the book value of equity and reported net income. All the variables 
are scaled by the number of shares71 as follows (similar to (3.12)): 
                         𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                         (3.18) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share (share price) of a financial firm i three months following 
the end of fiscal year t (e.g. 31 March if the fiscal year ends on 31 December). The three months 
lag is needed to ensure that the accounting information is published and publicly available to 
                                                          
70 A brief background for the price model is provided in Section 3.2.2. 
71 This is to address the heteroscedasticity concerns due to scale effect in this model (for more details see Barth and 
Clinch, 2009). As a robustness check, the lagged total assets, instead of the number of outstanding shares, is used to 
scale all the variables similar to Marquardt and Wiedman (2004); O'Hanlon and Taylor (2007); and Manganaris et 
al. (2015) (see Section 5.5). Also the main models are re-estimated in Appendix V based on lagged book value of 
equity as another alternative scaling method. A number of previous studies use this method (e.g. Lai and Krishnan, 
2009; Rees and Valentincic, 2013; Middleton, 2015). 
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investors (Lang et al., 2003; Barth et al., 2008).72 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity per share 
for financial firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported net income per share of financial 
firm i for the fiscal year t, and 𝐷𝑡 is a year dummy variable for fiscal year t. This model has been 
extensively employed in the accounting literature to measure the value relevance of accounting 
information (e.g. Collins el al., 1997; Bartov et al., 2005; Barth et al., 2008; Balachandran and 
Mohanram, 2011; Shen and Stark, 2013; Venter et al., 2014). 
The valuation coefficients on the components of book value of equity are expected to be in the 
region of one (this issue is discussed further in Section 3.2.3). This is particularly the case for 
level 1 fair values and to large extent for level 2 fair values. If the reported level 1 and level 2 fair 
values accurately capture their underlying economic values, investors are likely to allocate euro-
for-euro value to these amounts. For level 3 fair values and non-fair value items, based on the 
degree of subjectivity, and thus reliability concerns, associated with these amounts, coefficients 
are expected to deviate from one. Due to efficiency concerns in some of the markets in the 
countries under investigation, this thesis does not test the variation in the valuation coefficients 
on accounting numbers from its theoretical benchmark (as pointed out in the limitations of the 
thesis in Section 6.5). 
The main objective is to examine the value relevance of the three levels of fair value amounts. 
Therefore, the book value of equity is decomposed into fair value and non-fair value components 
as follows: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 +   𝑏5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡                
+ δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3.18)
where 𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the non-fair value net assets for firm i as reported at the end of fiscal year t. 
Simply put, 𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the difference between book value of equity and net assets measured at 
                                                          
72 Similar to the first part, as a robustness check in Section 5.5, six months market value of equity is used as a 
dependent variable.  
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fair value. 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 (𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡) are level 1 (level 2, level 3) fair value net assets for 
firm i as reported at the end of fiscal year t. Due to lower frequency of liabilities at fair value, this 
study uses fair value net assets rather than addressing fair value assets and fair value liabilities 
separately (Kolev, 2009). All the variables are scaled by the number of shares. Since the aim is 
to examine the value relevance of fair value hierarchy, the focus is on the coefficients of the three 
levels of fair value net assets (i.e. 𝑏2, 𝑏3, and 𝑏4). If investors consider level 1 fair value amounts 
to be more reliable and thus more value relevant than level 3 fair values, 𝑏2 are expected to be 
greater in magnitude than 𝑏4. The estimated coefficient on level 2 fair values, 𝑏3, is predicted to 
fall, in magnitude, between the coefficients on level 1 and level 3. 𝑏1 and 𝑏5 are the valuation 
coefficients on non-fair value net assets and reported net income, respectively. Given the 
relatively short time span of the data, only four years of fair value hierarchy disclosure, as well 
as the unbalanced sample of financial firms,73 this study uses pooled OLS regression in 
investigating the value relevance of fair value hierarchy. 
It is worth mentioning that the assumption of market efficiency becomes necessary when value 
relevance research tests whether the pricing coefficients on accounting numbers differ from 
theoretical benchmarks (Barth et al., 2011). This has an important implication for the present 
study, given the doubts concerning the efficiency of some European markets, as well as the 
potential effect of the variation in market efficiency across European countries on the estimated 
coefficients (Aboody et al., 2002; Hellström, 2006; Dobija and Klimczak et al., 2010; Aharony 
et al., 2010). Therefore, this study does not derive theoretical benchmarks for the valuation 
coefficients on fair value amounts, and neither does it examine their deviations from any 
theoretical values. 
                                                          
73 For some years in the study, there are firms with no readily available reports and/or no disclosure on IFRS 7, as 
well as firms being listed or delisted during the study period (see Section 3.3.3). 
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The second hypothesis examines whether the institutional environment has an impact on the value 
relevance of fair value hierarchy. Country-level variables are introduced to the model as follows:  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡+       
          𝑏5𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏6𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗
            𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 +   𝑏8𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡   + 𝑏9 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(3.19) 
INSRANK is a constructed variable to proxy for the strength of institutional environment at 
country level. Similar to Part I in this chapter, five country-specific measures are employed, 
namely, Efficacy of corporate boards, Strength of auditing and reporting, Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests, Regulation of securities exchanges, and judicial independence. The data 
for these measures are extracted from the annual Global Competitiveness Report issued by World 
Economic Forum over the period 2009-2012.74 Based on the principle component factor analysis 
of the institutional variables, a standardised institutional environment score (INSSCORE) is 
created.  
Previous accounting studies follow this approach to capture country-specific characteristics (e.g. 
Nobes, 2011; Nobes and Stadler, 2013). Then, the institutional environment score (INSSCORE) 
is rank-transformed into decile rank (INSRANK) ranging from 0, which represents the strong 
institutional environment (high values of INSSCORE) to 9, associated with weak institutional 
environment (low values of INSSCORE). Since information asymmetry and measurement errors 
are likely to be more associated with level 3 fair values than with level 1 and level 2 fair values, 
this study predicts that country-specific institutional characteristic will affect more the value 
relevance of mark-to-model fair value amounts (i.e. level 3 fair values). Compared to level 1 and 
2 fair values (𝑏5 and 𝑏6), the valuation coefficient on the interaction between institutional 
environment (INSRANK) and level 3 fair values, 𝑏7, is expected to be greater in absolute value
75 
                                                          
74 Section 3.2.4 discussed further the selected institutional environment measures and their expected impact on the 
value relevance of accounting information. 
75 The coefficient on the interaction between INSRANK and fair values is expected to be negative since INRANK 
ranges from 0 (strong institutional environment) to 9 (weak institutional environment).  
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and more significant. In this version of the model, the estimated coefficients on fair values (i.e. 
𝑏2, 𝑏3 and 𝑏4) can be interpreted as the valuation coefficients of fair values reported by firms in 
countries with strong institutional business environment. The coefficient on INSRANK, 𝑏9, shows 
the association between institutional environment and firms’ market value. The remaining 
coefficients are as previously defined.   
In addition to the country-level institutional environment, this study analyses whether the value 
relevance of fair value hierarchy varies with corporate governance mechanisms. The firm-level 
corporate governance measures are incorporated in the main model: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡+       
          𝑏5𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡  + 𝑏6𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏7𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗
            𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 +   𝑏8𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡   + 𝑏9 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(3.20) 
Again, similar to Part I in this chapter, GOVRANK is a decile rank measure based on five firm-
specific corporate governance variables: Board meeting, Audit size, Audit meeting, No of block 
and Audit fee. Governance data are collected from the firms’ financial annual reports and/or 
corporate governance reports over the period 2009-2012. Using the principal-component factor 
analysis, a standardised corporate governance score (GOVSCORE) is regressed on country 
dummy variables (COUNTRY) to filter out the country effect on corporate governance quality 
(see, Verriest et al., 2013), as follows: 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖 =  𝑎0 +  ∑ 𝑏𝑛 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖 
                     (3.21) 
The residual estimated from the above regression (GOVRANK) is considered as a measure of 
firm-level corporate governance after filtering out country-level variation. Again it ranges from 
0, for firms with strong corporate governance, to 9, representing firms with weak corporate 
governances, and then scaled by 9. Corporate governance is expected to play a vital role in 
mitigating the information asymmetry problem associated with mark-to-model fair value 
amounts. In contrast, corporate governance practices are less likely to play a significant role in 
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determining the reliability of fair value amounts based on observable market inputs (i.e. level 1 
and level 2 fair values). Hence, the coefficient on the interaction between firm-level corporate 
governance and level 3 fair values, 𝑏7, is predicted to be greater in absolute value and more 
significant, in comparison to level 1 and 2 fair values (𝑏5 and 𝑏6). 𝑏2, 𝑏3 and 𝑏4 can be deemed 
as the valuation coefficients of fair values reported by firms with strong corporate governance. 
The increment to the intercept, 𝑏9, shows the association between corporate governance and 
market value of equity. The rest of the coefficients were defined previously.  
Two additional analyses are run through partitioning the sample by firm size and bank’s Tier 1 
capital ratio. Firstly, the value relevance of the three levels of fair value are examined after 
splitting the sample into: small and large firms, based on the sample median of total assets. 
Secondly, the banks in the sample are divided into two groups: low and high Tier 1 ratio banks 
to test the value relevance of fair values.  
3.3.3 Sample selection procedures 
The disclosure of the fair value hierarchy is not specific to any particular industry; yet financial 
sector firms tend to hold a considerable percentage of their assets and liabilities measured at fair 
value. Thus, the present study focuses on financial firms that are likely to provide a more 
comprehensive disclosure of fair value hierarchy under IFRS 7, compared to other industries. The 
sample period starts in 2009 since fair value hierarchy disclosure under IFRS 7 is mandated for 
the fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2009. Due to data availability at the time of this 
study, the sample period ends in 2012. Table 3.5 presents the sample selection procedures with 
the corresponding number of observations at each stage. The BankScope database (by Bureau 
van Dijk) is used to identify the initial sample of listed financial firms in the EEA and 
Switzerland. The initial sample comprises 988 firm-year observations related to financial firms 
that prepare their financial statements under IFRS. Market and accounting data are drawn from 
Datastream. Data on fair value hierarchy disclosure are hand-collected from firms’ annual reports 
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over the period 2009-2012, given that this information on EEA and Swiss firms is not available 
in databases. To this end, annual reports are downloaded from the firms’ websites and/or 
Thomson One Banker. The study excludes 209 observations for which annual reports were not 
available, or at least they were not available in English. In addition, observations related to firms 
that provided no disclosure or insufficient disclosure on fair value hierarchy are excluded from 
the sample (40 observations). Finally, 40 observations with no market data in Datastream are 
dropped from the sample. These procedures yield a final sample of 699 financial firm-year 
observations to test the first hypothesis on the value relevance of fair value hierarchy as well as 
the second hypothesis regarding the impact of the institutional business environment. 
In order to test third hypothesis that addresses the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, 
corporate governance data are hand collected from firms’ annual reports and/or corporate 
governance reports over the period 2009-2012. A further 160 observations were excluded due to 
missing or incomplete governance data. This left a final sample of 539 firm-year observations to 
test the impact of corporate governance on the value relevance of fair value hierarchy.  
Table 3. 5 Sample selection procedures 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
Firm-year 
observations 
All financial firms that are listed 
in the EEA and Switzerland over 
2009-2012 and use IFRS 
 
238 250 254 246 988 
 
Exclude firms without readily 
available reports and those 
without reports in English 
 
(54) (56) (52) (47) (209) 
Exclude firms with no data on 
IFRS 7 
 
(13) (9) (9) (9) (40) 
Exclude firms with no market 
data in the databases 
 
(8) (9) (11) (12) (40) 
The main sample 163 176 182 178 699 
No corporate governance data 
 
(36) (40) (43) (41) (160) 
The corporate governance 
sample 127 136 139 137 539 
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The final sample of 699 firm-year observations related to 185 financial firms listed in the EEA 
countries and Switzerland. In Table 3.6, Panel A reports the country breakdown of the sample 
firms as well as the country distribution of observations. Column B outlines the corresponding 
distribution of firms and observations to test H3B addressing the impact of corporate governance.  
As presented in Column A, UK has the largest number of firms in the sample (29 firms), with a 
total of 108 firm-year observations. Italy and Switzerland follow with 20 and 13 firms (79 and 
51 firm-year observations), respectively. At the other extreme, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland and 
Lithuania have 7, 5, 8 and 5 firm-year observations, respectively, related to two financial firms 
in each country.  
For the third hypothesis requiring data on firm-level corporate governance, Panel B in Table 3.6 
shows that the sample consists of 539 observations from 140 firms listed in 23 countries. UK and 
Italy have the largest number of financial firms in the sample, 27 and 14 firms (102 and 56 firm-
year observations), respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, two countries are represented 
by one financial firm (and 4 firm-year observations), namely Romania and Slovakia.  
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Table 3. 6 Country breakdown 
 (A) Entire Sample (B) Corporate Governance Sample 
Country Firms Obs Percent Firms Obs Percent 
Austria 6 22 3.15 6 22 4.08 
Belgium 4 15 2.15 4 15 2.78 
Bulgaria 2 7 1.00 - - - 
Cyprus 3 11 1.57 3 11 2.04 
Denmark 9 34 4.86 5 18 3.34 
Finland 5 20 2.86 4 16 2.97 
France 9 34 4.86 8 30 5.57 
Germany 11 43 6.15 10 39 7.24 
Greece 7 26 3.72 2 8 1.48 
Hungary 2 5 0.72 - - - 
Ireland 2 8 1.14 2 8 1.48 
Italy 20 79 11.3 14 56 10.39 
Lithuania 2 5 0.72 - - - 
Luxemburg 3 12 1.72 2 8 1.48 
Malta 3 12 1.72 3 12 2.23 
Netherland 6 24 3.43 5 20 3.71 
Norway 11 42 6.01 8 31 5.75 
Poland 12 46 6.58 6 24 4.45 
Portugal 3 12 1.72 3 12 2.23 
Romania 3 12 1.72 1 4 0.74 
Slovakia 4 11 1.57 1 4 0.74 
Slovenia 3 12 1.72 2 8 1.48 
Spain 7 24 3.43 6 20 3.71 
Sweden 6 24 3.43 6 24 4.45 
Switzerland 13 51 7.3 12 47 8.72 
UK 29 108 15.45 27 102 18.92 
Total 185 699 100 140 539 100 
 
3.4 Conclusions  
This chapter is divided into two main parts corresponding to the two empirical parts of the study. 
Part I presents the research methodology to assess the impact of IFRS adoption and of the 
financial crisis on the value relevance of accounting information. Part I starts with the 
development of four hypotheses to be tested. The first hypothesis concerns the impact of IFRS 
adoption on the value relevance of accounting information. The second hypothesis addresses the 
change in the value relevance of the book value of equity and earnings when the financial crisis 
hit. The third and fourth hypotheses are formed to evaluate the impact of the institutional 
environment and of corporate governance, respectively, on the value relevance of equity book 
value and earnings during the financial crisis. The study employs the price model proposed by 
Ohlson (1995) to test the value relevance. In this model, the market value of equity is regressed 
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on the book value of equity and earnings. Firstly, the explanatory power of the price model is 
used to test whether there has been any change in the value relevance of accounting information 
as a result of IFRS adoption. Secondly, a crisis dummy variable is interacted in the price model 
to evaluate the impact of the financial crisis on the valuation roles of the book value of equity 
and earnings. Additionally, the role of the institutional environment and that of corporate 
governance are examined after interaction with the valuation of equity book value and earnings 
during the crisis period. Finally, the sample selection procedures and the distribution of 
observations throughout the period covered by the study and across countries are presented. 
Part II of this chapter presents the research methodology employed to evaluate the value relevance 
of fair value hierarchy as disclosed under IFRS 7. The first hypothesis to be tested concerns the 
value relevance of the three levels of fair value hierarchy. The second and third hypotheses 
address the value relevance of fair value hierarchy as a function of the institutional environment 
and of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, respectively. As in Part I, the price model 
is used as the baseline regression to test the value relevance of fair values. More specifically, the 
market value of equity is regressed on the three levels of fair values in addition to non-fair value 
net assets and net income. The following models include the interaction between the institutional 
environment as well as corporate governance measures, on one hand, and the three levels of fair 
value on the other. The final section presents the sample selection procedures in addition to firm 
and observations distribution across the countries under study.  
The next two chapters present and discuss the empirical findings which obtained from testing the 
hypotheses stated in Part I and Part II of this chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Findings and Discussion on the Impact of IFRS 
and the Crisis on Value Relevance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the first part of the empirical findings derived from testing the hypotheses 
developed in Part I in the previous chapter. It shows and discusses the findings on the impact of 
IFRS adoption and the financial crisis on the value relevance of accounting information. The 
chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 offers the descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in the empirical tests. Section 4.3 presents as well as discusses the empirical results on testing the 
changes in the value relevance of accounting information following IFRS adoption. Then, the 
findings on the impact of the crisis period (2008-2012) on the value relevance of equity book 
value and earnings are presented and discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the impact of 
the institutional environment and corporate governance mechanisms on the value relevance of 
book value of equity and net income during the crisis period. Section 4.6 presents the additional 
analyses and robustness checks performed. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics on accounting and market variables used to test the 
first hypothesis (H1A) on the impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting 
information. The entire study period is divided into two phases, pre-IFRS adoption (1998-2004) 
and IFRS adoption (2005-2012). Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the whole sample 
of financial firms (including banks), while Panel B shows the corresponding statistics for the sub-
sample of banks. To mitigate the effects of outliers, all variables are winsorised at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. 
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Table 4. 1 Descriptive statistics: pre-IFRS adoption and IFRS adoption 
Panel A Price model variables for financial firms over two periods, pre-IFRS adoption (1998-2004) and 
IFRS adoption (2005-2012) as well as the entire study period (1998-2012) 
 
Panel B Price model variables for banks over two periods, pre-IFRS (1998-2004) and IFRS adoption 
(2005-2012) as well as the entire study period (1998-2012) 
Notes: P is the market value per share of firm three months following the end of the fiscal year. BVPS is the book value of equity 
per share for firm at the end of the fiscal year. EPS is the reported earnings per share of firm over the fiscal year. * significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%. The differences in means between pre-IFRS adoption and IFRS adoption 
periods are tested using two sample t-test.76 The differences in medians are tested by ‘Wilcoxon signed rank test’.  
 
Compared to the period of pre-IFRS adoption, the market value per share tends to be lower over 
IFRS adoption period. For the main sample of financial firms, the mean of market value per share 
(P) is €50.82 before IFRS adoption and €26.55 after the mandatory introduction of IFRS, and the 
difference is statistically significant. The sub-sample of banks shows a similar pattern in terms of 
market value per share.  
The mean of book value of equity per share (BVPS) increases from €80.23 (€81.45) before IFRS 
adoption to €90.09 (€110.45) over the period of IFRS for the whole sample (the sub-sample of 
banks), and the difference is statistically significant only for the sub-sample of banks. However, 
                                                          
76 Since the panels are unbalanced, t test is used for the difference in the means for independent samples. As a further 
check, paired-samples t-test is used to test the difference between the means between 2004 and 2005 amounts 
(implying that the observations from the two periods are not independent) and results remain substantially unaltered.  
 
P  BVPS  EPS   
Entire 
Pre – 
IFR IFRS diff Entire 
Pre – 
IFR IFRS diff Entire 
Pre – 
IFR IFRS diff 
Mean (€) 37.50 50.82 26.55 *** 85.64 80.23 90.09 - 6.66 6.90 6.47 - 
Std. Dev 102.06 142.92 43.92  264.22 240.42 282.30  20.05 19.73 20.31  
Coefficient of 
Variation 2.72 2.81 1.65 
 
3.09 3.00 3.13 
 
3.01 2.86 3.14 
 
P25 4.73 7.47 3.56  3.42 3.71 3.28  0.22 0.33 0.15  
Median 13.55 16.10 10.19 *** 9.44 10.65 8.77 *** 0.90 1.08 0.79 *** 
P75 33.53 47.07 26.25  28.04 36.61 23.65  3.01 3.86 2.43  
Obs 2799 1263 1536  2799 1263 1536  2799 1263 1536  
 P  BVPS  EPS   
Entire 
Pre – 
IFR IFRS diff Entire 
Pre – 
IFR IFRS diff Entire 
Pre – 
IFR IFRS diff 
Mean (€) 34.05 41.28 28.10 *** 97.35 81.45 110.45 ** 7.42 7.00 7.76 - 
Std. Dev 56.86 68.87 43.73  277.90 224.77 314.54  20.39 17.95 22.20  
Coefficient of 
Variation 1.67 1.67 1.56  2.85 2.76 2.85  2.75 2.56 2.86 
 
P25 5.35 0.30 0.03  4.07 4.06 4.10  0.29 0.44 0.20  
Median 14.69 17.68 11.65 *** 10.82 11.76 9.74 ** 1.08 1.25 0.90 *** 
P75 39.39 636.0 260.0  35.52 44.00 27.40  3.53 4.64 2.84  
Obs 2131 963 1168  2131 963 1168  2131 963 1168  
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the median shows a significant decrease in the book value of equity after IFRS adoption for the 
both the entire sample of financial firms and the sub-sample of banks.  
For the whole sample of financial firms, the mean of earnings per share (EPS) decreases from 
€6.90 before IFRS adoption to €6.47 over the period of mandatory IFRS adoption, however, the 
difference is not statistically significant. In contrast, the sub-sample of banks has a higher mean 
of earnings per share after IFRS adoption, but the difference is not significant. The medians of 
earnings per share for both the whole sample and the sub-sample show a significant decrease 
after mandatory IFRS adoption. The decrease in market value and profitability is probably driven 
by the financial crisis during the period of IFRS adoption. 
The descriptive statistics show that the coefficients of variation77 for the accounting variables 
have increased after IFRS adoption. For the whole sample, the coefficient of variation of equity 
book value (earnings) per share increases from 3 (2.86) over the pre-IFRS adoption period to 3.13 
(3.14) during the period of IFRS implementation. A similar pattern is shown for the sub-sample 
of banks, indicating an increase in the volatility around the mean for accounting numbers in the 
period of IFRS adoption. This is in line with the view that the adoption of fair value-oriented 
accounting standards, such as IFRS, results in more volatile accounting figures, especially net 
income78 (Ball, 2006; Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Karampinis and Hevas, 2011). Arguably, 
the high volatility of accounting variables might be related to the crisis during the period of IFRS 
adoption. 
The second hypothesis is about the impact of the financial crisis on the value relevance of book 
value of equity and net income reported under IFRS. In this context, Table 4.2 reports the 
                                                          
77 The coefficient of variation is used to measure the volatility of accounting figures. Prior literature suggests that 
the volatility of accounting numbers has an impact on the valuation of book value of equity and earnings (see, for 
example, Collins et al., 1997; Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). 
78 This is particularly true if the measurement error associated with assets’ fair value, especially for those with no 
active market, is not fully offset by the measurement errors of liabilities’ fair value (Landsman, 2007). 
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descriptive statistics on accounting and market variables where IFRS adoption period is divided 
into pre-crisis period (2005-2007) and crisis period (2008-2012). Panel A presents the descriptive 
statistics for the whole sample of financial firms. The mean and median of market value per share 
(P) appear to be significantly lower over the period of financial crisis relative to pre-crisis period. 
Likewise, the medians of book value of equity (BVPS) and earnings (EPS) per share are 
significantly lower in the financial crisis period. The means of book value of equity and earnings 
per share decrease during the crisis period, however, this decrease is only statistically significant 
for earnings.  
Table 4. 2 Descriptive statistics: pre-crisis and the financial crisis 
Panel A Price model variables for financial firms over two periods, pre-financial crisis (2005-2007) and 
the financial crisis (2008-2012), as well as IFRS adoption (2005-2012) 
 
Panel B Value relevance model variables for banks over two periods, pre-financial crisis (2005-2007) 
and the financial crisis (2008-2012), as well as IFRS adoption (2005-2012) 
Notes: The variables are defined in the notes of Table 4.1. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%. 
The differences in means between pre-IFRS adoption and IFRS adoption periods are tested using two sample t-test.79 The 
differences in medians are tested by ‘Wilcoxon signed rank test’.  
 
The descriptive statistics in Panel B for the sub-sample of banks are consistent with those of the 
whole sample of financial firms. That is, when the financial crisis hits the economies of the 
                                                          
79 Since the panels are unbalanced, t test is used for the difference in the means for independent samples. As a further 
check, paired-samples t-test is used to test the difference between the means between 2007 and 2008 amounts 
(implying that the observations from the two periods are not independent) and results remain substantially unaltered. 
 P  BVPS  EPS  
 IFRS 
Pre – 
Crisis Crisis diff IFRS 
Pre – 
Crisis Crisis diff IFRS 
Pre – 
Crisis Crisis diff 
Mean 26.55 41.70 17.30 *** 90.09 101.77 82.96 - 6.47 8.81 5.04 *** 
Std. Dev 43.92 59.09 27.43  282.30 300.91 270.24  20.31 22.59 18.66  
Coefficient 
of Variation 1.65 1.42 1.59 
 
3.13 2.96 3.26 
 
3.14 2.56 3.70 
 
P25 3.56 8.14 2.36  3.28 4.21 2.73  0.15 0.56 0.02  
Median 10.19 18.40 6.38 *** 8.77 10.78 7.44 *** 0.79 1.52 0.47 *** 
P75 26.25 44.60 18.51  23.65 25.59 22.23  2.43 3.79 1.57  
Obs 1536 582 954  1536 582 954  1536 582 954  
 P  BVPS  EPS   
IFRS 
Pre – 
Crisis Crisis diff IFRS 
Pre – 
Crisis Crisis diff IFRS 
Pre – 
Crisis Crisis diff 
Mean 28.10 43.58 18.60 *** 110.45 118.74 105.37 - 7.76 9.87 6.47 ** 
Std. Dev 43.73 57.39 28.82  314.54 327.12 306.68  22.20 23.63 21.18  
Coefficient 
of Variation 1.56 1.32 1.55 
 
2.85 2.75 2.91 
 
2.86 2.39 3.27 
 
P25 0.03 10.23 2.43  4.10 5.22 3.38  0.20 0.78 0.03  
Median 11.65 20.54 6.69 *** 9.74 11.84 8.75 *** 0.90 1.69 0.51 *** 
P75 260.0 49.93 20.35  27.40 30.10 26.57  2.84 4.82 1.93  
Obs 1168 444 724  1168 444 724  1168 444 724  
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countries under study, financial firms suffered reduced profitability and lower market value of 
equity. 
The dispersion around the mean, measured by the coefficient of variation, is higher during the 
crisis period for all the variables. Interestingly, the variation around the mean tends to increase 
by a greater extent for earnings (from 2.56 to 3.70 for the main sample) in comparison to book 
value of equity (from 2.96 to 3.26 for the main sample). This must be taken into account in 
evaluating the impact of financial crisis on the value relevance of book value of equity and 
earnings. The same pattern of higher coefficient of variation during the crisis period can be 
observed in Panel B for the sub-sample of banks. 
Country-level variables are presented in Table 4.3, the data are drawn from the annual Global 
Competitiveness Reports issued by World Economic Forum. The country-level measures 
include: Efficacy of corporate boards, Strength of auditing and reporting standards, Protection 
of minority interests, Regulation of securities exchanges, and Judicial independence. These 
measures are coded on a scale from 1 to 7, where a value of 1 is associated with weak institutional 
environment and 7 indicates a strong institutional setting. This research aims to investigate the 
changes in the value relevance of the balance sheet and the income statement as a function of 
institutional factors during the crisis period. To this end, the means of institutional environment 
measures for each country over the financial crisis period are used (i.e. the means of five years 
2008-2012).  
As presented in Table 4.3, three Nordic countries have the highest score in the measure of Efficacy 
of corporate boards. Sweden (5.88), followed by Norway (5.56) and Finland (5.54) have highly 
efficient corporate boards. At the other extreme, Greece (3.98), Italy (4.00), Poland (4.36) and 
Portugal (4.36) have the lowest scores.  
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Table 4. 3 Institutional factors (average values) over 2008-2012 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2008 – 2012 issued by World Economic Forum. 
Notes: Efficacy of corporate boards measures how corporate governance is characterised by investors and boards of directors in 
a country [1 = management has little accountability to investors and boards; 7 = investors and boards exert strong supervision of 
management decisions). Strength of auditing and reporting standards measures how financial auditing and reporting standards is 
assessed regarding company financial performance [1 = extremely weak; 7 = extremely strong]. Protection of minority interests 
assess to what extent the interests of minority shareholders are protected by the legal system [1 = not protected at all; 7 = fully 
protected]. Regulation of securities exchanges is an assessment for the regulation and supervision of securities exchanges [1 = 
ineffective; 7 = effective]. Judicial independence measures to what extent the judiciary is independent from influences of 
members of government, citizens, or firms [1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent].  
 
In terms of Strength of auditing and reporting standards, Finland (6.20), Sweden (6.18) and 
Norway (6.02) have the highest scores, while Italy (4.24), Greece (4.7) and Spain (4.92) are at 
the other end of the scale with the lowest scores. Sweden (6), Finland (5.94), and Norway (5.67) 
seem to have the strongest Protection of minority interest, whereas Italy (3.66), Spain (4.32) and 
Poland (4.18) have the weakest minority shareholders interest protection. For Regulation of 
securities exchanges, Sweden (5.92), Norway (5.82) and Finland (5.8) have the highest scores. 
On the other hand, Greece (4.34), Italy (4.28) and Spain (4.02) are associated with the lowest 
scores. Finally, Ireland (6.64), Finland (6.42), Denmark and Sweden (6.4) have the most 
independent judiciary from influences of members of government, citizens and firms (Judicial 
independence). At the other extreme, Spain (3.92), Italy (3.74) and Greece (3.54) have the least 
Country Efficacy of  
corporate 
boards 
Strength  
of auditing & 
reporting 
Protection 
 of minority 
interests 
Regulation of  
securities 
exchanges 
Judicial  
independence 
Austria 5.26 5.86 5.16 5.04 5.80 
Belgium 5.17 5.70 5.10 5.13 5.29 
Denmark 5.40 5.72 5.50 5.60 6.40 
Finland 5.54 6.20 5.94 5.80 6.42 
France 5.16 5.62 4.82 5.38 4.94 
Germany 5.32 5.50 5.28 5.10 6.12 
Greece 3.98 4.70 4.78 4.34 3.54 
Iceland 4.88 5.04 4.52 4.46 5.82 
Ireland 4.80 4.94 4.90 4.52 6.64 
Italy 4.00 4.24 3.66 4.28 3.74 
Luxemburg 5.28 5.88 5.14 5.78 5.94 
Netherland 5.40 5.94 5.32 5.42 6.36 
Norway 5.56 6.02 5.76 5.82 6.22 
Poland 4.36 4.98 4.18 4.96 4.08 
Portugal 4.36 4.98 4.60 4.94 4.40 
Spain 4.50 4.92 4.32 4.02 3.92 
Sweden 5.88 6.18 6.00 5.92 6.40 
Switzerland 5.34 5.70 4.92 5.70 6.36 
UK 5.38 5.92 5.32 5.20 6.12 
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independent judiciary. In sum, Sweden, Finland and Norway report high scores in most of 
country-level variables used, whereas Greece, Spain and Italy typically have the lowest scores. 
 
Table 4.4 reports the descriptive statistics for the firm-level corporate governance variables 
presented as averages over the period 2008-2012. Corporate governance data are collected from 
annual reports and/or corporate governance reports. Firstly, for the whole sample of financial 
firms, the mean of board meetings per year (Board meeting) is 11.36, ranging from a minimum 
of 3.50 to a maximum of 26.50 meetings. The second firm-specific variable is the audit committee 
size (Audit size), which is the total numbers of directors who serve on the audit committee. The 
mean of audit committee size is 4.09 members and it ranges from 2 to 7.60 members. The mean 
of audit committee meetings per year (Audit meeting) is 6.78 meetings with a minimum of 1 
meeting and maximum of 23.60 meetings. The number of blockholders (No of block) is the 
number of shareholders who hold more than 5% of voting rights, as reported by firms. The 
average number of blockholders is 2.26 ranging from 0 to 6.75 blockholders. Finally, the mean 
of annual audit fees paid to external auditors (Audit fee) is €7,261.2 (in thousands), ranging from 
a minimum of €0.82 to a maximum of €74,452.50. In the principle component analysis (described 
below) the natural logarithm of audit fees is used. Overall, these figures are consistent with 
previous studies focusing on European firms as well as on non-European firms (e.g., Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent, 2006; Erkens et al., 2012; Essen et al., 2013; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). 
The sub-sample of banks reveals higher score for firm-level corporate governance variables 
except for No of block (i.e. the number of shareholders holding 5% or more of voting rights). The 
mean of Board meeting is 12.55, with a minimum value of 3.50 and a maximum of 26.50 
meetings. The mean of Audit size is 4.20. Similarly to the whole sample, it ranges from 2 to 7.60 
directors. The mean value of Audit fee is 9206.6, ranging from €0.82 to €74452.5 (in thousands). 
Compared to the whole sample of financial firms, the sub-sample of banks has lower No of Block 
with a mean of 2.12 and a range from 0 to 6.75.   
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Table 4. 4 Descriptive statistics on corporate governance variables 
 Panel A Financial Firms (incl. Banks) Panel B Banks (only) 
 
Board 
meeting 
Audit 
size 
Audit 
meeting 
No of 
block 
Audit 
 fee 
Board 
meeting 
Audit 
size 
Audit 
meeting 
No of 
block 
Audit  
fee 
Mean 11.36 4.09 6.78 2.26 7261.2 12.55 4.20 7.79 2.12 9206.6 
Std. Dev 5.06 1.07 4.01 1.36 14301.3 5.44 1.16 4.24 1.38 16005.9 
Min 3.50 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.82 3.50 2.00 1.80 0.00 0.82 
P25 7.60 3.20 4.00 1.20 351.6 8.00 3.00 4.60 1.00 491.3 
Median 10.80 4.00 5.60 2.00 1199.5 11.80 4.00 7.00 2.00 1532.5 
P75 14.50 4.80 8.25 3.20 4210.8 16.20 5.00 10.80 3.00 6852.7 
Max 26.50 7.60 23.60 6.75 74452.5 26.50 7.60 23.60 6.75 74452.5 
N 470 470 470 470 470 320 320 320 320 320 
Notes: Board meeting is the number of annual board meetings. Audit size is the total numbers of directors who serve on the audit 
committee. Audit meeting is the number of annual audit committee meetings. No of block is the number of shareholders who hold 
more than 5% voting rights. Audit fee is the audit fees paid by a firm to external auditors, presented in thousands of euros. All the 
variables are the average of its annual values over the period 2008-2012. 
Table 4.5 presents the summary descriptive statistics on corporate governance variables as 
averages over the period 2008-2012 grouped by country. In both Panels A and B, the data shows 
a large cross-country variation in terms of corporate governance characteristics. For instance, in 
the whole sample of financial firms Greece and Ireland have the highest Board meeting, 20.92 
and 16.2 meetings respectively, in comparison to less than 5 meetings per year in Austria and 
Switzerland. Finland, Luxemburg and Sweden have around 3 directors serving in audit committee 
in average, whereas the number reaches more than five members in Greece, Belgium and Austria. 
For Audit meeting, Table 4.5 shows the lowest Board meeting in Germany (4), Switzerland (3.1) 
and Austria (1.9). At the other extreme, Portugal (12.33), Ireland (11.7) and Italy (10.85) reveal 
the highest number of Audit meeting. The financial firms in Greece, Italy, and Poland has less 
than 1.5 blockholders in average over the period (2008-2012), while those in Belgium, 
Netherland and Australia show an ownership structure with more than 3 blockholders. Finally in 
terms of Audit fee, Finland, Poland and Austria have the lowest fees, while France, Spain and 
Netherland show the highest audit fees paid. The descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of banks 
are very similar to those of the whole sample of financial firms. This variation across countries 
in relation to corporate governance practices is consistent with the variation in the institutional 
factors, such as market regulation and judicial independence. 
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Table 4. 5 Descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables by country 
Panel A Financial Firms (inc. Banks) 
Country Board meeting Audit size Audit meeting No of block Audit fee   
Mean 
Std. 
Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev N 
Austria 4.00 0.00 7.18 0.44 1.90 0.10 3.50 0.52 382.5 134.4 10 
Belgium 15.69 1.65 5.27 1.03 7.60 0.00 5.08 0.31 10953.3 4230.3 9 
Denmark 13.20 2.76 3.48 0.53 4.28 0.39 1.73 0.59 1273.2 1260.9 15 
Finland 14.85 4.85 2.90 0.58 6.67 4.87 2.45 0.58 741.9 831.2 20 
France 8.84 3.21 4.51 1.36 5.58 3.68 2.62 1.85 25905.5 24490.9 40 
Germany 6.00 1.03 4.30 0.31 4.00 1.45 1.50 0.31 2620.0 1941.7 10 
Greece 20.92 4.79 5.13 0.13 10.25 0.26 0.40 0.42 3516.1 484.8 6 
Ireland 16.20 5.58 5.00 0.41 11.70 1.96 2.00 1.45 5370.0 2798.9 10 
Italy 14.94 4.69 4.05 1.09 10.85 5.29 1.29 1.17 4443.2 9203.6 70 
Luxemburg 6.13 1.16 2.90 0.10 4.80 1.03 2.20 0.21 3141.9 2006.1 10 
Netherland 9.40 1.42 4.20 0.96 4.70 0.84 3.85 1.85 12000.6 19477.9 20 
Norway 14.89 3.24 3.22 0.34 6.73 1.53 1.61 0.49 847.3 980.7 35 
Poland 6.27 1.80 4.57 0.54 4.33 0.69 1.36 0.31 570.2 314.4 30 
Portugal 10.00 1.80 3.80 0.67 12.33 3.31 2.93 0.75 3366.7 1353.9 15 
Spain 13.90 1.59 4.75 0.46 10.25 2.73 2.90 0.91 15352.5 16320.7 20 
Sweden 14.77 3.05 3.10 0.10 5.20 1.48 2.37 0.41 1834.9 2045.1 30 
Switzerland 4.80 0.62 4.40 0.62 3.10 0.93 1.50 0.52 3349.7 750.8 10 
UK 9.30 4.12 4.12 0.74 5.55 2.57 2.66 1.25 9710.5 16673.6 110 
Total 11.36 5.06 4.094 1.07 6.780 4.01 2.263 1.36 7261.2 14301.4 470 
 
Panel B Banks (only) 
 
Country Board meeting Audit size Audit meeting No of block Audit fee  
 Mean 
Std. 
Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev N 
Austria 4.00 0.00 7.18 0.44 1.90 0.10 3.50 0.52 382.4 134.5 10 
Belgium 15.69 1.65 5.27 1.03 7.60 0.00 5.08 0.31 10953.2 4230.3 9 
Denmark 13.20 2.76 3.48 0.53 4.28 0.39 1.73 0.59 1273.1 1260.9 15 
Finland 19.50 1.55 3.00 0.00 10.13 4.68 2.90 0.52 403.8 36.1 10 
France 8.45 3.44 4.65 1.45 6.68 3.64 2.33 2.03 34032.2 23100.1 30 
Germany 5.00 0.00 4.60 0.00 2.60 0.00 1.80 0.00 740.0 0.00 5 
Greece 20.92 4.79 5.13 0.13 10.25 0.26 0.40 0.42 3516.1 484.8 6 
Ireland 16.20 5.58 5.00 0.41 11.70 1.96 2.00 1.45 5370.0 2798.9 10 
Italy 15.71 4.58 4.11 1.16 11.48 5.41 1.20 1.24 5071.9 9805.6 60 
Luxemburg 6.13 1.16 2.90 0.10 4.80 1.03 2.20 0.21 3141.8 2006.1 10 
Netherland 8.30 0.52 3.90 0.93 5.10 0.52 4.30 0.72 1060.6 477.9 10 
Norway 15.92 3.20 3.31 0.37 6.94 1.77 1.46 0.50 820.4 1106.3 25 
Poland 6.27 1.80 4.57 0.54 4.33 0.69 1.36 0.31 570.3 314.4 30 
Portugal 10.00 1.80 3.80 0.67 12.33 3.31 2.93 0.75 3366.7 1353.9 15 
Spain 13.90 1.59 4.75 0.46 10.25 2.73 2.90 0.91 15352.5 16320.6 20 
Sweden 15.24 3.14 3.12 0.10 5.54 1.39 2.44 0.41 2116.6 2133.5 25 
UK 12.63 5.51 4.47 0.75 7.53 1.64 2.20 1.20 31152.2 18908.4 30 
Total 12.55 5.44 4.20 1.16 7.79 4.24 2.12 1.38 9206.60 16005.89 320 
Notes: The variables are defined in the notes of Table 4.4. All the variables are the average of its annual values over the period 
2008-2012. 
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4.3 The impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance 
Table 4.6 Panel A reports the results of estimating the price model for the main sample of all 
financial firms, including banks, over the study period (1998-2012) and for the pre-IFRS adoption 
period (1998-2004), as well as the IFRS adoption period (2006-2012). Panel B reports the results 
for the sub-sample of banks. As pointed out in equation 3.12 in Chapter 3, this study uses fixed 
effect estimator with robust standard errors in the first empirical part of the thesis.  
Starting with Panel A, the estimated valuation coefficient on book value of equity per share, 𝑏1, 
is statistically insignificant for the entire sample period, and over both the pre-IFRS adoption and 
the IFRS adoption periods. In terms of earnings per share, the valuation coefficient, 𝑏2, is positive 
and statistically significant for the entire study period (at the 0.05 level). The coefficient increases 
from 1.672 (significant at the 0.05 level) in the pre-IFRS adoption period to 2.82 (significant at 
the 0.01 level) after IFRS adoption.  
Results of the same test for the sub-sample of banks show that the valuation coefficient on book 
value of equity per share, 𝑏1, is always negative but is statistically different from zero (significant 
at the 0.01 level) only for the pooled sample that includes the entire period.80 The valuation 
coefficient on earnings per share, 𝑏2, is always positive, and shows an increase from 2.389 
(significant at the 0.01 level) over the period of pre-IFRS adoption to 2.452 (significant at the 
0.01 level) after the mandatory introduction of IFRS in 2005. This evidence of changes in the 
coefficients following IFRS adoption is comparable to that reported by Agostino et al. (2011) and 
Manganaris et al. (2015) regarding European financial firms. 
                                                          
80 Section 4.4 provides possible explanations for the negative coefficient on the book value of equity. This 
explanation is not emphasised here given that different accounting standards are used to prepare the financial 
statements of the sample firms (i.e. local accounting standards before 2005 and IFRS since 2005), which might drive 
these results.  
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Table 4. 6 The impact of IFRS adoption on value relevance of accounting information 
  Panel A Financial Firms (inc. Banks) Panel B Banks (only) 
  Pooled Pre-IFRS IFRS Pooled Pre-IFRS IFRS 
VARIABLES Coeff. (1998-2012) (1998-2004) (2005-2012) (1998-2012) (1998-2004) (2005-2012) 
        
BVPS 𝑏1 0.151 0.0317 -0.0127 -0.107*** -0.0232 -0.0315 
  (0.191) (0.0625) (0.0394) (0.0373) (0.0697) (0.0442) 
EPS 𝑏2 2.733** 1.672** 2.82*** 3.192*** 2.389*** 2.452*** 
  (1.248) (0.682) (0.423) (0.566) (0.914) (0.538) 
Constant  25.33*** 42.02*** 28.25*** 34.84*** 33.27*** 29.14*** 
  (9.030) (4.217) (2.815) (4.823) (4.606) (4.564) 
        
Year dummy 
𝐷𝑡 
 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  2799 1,263 1536 2,131 963 1,168 
No of firms  194 194 194 148 148 148 
Within R2  0.416 0.242 0.514 0.378 0.244 0.494 
Difference   0.2719***   0.247***  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of the price model as follows: 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝑏2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+ δ𝐷𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 , where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share of firm i three months following the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is 
the book value of equity per share for firm i at the end of fiscal year t.  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported earnings per share of firm i over the 
fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. The difference in the value relevance of accounting information between pre-IFRS 
adoption period (1998-2004) and IFRS adoption period (2005-2012) is measured by the difference in the within explanatory 
power of price model, within 𝑅2, over the two periods.The significance of the difference in within 𝑅2 is tested based on Z statistics 
= (𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
2 − 𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒
2 )/ (𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 +  𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 )^0.5 where 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 and 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 are the variance of coefficients of determination of the within-group 
estimator using bootstrap methods following Agostino et al. (2011: 444). The results are reported for the entire sample of financial 
firms in Panel A and for the sub-sample of banks in Panel B.  
 
However, these results are not consistent with the view that IFRS balance sheet numbers, 
compared to income statements, become more value relevant following IFRS adoption. Some 
previous studies argue that since IFRS focus more on timely recognition of balance sheet items 
with a large use of fair value accounting (Ball, 2006), balance sheet numbers reported under IFRS 
tend to be more emphasised for valuation purposes (i.e. more value relevant) (Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Karampinis and Hevas, 2011; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). On the other hand, 
net income reported in accordance with fair value oriented accounting standards, such as IFRS, 
becomes more volatile, less persistent, and thereby less value relevant (Schipper and Vincent, 
2003; Ball, 2006; Hodder et al., 2006; Hung and Subramanyam, 2007). Overall, the results 
reported in this chapter demonstrate that there could be a change in the valuation weight 
(valuation focus) between equity book value versus net income numbers after IFRS enforcement 
(see Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Devalle et al., 2010; Agostino et al., 2011). Yet investigating 
the changes in the valuation roles of equity book value and net income as a result of IFRS 
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adoption is beyond the scope of the thesis. It is worth mentioning that the changes in the valuation 
weights of the balance sheet and the income statement could be caused by the financial crises that 
hit the economies of the countries in the sample over the period under study. Also, several factors 
other than financial reporting standards might drive these results, such as country-level 
institutional environment and firm-level characteristics. Some of these factors are addressed in 
the examination of the valuation roles of the balance sheet and income statement during the crisis 
period (see Section 4.4 in this chapter).  
As discussed in chapter 3, the valuation coefficient on book value of equity for a sample of 
financial firms is expected to be close to one. The results in Table 4.6 are not consistent with this 
expectation. One reason for this could be the scaling methods used in this thesis. Other accounting 
scholars use alternative scaling methods than number of shares, such as lagged total assets (e.g. 
Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; O'Hanlon and Taylor, 2007; Manganaris et al., 2015) and lagged 
book value of equity (e.g. Lai and Krishnan, 2009; Rees and Valentincic, 2013; Middleton, 2015). 
As a robustness check, this thesis uses both the lagged total assets (Section 4.6) as well as the 
lagged book value of equity (Appendix V) as alternative scaling methods. With the alternative 
scaling methods the coefficient on book value of equity is positive and greater in magnitude as 
well as closer to one (i.e. its theoretical value). The findings from the estimations using alternative 
scaling methods yield inference that are largely similar to those obtained from the main 
estimations scaled by the number of ordinary shares. It is worth mentioning there is no consensus 
among accounting researchers on the best scaling methods that eliminate scale effect. Barth and 
Clinch (2009) show evidence that the unscaled price model and the price model scaled by the 
number of ordinary shares perform best, among other specifications, in mitigating the scale 
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effect.81  Therefore, this thesis uses the number of outstanding shares to scale all the market and 
accounting variables in the price model.  
An alternative explanation for the unexpected magnitude of the coefficient on book value of 
equity is that the coefficient is constrained to be the same across the countries under study. 
However, most of the countries under study do not have a sufficient number of observations to 
draw a conclusion from single country regressions.    
The first hypothesis, H1A, to be tested is on the impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance 
of accounting information. The within explanatory power (within 𝑅2) is the measure under 
scrutiny, capturing the overall value relevance of book value of equity and earnings. For the main 
sample of financial firms, the within 𝑅2 is 0.242 in the pre-IFRS adoption period and increases 
to 0.514 over the IFRS adoption period. The Z statistics, which is computed using bootstrapping 
techniques (see Agostino et al., 2011: 444), shows that there is a significant increase in the within 
explanatory power of price model after IFRS enforcement. Similarly, for the sub-sample of 
banks, the within 𝑅2 increases from 0.244 in the pre-IFRS adoption period to 0.494 following 
IFRS adoption, and this increase is statistically significant. The results suggest that mandatory 
IFRS adoption results in an improvement in the value relevance of financial statements prepared 
by financial firms in Europe. This supports the first hypothesis, H1A, which predicts that the 
value relevance of accounting information increases following mandatory IFRS adoption by 
financial firms. These findings are comparable to those obtained in previous studies that 
document an increase in the value relevance of accounting information after the mandatory 
introduction of IFRS (Filip, 2010; Devalle et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011).  
                                                          
81 Barth and Clinch (2009) posit that compared to other apparently size related scalers, such as book value of equity 
and market value of equity, the number of outstanding shares is a better proxy for scale, because it does not fluctuate 
widely on a yearly basis, as well as it is less likely to be affected by variation unrelated to the scale effects (such as 
economy-wide factors) that cause econometric difficulties. 
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However, the findings of this study are not consistent with those of prior research reporting a 
decrease or no improvement in the value relevance of financial statements after mandating IFRS 
in lieu of domestic financial reporting standards (see, e.g., Karampinis and Hevas, 2011; Aubert 
and Grudnitski, 2011; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). In this context two observations should be made. 
First, compared to the longer time span included in this empirical analysis (eight years of IFRS 
adoption), existing studies are conducted based on samples related to the early years of IFRS 
adoption. Investors as well as financial statements analysts might not be familiar with the new 
standards in the early period of implementation (Li, 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Houqe et al., 2012). 
Additionally, firms in the transition to IFRS period typically continue their pre-IFRS national 
accounting “tradition” (Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Kvaal and Nobes, 2012). Taken together, the 
effect of IFRS adoption could be uncertain in the early years of adoption. Second, many previous 
studies include firms from different industries in their samples, and typically exclude financial 
firm, which also might explain the different results in this study. Accordingly, Barth et al. (2012) 
find the adjustment to net income from local accounting standards to IFRS relating to financial 
instrument under IAS 39 is value relevant for financial firms only, but not for other non-financial 
firms. More importantly, the empirical findings of this study support the earlier evidence of 
positive impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of financial statements prepared by 
European financial firms (i.e. the results of Agostino et al., 2011), which is consistent with the 
view that IFRS adoption results in higher accounting information quality.  
 
4.4 The impact of the financial crisis on the value relevance 
The second hypothesis, H2A, examines the impact of the crisis period (2008-2012) on the 
valuation roles of the book value of equity and earnings. The analysis starts by evaluating the 
influence of the financial crisis on the combined value relevance of the book value of equity and 
earnings. As reported in Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.7, the difference in the within 𝑅2 between 
the period of pre-crisis and the crisis period is not statistically significant for both the whole 
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sample of financial firms and the sub-sample of banks. Interestingly, the valuation coefficient on 
book value of equity per share increases from 0.0065 (statistically insignificant) for the pre-crisis 
period to 0.0856 and becomes significant at the 0.01 level during the financial crisis for the whole 
sample. The subsample of banks confirms this pattern. For the whole sample of financial firms, 
the valuation coefficient on earnings appears to decrease sharply from 3.095 (significant at the 
0.01 level) over the period of pre-crisis to 0.769 (significant at the 0.01 level) during the crisis 
period. The sub-sample of banks shows consistent results where the coefficient on earnings 
decreases from 3.745 (significant at the 0.05 level) to 0.728 (significant at the 0.01 level). These 
results are in line with the prediction of higher (lower) value relevant book value of equity 
(earnings) over the crisis period. The direction and the significance of these changes are examined 
below (Column (3) of Table 4.7).  
Column (3) in Table 4.7 presents the results on the impact of financial crisis starting in 2008 on 
the value relevance of book value of equity and earnings. In the fully interacted model in Column 
(3), the increment to the intercept, 𝑏1, which captures the effect of crisis period on market value 
per share, is negative and significantly different from zero. This can reflect the decrease in market 
value of equity as a result of financial crisis, which is consistent with the descriptive statistics 
depicting a lower equity market value on average for the period of the financial crisis (2008-
2012) compared to the pre-crisis period (2005-2007). The coefficient on BVPS, 𝑏2, can be 
interpreted as the valuation of book value of equity before financial crisis. The valuation 
coefficient 𝑏2 is negative but statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficient on 
earnings before the crisis period, 𝑏4, is positive (equals 3.312) and statistically different from 
zero at the 0.01 level. Earnings play a more important valuation role relative to book value of 
equity before the crisis period. This is consistent with the results of Agostino et al. (2011) and 
Manganaris et al. (2015) that net income figures are more emphasised for valuation purposes over 
the period of IFRS adoption for a sample of European financial firms. 
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It is worth mentioning here that the model in column (3) is not exactly the combination of the 
models in columns (1) and (2). This is because Crisis has not been interacted with year dummy 
variables included in the model (3).82 Besides, the thesis uses firm fixed effect models in the first 
empirical part, which implies that the variable Crisis needs to be interacted with firm fixed effect 
to yield a model in column (3) equivalent to the combination of those reported in column (1) and 
(2).  If the thesis used OLS regressions and Crisis were interacted with year dummy variables, 
the estimated coefficient on book value of equity (earnings) in column (3) would be the same as 
that in column (1) and the interaction in column (3) should reflect the difference between the 
respective coefficients from models (1) and (2). The models in columns (1) and (2) are introduced 
here only as a complementary analysis to evaluate the changes in the combined value relevance 
of book value of equity and earnings during the crisis period. 
Table 4. 7 The impact of the financial crisis on the value relevance  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. Column (1) and (2) report the fixed effect estimations of the price model as follows: 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 +  𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆 +
𝑏2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+ δ𝐷𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡. where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value of firm i three months following the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book 
value of equity per share for firm i at the end of fiscal year t.   𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡is the reported earnings per share of firm i over the fiscal year 
t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. Column (3) reports the fixed effect estimation of 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑏3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡over the period 2005-2012. Crisis is a dummy variable coded 1 
                                                          
82 The crisis dummy variables, Crisis, is not interacted with the year dummy variables since the year dummies are 
not those of interest in this study and they have been added to the model to control for the year effect.  
83 The coefficients correspond only to the regressions in Column (3) evaluating the impact of the financial crisis. 
  Panel A Financial Firms (incl. Banks) Panel B Banks (only) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
  Pre-Crisis Crisis Entire Pre-Crisis Crisis Entire 
 Coeff.83 (2005-2007) (2007-2012) (2005-2012) (2005-2007) (2007-2012) (2005-2012) 
        
Crisis 𝑏1   -17.88***   -22.08*** 
    (2.717)   (3.035) 
BVPS 𝑏2 0.00646 0.0856*** -0.0893 -0.0702 0.0888*** -0.152** 
  (0.0621) (0.0136) (0.0564) (0.0974) (0.0141) (0.0708) 
Crisis* BVPS 𝑏3   0.137***   0.198*** 
    (0.0520)   (0.0662) 
EPS 𝑏4 3.095*** 0.769*** 3.312*** 3.745** 0.728*** 4.241*** 
  (0.841) (0.210) (0.723) (1.469) (0.223) (0.935) 
Crisis* EPS 𝑏5   -2.095***   -2.941*** 
    (0.768)   (0.990) 
Constant 𝑏0 19.34*** 4.769*** 26.91*** 20.89*** 3.030** 25.33*** 
  (4.874) (1.167) (2.674) (4.669) (1.512) (3.846) 
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  yes yes Yes yes yes Yes 
Observations  582 954 1,536 444 724 1,168 
Number of firms  194 194 194 148 148 148 
𝑅2 (within)  0.388 0.406 0.537 0.395 0.417 0.537 
Difference  0.018   0.022   
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for the years of crisis period (2008-2012) and zero otherwise. The difference in the value relevance of accounting information 
between pre-crisis period (2005-2007) and crisis period (2005-2012) is measured by the difference in the within explanatory 
power of price model, within 𝑅2, over the two periods. The significance of the difference in within 𝑅2 is tested based on Z 
statistics = (𝑅𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠
2 − 𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒
2 )/ (𝜎𝑅𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠2
2 + 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 )^0.5 where 𝜎𝑅𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠2
2 and 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 are the variance of coefficients of determinations of the 
within-group estimator using bootstrap methods following Agostino et al. (2011: 444). Panel A shows the statistics for the entire 
sample of financial firms and Panel B reports those of the sub-sample of banks. Coeff. presents the coefficients corresponding 
only to the regressions in Column (3) evaluating the impact of the financial crisis. 
 
The main valuation coefficients of interest are those on the interaction between financial crisis 
and accounting numbers, 𝑏3 and 𝑏5 in equation (3.14). They reflect the impact of financial crisis 
on the valuation roles of book value of equity and earnings, as summary measures of the balance 
sheet and income statement, respectively. Based on the empirical findings of Barth et al. (1998a), 
this study hypothesises that the value relevance of book value of equity increases, while that of 
net income decreases as the financial crisis hits. As such, 𝑏3 is predicted to be positive and 𝑏5 to 
be negative. The interaction term between financial crisis and book value of equity is positive (𝑏3 
= 0.137) and statistically different from zero (at the 0.01 level), suggesting an increase in the 
valuation role of balance sheet figures. In contrast, the valuation coefficient on the interaction 
between financial crisis and earning is negative (𝑏3 = -2.095) and significant at the 0.01 level. 
These results confirm the prediction of higher (lower) value relevant book value of equity (net 
income) as the financial crisis evolves.  
Turning to the sub-sample of banks in Panel B, in Column (3) the coefficient on BVPS, 𝑏2, can 
be interpreted as the valuation of equity book value of equity prior the crisis. 𝑏2 is unexpectedly 
negative and significant for the sub-sample of banks. One possible reason put forward by Hao et 
al. (2011) is that the valuation coefficient on book value of equity has a negative value for high 
profitable firms. For such firms the investment growth causes “equity value to decrease with 
equity book value” (Hao et al., 2011: 607).84,85 This might be the case for European banks before 
the crisis period when there had been a significant increase in Euro-dominated securitisation by 
                                                          
84 In particular, they find that growth has a negative effect on the slope of the market value and book value of equity 
for firms with high profitability.  
85 Another possible reason for negative book value of equity could be constraining the coefficient on equity book 
value to be the same across countries (Barth et al., 2014). 
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banks since 2004 (Altunbas et al., 2009). In particular, banks could show high profitability in this 
period given that they tend to securitise mortgage loans and move them off their balance sheets. 
Higher profitability due to securitisation could be obtained as a result of the reduction in assets 
or via the reinvestment of the freed-up resources (Martínez-Solano et al., 2009). Moreover, 
negative coefficient on book value of equity is reported in some prior studies (see, for example, 
Amir and Lev, 1996; Shortridge, 2004, Barth et al., 2014). The coefficient on the interaction 
between financial crisis and book value of equity equals 0.198 and is statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. Column (3) also reveals that the coefficient on earnings before the crisis, 𝑏4, is 
positive and statistically significant. The valuation coefficient on the interaction term between 
financial crisis and earning is negative (𝑏3 = -2.941) and statistically different from zero at the 
0.01 level. That is, the results of the sub-sample of banks confirm those of the entire sample that 
the book value of equity tends to be more value relevant, whereas earnings are less value relevant 
when the financial crisis hit the economy since 2008.  
In sum, the empirical findings reported in Table 4.7 for both the whole sample and the sub-sample 
of banks support the prediction on the equity valuation implication of the distinctive roles of the 
balance sheet and the income statement during the financial crisis. These results confirm H2A, 
which posits an increase in the value relevance of equity book value in comparison to a decrease 
in that of earnings as the crisis evolves. The findings of this study are comparable to previous 
studies investigating the value relevance of financial statements as a function of firm-specific 
financial health (Barth et al., 1998a) as well as the Asian financial crisis (Graham et al., 2000; 
Davis-Friday et al., 2006).  
4.5 The impact of institutional environment and corporate governance 
4.5.1 Institutional environment 
To evaluate the impact of the institutional environment on the value relevance of book value of 
equity and net income during the crisis period, as stated in H3A, a multiplicative interaction model 
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is chosen where the partial effect of accounting information on market value of equity is 
conditional on the institutional environment. In order to summarise the underlying characteristics 
of institutional environment, as discussed in Chapter 3, the present study creates a standardised 
institutional score, INSSCORE, based on the principal-component factor analysis of five country-
level variables: Efficacy of corporate boards, Strength of auditing and reporting, Protection of 
minority shareholders’ interests, Regulation of securities exchanges, and Judicial independence. 
Previous accounting studies follow such approach to capture country-specific characteristics (see, 
for example, Nobes, 2011; Nobes and Stadler, 2013).  
Table 4.8, Panel A, reports the correlation coefficients among the institutional environment 
factors. Panel B presents the factor loadings for the “varimax orthogonal rotation”,86 which depict 
the weights of individual variables in calculating the institutional score. As expected, all 
institutional variables are positively loaded in constructing INSSCORE. The factor analysis 
results in a factor with the eigenvalue87 of 4.513, which captures more than 0.90 of the total 
variation in the original data. The second column reports the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index 
of sampling adequacy (see Kaiser, 1974). The mean of this measure is 0.8055 and much greater 
than the suggested threshold 0.50, indicating that INSSCORE captures the underlying common 
factors of the five institutional variables used (Stewart, 1981). Finally, Panel C depicts the 
descriptive statistics of INSSCORE where the mean is 0 and standard deviation is 1 owning to 
standardisation. An inverse decile rank, INSRANK, is created ranging from 0, which reflects the 
highest values of INSSCORE (strong institutional environment) to 9 representing the lowest 
values of INSSCORE (weak institutional environment), and then it is scaled by 9.  
                                                          
86 In order to simplify the factor structure and hence to make its interpretation easier, Varimax rotation is applied to 
the factors. Varimax rotation, developed by Kasier (1958), is most widely used rotation method (Abdi, 2003). It 
makes each variable to be associated with one (or only a small number) of factors, as well as each factor to represent 
only a small number of variables.  
87 Eigenvalues can be defined as a set of scalers that are associated with a linear system of equations (as such as a 
matrix equation). They are sometimes called characteristic values, quadratic roots, proper values or latent roots 
(Nobes, 2011). 
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Table 4. 8 Principal component analysis of institutional environnent variables 
Panel A Correlations 
 Efficacy of Strength Protection Regulation of Judicial 
 
corporate 
boards 
of auditing & 
reporting 
of minority 
interests 
securities 
exchanges 
Independence 
Efficacy of corporate boards 1     
      
Strength of auditing & 
reporting 0.9669 1    
 (0.000)     
Protection of minority 
interests 0.8980  0.9177  1   
 (0.000) (0.000)    
Regulation of securities 
exchanges 0.8784  0.8810  0.8232 1  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Judicial independence 0.9150  0.8575  0.8674 0.7702 1 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Panel B Institutional environment factor score analysis and sample adequacy 
 
Variables 
Factor Loading 
Coefficients 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy88 
Efficacy of corporate boards 0.9814 0.7398 
Strength of auditing & reporting 0.9742 0.7585 
Protection of minority interests 0.9491 0.8509 
Regulation of securities exchanges 0.9156 0.9589 
Judicial independence 0.9284 0.7751 
Variation Explained 0.9027 Mean KMO =0.8055 
Eigenvalue 4.51327  
 
Panel C Descriptive statistics of institutional environment score and ranking 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
INSSCORE 954 0.00 1.00 -1.88 -0.99 0.35 0.74 1.41 
INSRANK 954 0.44 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.44 0.78 0.89 
Notes: (1) Efficacy of corporate boards, (2) Strength of auditing and reporting, (3) Protection of minority interests, (4) Regulation 
of securities exchanges, and (5) Judicial independence are the institutional environment variables extracted from Global 
Competitiveness Report, reported as means for the period 2008-2012. The institutional environment varaibles are defined in the 
notes of Table 4.3. These measures are coded on a scale from 1 to 7, where a value of 1 is associated with weak institutional 
factor and 7 indicates a strong institutional setting. Panel A shows Pearson correlation coefficients among institutional variables. 
The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Panel B reports factor loading coefficients as well as Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index of 
sampling adequacy for institutional factors using the five institutional variables. Panel D presents the descriptive statistics on 
INSSCORE and INSRANK. INSCORE is the standardised score calculated using the factor analysis n Panel B. INSRANK is the 
inverse decile rank of INSSCORE with a range from 0 (strong institutional environment) to 1 (weak institutional environment). 
 
                                                          
88 “The KMO statistic for an individual variable is the sum of the squared correlation coefficients between this 
variable and all other variables (but not with itself) divided by this value added to the sum of the squared partial 
correlation coefficients. The KMO statistic for multiple variables is the sum of these statistics computed for all 
variables in the analysis” (Hutcheson and Sofroniou1999: 224). KMO statistics measures the extent to which the 
underlying variables belong together and hence suitable for factor analysis. Kaiser (1974) suggests the threshold of 
KMO = 0.50 under which it is considered that there is little variation shared between variables to be meaningfully 
explained using principle component factor analysis.  
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Panel A in Table 4.9 reports the results of the price model after adding the interactions between 
the institutional environment rank and both book value of equity and earnings over 2008-2012 
for the whole sample of financial firms. The coefficient on book value of equity, 𝑏1, can be 
interpreted as the valuation of equity book value for firms in countries with strong institutional 
environment. It appears to be negative but not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Moving 
to the coefficient of interest, 𝑏2, it is predicted that weak institutional environment results in more 
value relevant book value of equity during the financial crisis period. The estimated coefficient 
on the interaction between equity book value and institutional rank is positive and statistically 
significant (𝑏2= 0.405). Since the strength of institutional environment ranges from 0, indicating 
a strong environment, to 1, reflecting weak institutional environment, these results suggest that 
investors in firms domiciled in countries with weak institutional environments appear to place 
more valuation weight on equity book value. The coefficient on reported earnings is positive (𝑏3= 
0.865) and different from zero at the 0.05 level for firms in strong institutional environment. It is 
expected that investors in weak institutional environment will place a lower valuation weight on 
income statement numbers during the crisis. The valuation coefficient on the interaction between 
the strength of institutional environment and earnings, 𝑏4  = 0.164 is positive, contrary to the 
predication; however it is not statistically significant. This does not support the significant impact 
of the institutional environment on the valuation weight of earnings over the crisis period. 
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Table 4. 9 The impact of institutional environment on value relevance 
 
Coeff. Panel A Financial Firms (incl. Banks) Panel B Banks (only) 
    
BVPS 𝑏1 -0.120* -0.135 
  (0.0705) (0.0822) 
INSRANK* BVPS 𝑏2 0.405*** 0.439*** 
  (0.136) (0.158) 
EPS 𝑏3 0.865** 0.911* 
  (0.393) (0.483) 
INSRANK * EPS 𝑏4 0.164 0.0428 
  (0.731) (0.886) 
Constant 𝑏0 3.972*** 1.708 
  (0.914) (1.254) 
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  954 724 
Number of firms  194 148 
𝑅2 (within)  0.415 0.427 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 
𝑏4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡over the crisis period from 2008-2012 where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the share price of a firm i three months 
following the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity per share for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡is the 
reported earnings per share of firm i over the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. INSRANK is institutional rank ranging 
from 0 (weak institutional environment) to 9 (strong institutional environment), which is constructed based on the factor score, 
INSSCORE, using principal-component factor analysis of five institutional variables collected over the period 2008-2012: (1) 
Efficacy of corporate boards, (2) Strength of auditing and reporting standards, (3) Protection of minority shareholders’ interests, 
(4) Regulation of securities exchanges, and (5) Judicial independence. The institutional environment variables are defined in the 
notes of Table 4.3. Panel A shows the statistics for the entire sample of financial firms and Panel B reports those of the sub-
sample of banks. 
 
The results suggest that the institutional environment plays a key role in determining the valuation 
weight of the balance sheet but not in that of income statement during the financial crisis. In 
particular, investors tend to rely more on the balance sheet numbers for valuation purposes in the 
countries with weak institutional environments during the crisis period. That is, the third 
hypothesis in this empirical part is partially supported, since H3A states that during the financial 
crisis the value relevance of equity book value increases and that of net income decreases for 
firms in countries characterised by a weak institutional environment. Moreover, there is 
consistency in the results for the main sample of financial firms and those for the sub-sample of 
banks. These findings are comparable with those obtained from the study of Davis-Friday et al. 
(2006) suggesting that the institutional settings have an influence on the value relevance of book 
value of equity but not on that of net income during the Asian crisis period. In general, the 
findings are in line with previous research emphasising the importance of institutional 
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environment in determining the quality of accounting information (Black and White, 2003; Leuz 
et al., 2003; Anandarajan et al. 2011; Huoqe et al., 2012). 
4.5.2 Corporate governance 
Additionally, this study evaluates in H4A whether firm-level corporate governance has an impact 
on the value relevance of book value of equity and net income during the crisis period. As such, 
interaction terms between the strength of corporate governance and both equity book value and 
earnings are added to the price model estimated over 2008-2012.  
A standardised governance score, GOVSCORE, is created using the principal-component factor 
analysis of five firm-level governance variables: Board Meeting, Audit Size, Audit Meeting, No 
of Block and Audi Fee.   
Panel A of Table 4.10 provides the correlation coefficients between corporate governance 
variables. The principal-component factor analysis isolates random measurement errors that 
might be associated with corporate governance variables (Baik et al., 2009). Previous accounting 
studies adopt this approach to summarise firm-specific characteristics (Larcker et al., 2007; Song 
et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2012). Panel B reports the weights (i.e. the factor loadings for the varimax 
orthogonal rotation) used to calculate the single factor representing corporate governance 
mechanisms at firm level, GOVSCORE. With the exception of No of block, the corporate 
governance variables are positively associated with the constructed variable, GOVSCORE. Large 
shareholders can extract private benefits from their position as controlling investors at the 
expenses of minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Faccio et al., 2001; Conyon and 
Florou, 2002; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Liu and Magnan, 2011), which might explain the 
negative association with GOVSCORE. 
The generated governance variable, GOVSCORE, has an eigenvalue of 1.7852 and captures more 
than 0.35 of the total variance in the original corporate governance variables. As it can be noticed 
in Panel B, the mean of Kaiser-Meyer-Olk (KMO), the measure of sampling adequacy, is 0.5522 
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which is greater than 0.50, suggesting that the constructed variable, GOVSCORE, well represents 
the five underlying corporate governance variables. GOVSCORE is a standardised variable; 
thereby its mean and standards deviation are 0 and 1, respectively (see Panel C of Table 4.10). 
Furthermore, corporate governance quality is highly associated with country-level institutional 
environment characteristics, such as investor protection and legal enforcement (Durnev and Kim, 
2005; La Porta et al., 2000). To address this concern, corporate governance score, GOVSCORE, 
is regressed on country dummy variables, COUNTRY (see, Verriest et al., 2013). The residuals 
from this regression are used to create an inverse decile rank of corporate governance, GOVRANK 
that ranges from 0 for firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms to 9 for those with 
weak governance mechanisms, and then scaled by 9. Panel C of Table 4.10 reports the descriptive 
statistics on corporate governance score, GOVSCOR, as well as governance rank, GOVRANK. 
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Table 4. 10 Principal component analysis of corporate governance variables 
Panel A Correlations 
 Board Meeting Audit Size Audit Meeting No of block Audit Fee 
Board Meeting 1 
    
 
     
Audit Size -0.016 1 
   
 (0.660) 
    
Audit Meeting 0.5728 0.1324 1 
  
 (0.000) (0.001) 
   
No of block -0.2254 0.0005 -0.256 1 
 
 (0.000) (0.989) (0.000) 
  
Audit Fee 0.0191 0.2214 0.155 -0.1131 1 
 (0.599) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
 
 
Panel B Corporate governance factor score analysis and sample adequacy 
Variables 
Factor Loading 
Coefficients 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy 
Board Meeting 0.7802 0.5307 
Audit Size 0.2192 0.4835 
Audit Meeting 0.8493 0.5407 
No of block -0.5478 0.7523 
Audit Fee 0.3273 0.5505 
Variation Explained 0.3570 Mean KMO =0.5522 
Eigenvalue 1.7852  
 
Panel C Descriptive statistics of corporate governance score and ranking 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
GOVSCORE 470 0.00 1.00 -2.18 -0.74 -0.16 0.64 3.37 
GOVRANK 470 0.50 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.44 0.78 1.00 
Notes: the number reported for five firm-level corporate governance variables are the means over the period 2008-2012. The 
variables include (1) Board Meeting, (2) Audit Size (3) Audit Meeting, (4) No of block, and (5) Audi Fee. The corporate governance 
variables are defined in the notes of Table 4.4. Panel A report the Pearson correlation coefficients among corporate governance 
variables. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Panel B shows the factor loading coefficients as well as the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy for the constructed governance variable generated based the principle component 
factor analysis. Panel D presents the descriptive statistics on GOVSCORE and GOVRANK. GOVSCOE is the standardised score 
calculated using the factor analysis shown in Panel B. GOVRANK is an inverse decile rank of the residuals from the regression 
of GOVSCORE on country dummy variables, COUNTRY. GOVRANK ranges from 0 for strong corporate governance mechanisms 
to 1 reflecting weak governance mechanisms.  
 
Panel A of Table 4.11 reports the results of testing the impact of corporate governance on the 
value relevance of equity book value and earnings for the whole sample of financial firms. The 
coefficient on book value of equity (𝑏1= -0.257) is negative but not statistically significant, which 
can interpreted as the valuation on equity book value for firms with strong corporate governance. 
The interaction between corporate governance and book value of equity is positive (𝑏2= 2.450), 
as expected, and statistically significant. Corporate governance rank ranges from 0 for firms with 
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strong corporate governance to 1 for those with weak governance mechanisms.89 Therefore, the 
positive coefficient on the interaction between corporate governance and equity book value 
indicates a higher valuation for balance sheet numbers of firms with weaker corporate governance 
mechanisms. The valuation coefficient on earnings is positive and not statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level. The interaction between the strength of corporate governance and earnings is 
negative (𝑏2 =-4.707), in line with the expectation; however, it is not statistically significant. 
Hence, corporate governance practices appear to not have significant impact on the value 
relevance of earnings during the crisis. 
 
For the subsample of banks, the valuation coefficient on book value of equity is negative and that 
of earnings are positive (𝑏1= -0.413, 𝑏3= 0.220); yet they are not statistically significant. It is 
noteworthy that in the interaction models for both the main sample of financial firms and the sub-
sample of banks, the estimated coefficients on book value of equity and earnings are not 
statistically significant. These insignificant coefficients on accounting information are not 
uncommon in interaction models due to the potential high correlation between interaction terms 
and their constituents (Agostino et al., 2011; Wooldridge, 2012).90 The coefficients of interest 
here are those on the interactions between corporate governance ranking variable and both equity 
book value and net income. As predicted, the valuation coefficient on the interaction between 
corporate governance and book value of equity is positive, 𝑏2=2.704, and statistically different 
from zero at the 0.01 level. For the interaction between corporate governance and earnings, the 
valuation coefficient is positive, 𝑏4= 0.846, but statistically insignificant.  
                                                          
89 The original variable is a decile rank from 0 to 9, but then it is scaled by 9.  
90 The multicollinearity in interaction models affects the significance of the constituent variables but not that of the 
interaction term (i.e. the variables of interest), and thus it is not a major concern (Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990; 
Gul and Chia, 1994; Wooldridge, 2012). In fact, testing for multicollinearity shows relatively high Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIFs over 5) on BVPS and EPS in the governance interaction model for both the main sample of financial 
firms and the sub-sample of banks.  
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To sum up, the results suggest that the balance sheet tends to be more value relevant in the period 
of financial crisis for firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms, and these results are 
consistent for both the whole sample of financial firms and the sub-sample of banks.  
Table 4. 11 The impact of corporate governance on value relevance 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 
+ 𝑏4𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 over the crisis period, 2008-2012, where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is market value per share of firm i three months 
following the end of fiscal year t.𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity per share for firm i at the end of fiscal year t.   𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 is the 
reported earnings per share of firm i over the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. GOVRANK is a decile rank of 
corporate governance at firm level. Principle-component factor analysis is used to construct a corporate governance score, 
GOVSCORE, based on the means of five firm-level corporate governance variables collected over 2008-2012 including: (1) Board 
Meeting, (2) Audit Size (3) Audit Meeting, (4) No of block, and (5) Audi Fee. The corporate governance variables are defined in 
the notes of Table 4.4. To filter country-specific variations, GOVSCORE is regressed on dummy variables for countries and the 
residuals are used to from a decile governance rank, GOVRANK. GOVRANK ranges from 0 (weak corporate governance) to 9 
(strong corporate governance), and then scaled by 9. Panel A shows the statistics for the entire sample of financial firms and Panel 
B reports those of the sub-sample of banks. 
 
The impact of corporate governance on the valuation coefficient of the income statement is 
marginal. As such, these results provide partial support to the fourth hypothesis, H4A, which 
predicts that in times of financial crisis the value relevance of equity book value increases and 
that of net income decreases for firms with weak corporate governance. The overall findings of 
corporate governance influence are comparable to previous studies reporting a significant 
association between firm-specific corporate governance practices and accounting information 
quality (Frankel et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Larcker et al., 2007; Verriest et al., 2013). 
  Panel A Financial Firms (incl. Banks) Panel B Banks (only) 
 
Coeff. (2) (2) 
    
BVPS 𝑏1 -0.257 -0.413 
  (0.481) (0.497) 
GOVRANK* BVPS 𝑏2 2.450** 2.704*** 
  (1.009) (0.999) 
EPS 𝑏3 1.278* 0.220 
  (0.679) (1.083) 
GOVRANK * EPS 𝑏4 -1.293 0.846 
  (1.393) (2.517) 
Constant 𝑏0 -4.707 -4.279 
  (3.883) (4.401) 
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  470 320 
Number of firms  95 65 
𝑅2 (within)  0.611 0.647 
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4.6 Additional analysis and robustness checks 
For additional insights into the findings, this thesis partitions the sample into small and large 
financial institutions since information asymmetry problems are more likely to be higher for 
smaller firms (Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987). Financial firms with average total assets that are 
lower than the median for the entire sample are classified as small firms (1419 observations 
related to 97 firms), whereas those with total assets above the median as large firms (1380 
observations related to 97 firms). As shown in Table 4.12 Panel A, for both the pre-IFRS adoption 
and the IFRS adoption periods, the book value of equity is not statistically significant for the 
subsample of small firms. The coefficient on earnings slightly decreases from 2.716 before IFRS 
adoption to 2.348 in the period of IFRS adoption; and it is statistically significant for both periods. 
More importantly, the explanatory power of the price model decreases by 0.01 from 0.524 for the 
pre-IFRS adoption period to 0.514 for the IFRS adoption period; yet the difference is not 
statistically significant.  
Moving to the sub-sample of large financial firms, the valuation coefficient on book value of 
equity is positive and significant at the 0.01 level for the pre-IFRS adoption period; and it 
decreases and become statistically insignificant after mandating IFRS. The coefficient on 
earnings per share is statistically significant for both periods and appears to increase following 
the mandatory introduction of IFRS. The explanatory power (within 𝑅2) significantly increases 
from 0.16 for the pre-IFRS adoption period to 0.463 after IFRS adoption. That is, the new 
financial reporting standards appear to improve the quality of accounting information of large 
financial firms that are expected to be more transparent. On the other hand, there is no significant 
change in the value relevance of accounting information following IFRS adoption for small 
financial firms that are potentially more opaque. These results are in line with those obtained by 
Agostino et al. (2011) that the impact of IFRS adoption is much larger for large financial firms 
compared to small financial firms.  
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Additionally, this thesis partitions the sub-sample of banks into low versus high Tier 1 capital 
ratio banks on the ground that managers might exercise their discretion over accounting numbers 
in order to meet capital requirements. Moyer (1990) documents that banks that are close to 
violating the minimum capital requirements might inflate their reported earnings. For example, 
bank managers might use their discretion over loan loss provisions and the timing of accounting 
write-downs in order to meet the capital requirements (Ahmed et al., 1999; Wilson et al., 2010; 
Vyas, 2011; Cohen et al., 2014).91 Therefore, bank capital ratios are expected to have an influence 
on the quality of accounting information. Accordingly, Anandarajan et al. (2011) find some 
evidence of an association between the value relevance of accounting information and banks’ 
Tier 1 ratio (in their study, the association appears to be more significant for book value of equity 
than earnings). Banks with Tier 1 ratios below (above) the sample median are included in the low 
(high) Tier 1 group. This corresponds to 874 and 881 bank-year observations related to 60 and 
61 banks in low and high Tier 1 group, respectively. As shown in Panel B in Table 4.12, for the 
banks with low Tier 1 ratios, the coefficient on book value of equity (earnings) tends to decrease 
(increase) following the mandatory adoption of IFRS, which is in line with the main findings. 
Turning to the parameter of interest, the explanatory power of the price model, a proxy for the 
value relevance of accounting information, significantly increases from 0.233 for the period of 
pre-IFRS adoption to 0.568 after the mandatory introduction of IFRS. For the group of high Tier 
1 ratio, the coefficient on book value of equity increases, while that on earnings decreases after 
IFRS adoption. In terms of the explanatory power, within 𝑅2, it increases from 0.520 for the pre-
IFRS adoption period to over 0.66 in the period of IFRS adoption. The difference is statistically 
significant, suggesting an increase in the combined value relevance of book value of equity and 
                                                          
91 It is worth mentioning that increasing loan loss provisions causes a reduction in reported net income, and therefore, 
in Tier 1 capital, but the loan loss reserves can be added to Tier 2 (up to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets) to calculate 
the total regulatory capital according to the recommendation of Basel II which was implemented by the European 
bank regulators in January 2008.  
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earnings. In sum, both low and high Tier 1 groups support the general pattern of an increase in 
accounting information quality following IFRS adoption. 
Table 4. 12 The impact of IFRS on value relevance: Segmentations based on size and Tier 1 ratio 
  Panel A Financial Firms (incl. Banks) Panel B Banks (only) 
  Small firms Large firms Low Tier 1 High Tier 1 
VARIABLES  Coeff. Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre- IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
  
(1998-
2004) 
(2005- 
2012) 
(1998-
2004) 
(2005-
2012) 
(1998- 
2004) 
(2005-
2012) 
(1998- 
2004) 
(2005-
2012) 
          
BVPS 𝑏1 0.00940 -0.0338 0.0960*** 0.0347 0.186* -0.189 0.0401 0.385 
  (0.0347) (0.0528) (0.0237) (0.0577) (0.106) (0.197) (0.0822) (0.245) 
EPS 𝑏2 2.716*** 2.348*** 0.420** 2.511*** 1.644 3.851* 4.595*** 4.133*** 
  (0.428) (0.541) (0.209) (0.797) (1.039) (2.179) (1.142) (0.751) 
Constant 𝑏0 30.68*** 34.67*** 52.86*** 16.08*** 36.86*** 27.43*** 14.50*** 16.82* 
  (4.051) (3.735) (4.089) (5.293) (9.416) (3.605) (4.005) (9.863) 
          
Year dummy 
𝐷𝑡 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  647 772 616 764 402 472 401 480 
No of firms  97 97 97 97 60 60 61 61 
R2 (within)   0.524 0.514 0.160 0.463 0.233 0.568 0.520 0.663 
Difference  -0.011  0.303***  0.335***  0.143**  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of the price model as follows:𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 +  𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+ 
δ𝐷𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 . where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share of firm i three months following the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book 
value of equity per share for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported earnings per share of firm i over the fiscal year 
t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. The difference in the value relevance of accounting information between pre-IFRS adoption 
period (1998-2004) and IFRS adoption period (2005-2012) is measured by the difference in the within explanatory power of price 
model, within 𝑅2, over the two periods. The significance of the difference in within 𝑅2 is tested based on Z statistics = (𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
2 −
 𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒
2 )/ (𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 + 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 )^0.5 where 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 and 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 are the variance of coefficients of determinations of the within-group estimator 
using bootstrap methods following Agostino et l. (2011: 444). The results are reported for the entire main sample of financial 
firms in Panel A and for the sub-sample of banks in Panel B. Financial firms are classified as either large or small firms based on 
the median value of total assets over the study period. Banks are classified to either high or low Tier 1 banks based on the median 
value of Tier 1 ratio over the period (2005-2012). Due to missing values of Tier 1 ratio for some banks in Bankscope, the sum of 
observations is lower than the total number of observations reported in previous analyses for the sub-sample of banks.  
 
Similarly, the impact of the crisis period on the valuation roles of the balance sheet and the income 
statement is re-examined using subsamples partitioned by firm size as well as Tier 1 capital ratio 
in Table 4.13. In panel A, the coefficient on the crisis dummy variable is negative and 
significantly differs from zero for both the small and large firms (772 and 764 observations, 
respectively), suggesting a decrease in market value per share in the crisis period. The coefficient 
on book value of equity before the crisis period (i.e. 𝑏2) is negative for both groups and only 
significant at the 0.10 level for small financial firms. The interaction between the crisis and book 
value of equity is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level for the small financial 
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firms, suggesting a significant positive impact of financial crisis on the value relevance of balance 
sheet figures of small firms. The interaction between the crisis and the book value of equity is 
significant only at the 0.10 level for large firms, indicating that the value relevance of their 
balance sheet marginally increases during the crisis. The estimated coefficient on earnings per 
share is positive and statistically significant for both small and large financial firms. Finally, the 
interaction between the crisis and earnings is negative for both groups. Whereas it is significant 
at the 0.01 level for the small firms group, it is only significant at the 0.10 level for large financial 
firms. Again, this suggests a marginal effect of financial crisis on the value relevance of the 
income statement numbers for large financial firms. Overall, the impact of financial crisis on 
valuation roles of the balance sheet and the income statement appears to be more pronounced for 
smaller financial firms.  
Moving to banks breakdown into low and high Tier 1 capital ratio banks (472 and 480 
observations, respectively), as shown in Panel B, the significant negative coefficient on the crisis 
shows the decline in the market value of equity during the crisis period for both groups. The book 
value of equity before the crisis, 𝑏2, is negative and statistically significant for banks with low 
Tier 1, which is consistent with the results obtained for the entire subsample of banks. For high 
Tier 1 banks, the valuation coefficient on equity book value prior the crisis is positive and 
statistically significant only at the 0.10 level. The interaction between the crisis and book value 
of equity, 𝑏3, is negative; however, it is statistically significant only for banks with low Tier 1 
ratios. The valuation coefficient on earnings before the crisis period (i.e. 𝑏4) is significant and 
positive for both groups. The second coefficient of interest, the interaction between the crisis and 
earnings, is negative but statistically significant only for the group of banks with low Tier 1 ratios. 
That is, the value relevance of equity book value tends to increase, while that of earnings to 
decrease during the crisis period for low Tier 1 banks. In contrast, the crisis has insignificant 
impact on the value relevance of book value of equity and net income for high Tier 1 banks. This 
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could be explained by the higher incentive for banks with low Tier 1 ratios to manipulate 
accounting numbers, such as earnings management via loan loss provisions, during the crisis 
period in order to meet the capital requirement.  
Table 4. 13 The impact of the crisis on value relevance: Segmentations based on size and Tier 1 ratio 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  
𝑏4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡over the period 2005-2012 where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value of firm i three months following 
the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity per share for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡is the reported 
earnings per share of firm i over the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. Crisis is a dummy variable coded 1 for the 
years of crisis period (2008-2012) and zero otherwise. Panel A shows the statistics for the entire sample of financial firms and 
Panel B reports those of the sub-sample of banks. Financial firms are classified as either large or small firms based on the median 
value of total assets over the study period. Banks are classified to either high or low Tier 1 banks based on the median value of 
Tier 1 ratio over the period (2005-2012). Due to missing values of Tier 1 ratio for some banks in Bankscope, the sum of 
observations is lower than the total number of observations reported in previous analyses for the sub-sample of banks. 
 
As a robustness check, equity market value six months, rather than three months, after the end of 
the fiscal year is used in the price model to evaluate the changes in the value relevance of 
accounting information following IFRS adoption. Panel A in Table 4.14 shows that for the whole 
sample of financial firms the within 𝑅2 significantly increases from 0.155 for the pre-IFRS 
adoption period to 0.503 for the period of IFRS adoption. The sub-sample of banks report a 
similar pattern where the explanatory power shows an increase from 0.248 for the period before 
IFRS adoption to more than 0.48 after the mandatory introduction of IFRS, and the difference is 
  Panel A Financial Firms (incl. Banks) Panel B Banks (only) 
VARIABLES  Coeff. Small firms Large firms Low Tier 1 High Tier 1 
      
Crisis 𝑏1 -23.55*** -14.87*** -14.78*** -19.38*** 
  (4.947) (2.524) (3.447) (4.659) 
BVPS 𝑏2 -0.112* -0.0744 -0.590*** 0.490* 
  (0.0673) (0.0878) (0.157) (0.279) 
Crisis* BVPS 𝑏3 0.129** 0.186* 0.795*** -0.0325 
  (0.0571) (0.0985) (0.180) (0.113) 
EPS 𝑏4 3.412*** 4.052*** 9.908*** 4.269*** 
  (0.842) (1.318) (2.131) (1.414) 
Crisis* EPS 𝑏5 -2.196*** -2.634* -9.781*** -1.502 
  (0.822) (1.379) (2.293) (1.424) 
Constant 𝑏0 34.64*** 12.14** 15.70*** 11.97 
  (3.487) (5.126) (3.103) (9.797) 
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations  772 764 472 480 
Number of firms  97 97 60 61 
R2 (within)  0.557 0.540 0.727 0.705 
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statistically significant. These results confirm those obtained using share price three months after 
the end of the fiscal year.  
Additionally, the main model of value relevance is re-estimated after all the variables are scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. A number of previous studies use lagged total 
assets, rather than the number of outstanding shares, to address the potential scale bias in the price 
model (e.g. Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; O'Hanlon and Taylor, 2007; Manganaris et al., 
2015). As reported in Table 4.14 Panel B, both the whole sample of financial firms and the 
subsample of banks show a significant increase in the value relevance of accounting information, 
as measured by within 𝑅2 after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, which confirms the main results. 
Also, in Appendix V the main regression to test the impact of IFRS adoption is re-estimated using 
lagged book value of equity as an alternative scaling method and the main results still hold. 
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Table 4. 14 The impact of IFRS on value relevance (six month market value and different scaling method) 
  Panel A Using Six Month Market Value Panel B Scaled by Lagged Total Assets 
  Financial firms (incl. Banks) Banks (only) Financial firms (incl. Banks) Banks (only) 
  Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
VARIABLES Coeff. (1998-2004) (2005-2012) (1998-2004) (2005-2012) (1998-2004) (2005-2012) (1998-2004) (2005-2012) 
          
BVPS 𝑏1 0.135 -0.0159 0.0905 -0.0409 0.967*** 1.346*** 0.670*** 1.115*** 
  (0.121) (0.0406) (0.0866) (0.0409) (0.168) (0.120) (0.213) (0.141) 
EPS 𝑏2 1.670** 2.355*** 2.200*** 2.413*** 5.713*** 0.615* 3.005*** 1.066 
  (0.736) (0.445) (0.705) (0.518) (1.317) (0.347) (1.070) (0.881) 
Constant 𝑏0 46.72*** 26.29*** 31.96*** 28.42*** 0.0845* 0.0901*** 0.128*** 0.0883*** 
  (5.963) (2.803) (5.319) (4.051) (0.0459) (0.0233) (0.0258) (0.0145) 
          
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes Yes yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1,263 1,536 963 1,168 1,248 1,536 951 1,168 
No of firms  194 194 148 148 194 194 148 148 
R2 (within)  0.155 0.503 0.248 0.483 0.403 0.601 0.251 0.546 
Difference  0.348***  0.265***  0.198***  0.295***  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of the 
price model as follows: 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+ δ𝐷𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡. In Panel A 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share of firm i six months following the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of 
equity per share for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported earnings per share of firm i over the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. In Panel B 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value of firm 
i three months following the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported earnings of firm i over the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy 
variable for year t. 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡, and 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 are scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t.  
The difference in the value relevance of accounting information between pre-IFRS adoption period (1998-2004) and IFRS adoption period (2005-2012) is measured by the difference in the within 
explanatory power of price model, within𝑅2, over the two periods.The significance of the difference in within 𝑅2 is tested based on Z statistics = (𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
2 − 𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒
2 )/ (𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 + 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 )^0.5 where 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 and 
𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 are the variance of coefficients of determinations of the within-group estimator using bootstrap methods following Agostino et l. (2011: 444). The results are reported for the entire sample of 
financial firms and for a sub-sample of banks. 
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Similarly, the price model to investigate the impact of the crisis period on the value relevance of 
book value of equity and earnings is re-estimated using the market value per share six months, in 
lieu of three months, after the end of the fiscal year as a dependant variable. The results of this 
robustness test, as shown in Panel A of Table 4.15, are in line with the main findings for both the 
entire sample of financial firms and the sub-sample of banks. The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction between the crisis and book value of equity is positive and significant, while that on 
the interaction between the crisis and earnings is negative and statistically significant.  
Furthermore, the main model to test the impact of the crisis on the value relevance of accounting 
information is re-estimated after all the variables are divided by total assets at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. Panel B in Table 4.15 reports that the impact of the financial crisis on the value 
relevance of the book value of equity appears to be insignificant for both the whole sample of 
financial firms and the sub-sample of banks (i.e. 𝑏3). On the other hand, the estimated coefficient 
on the interaction between the crisis and earnings, 𝑏5, is negative and statistically significant, 
again for both the whole sample of financial firms and the banks sub-sample. That is, the results 
using lagged total assets as to scale the variables supports the main findings on the negative 
influence of the crisis period on the value relevance of income statement information, but not on 
that concerning the balance sheet figures.92 
                                                          
92 Similar findings are reported for using lagged book value of equity to scale all the variables in Appendix V.  
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Table 4. 15 The impact of the crisis on value relevance (robustness check) 
  Panel A Using Six Month Market 
Value 
Panel B Scaled by Lagged Total Assets 
VARIABLES Coeff. 
Financial Firms 
(incl. Banks) Banks (only) 
Financial Firms 
(incl. Banks) Banks (only) 
      
Crisis 𝑏1 -17.01*** -18.00*** -0.114*** -0.0801*** 
  (2.628) (2.751) (0.0177) (0.0250) 
BVPS 𝑏2 -0.0906 -0.163** 1.302*** 0.890*** 
  (0.0592) (0.0695) (0.132) (0.189) 
Crisis* BVPS 𝑏3 0.134** 0.204*** 0.0833 -0.0795 
  (0.0523) (0.0655) (0.0761) (0.319) 
EPS 𝑏4 3.361*** 4.404*** 1.374** 3.446** 
  (0.757) (0.924) (0.564) (1.494) 
Crisis* EPS 𝑏5 -2.044*** -3.021*** -1.279** -3.956** 
  (0.770) (0.979) (0.642) (1.521) 
Constant 𝑏0 24.99*** 23.10*** 0.0819*** 0.0774*** 
  (2.506) (3.441) (0.0219) (0.0133) 
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Observations  1,536 1,168 1,536 1,168 
Number of firms  194 148 194 148 
R2 (within)  0.523 0.545 0.608 0.599 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑏4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡over the period 2005-2012, where Crisis is a dummy variable coded 1 for the years of 
crisis period (2008-2012) and zero otherwise. In Panel A 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share of firm i six months following the end 
of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity per share for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported earnings 
per share of firm i over the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. In Panel B 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value of firm i three months 
following the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported 
earnings of firm i over the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡, and 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 are scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of year t. The results are reported for the entire sample of financial firms and for a sub-sample of banks. 
 
An alternative way to measure the overall value relevance is the explanatory power of the return 
model. As explained in Chapter 3, the return model is the regression of stock return on earnings 
and change in earnings, where the explanatory variables are scaled by the market value of equity 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. Table 4.16 reports that for the whole sample of financial firms 
and the sub-sample of banks the coefficient on earnings decreases after the introduction of IFRS, 
however it is statistically significant at the 0.05 level only in the pre-IFRS adoption period. The 
valuation coefficient on change in earnings decreases following IFRS adoption and is statistically 
significant for both periods for the whole sample of financial firms. For the sub-sample of banks 
the coefficient on change in earnings decreases after IFRS adoption and it is significant at the 
0.05 level only in the period of IFRS adoption. More importantly, the whole sample of financial 
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firms and the sub-sample of banks show that the explanatory power (within 𝑅2) is significantly 
higher during the period of IFRS adoption compared to the pre-IFRS adoption period. These 
results support the main findings of an increase in the value relevance of accounting information, 
measured using the price model, following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
Table 4. 16 The impact of IFRS adoption on value relevance (using the return model) 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of the return model as follows: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 +  𝑏1𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝑏2∆𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+ 
δ𝐷𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡, where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the stock return of financial firm i at year t as measured three months after fiscal year end. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 s the 
reported earnings of firm i over the fiscal year t scaled by the market value three months after the end of fiscal year t-1. ∆EPSt is 
the change in reported earnings of firm i between the fiscal year t and t-1 scaled by the market value three months after the end 
of fiscal year t-1 and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. The difference in the value relevance of accounting information between pre-
IFRS adoption period (1998-2004) and IFRS adoption period (2005-2012) is measured by the difference in the within explanatory 
power of price model, within𝑅2, over the two periods. The significance of the difference in within 𝑅2 is tested based on Z statistics 
= (𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
2 − 𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒
2 )/ (𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 +  𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 )^0.5 where 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 and 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 are the variance of coefficients of determinations of the within-
group estimator using bootstrap methods following Agostino et al. (2011: 444). The results are reported for the entire sample of 
financial firms in Panel A and for the sub-sample of banks in Panel B.  
 
Finally, the voluntary IFRS adopters have been excluded from the sample, which might introduce 
a selection bias when estimating the impact of financial crisis on the value relevance of equity 
book value and earnings. As a sensitivity test, the voluntary adopters are included in the sample 
to evaluate the influence of the crisis on the value relevance of accounting information.93 Table 
4.17 shows that for the whole sample of financial firms, the valuation coefficient on the book 
                                                          
93 Also, the financial firms with no data in pre-IFRS adoption period, which has been excluded in the main 
analysis, are included in this robustness check.  
  Panel A Financial Firms Panel B Banks 
  Pooled Pre-IFRS IFRS Pooled Pre IFRS IFRS 
VARIABLES Coeff. 
(1998-
2012) (1998-2004) (2005-2012) (1998-2012) (1998-2004) (2005-2012) 
        
EPS 𝑏1 -0.0718 0.566** -0.143* -0.0687 0.543** -0.134 
  (0.0508) (0.250) (0.0729) (0.0691) (0.275) (0.0992) 
∆EPS 𝑏2 0.404*** 0.475** 0.324*** 0.375*** 0.355* 0.309** 
  (0.101) (0.218) (0.109) (0.123) (0.182) (0.140) 
Constant 𝑏0 0.321*** 0.221*** 0.171*** 0.265*** 0.160*** 0.165** 
  (0.0458) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0461) (0.0463) (0.0586) 
        
Year dummy 
𝐷𝑡 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,415 1,073 1,342 1,837 817 1,020 
No of firms  194 194 194 148 148 148 
R2 (within)  0.303 0.238 0.370 0.347 0.256   0.415 
Difference   0.132***   0.159***  
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value of equity, 𝑏2, is not statistically significant. The coefficient on the interaction between the 
crisis variable and book value, 𝑏3= 0.206 is positive and statistically different from zero at the 
0.01 level, suggesting an increase in the value relevance of book value of equity when the crisis 
hits. The estimated coefficient on earnings, 𝑏4, is positive and statistically significant, reflecting 
the valuation on the reported earnings prior to the crisis. The impact of the crisis period on 
earnings 𝑏5 = -3.111 is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results of sub-
sample of banks in Panel B confirm this general pattern. Overall, including the voluntary IFRS 
adopters supports the main findings on the impact of financial crisis on the value relevance of 
accounting information. In particular, the value relevance of balance sheet numbers tends to 
increase, while that of income statement to decrease as the financial crisis evolves. 
Table 4. 17 The impact of the crisis on value relevance (including voluntary IFRS adopters) 
VARIABLES Coeff. Panel A Financial Firms (incl. Banks) Panel B Banks (only) 
    
Crisis 𝑏1 -20.98*** -22.47*** 
  (2.799) (2.788) 
BVPS 𝑏2 -0.0337 -0.145** 
  (0.0780) (0.0656) 
Crisis* BVPS 𝑏3 0.206*** 0.204*** 
  (0.0739) (0.0657) 
EPS 𝑏4 4.059*** 3.392*** 
  (0.991) (0.934) 
Crisis* EPS 𝑏5 -3.111*** -3.110*** 
  (1.123) (0.998) 
Constant 𝑏0 20.19*** 32.57*** 
  (3.200) (2.230) 
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  2,150 1,612 
Number of firms  277 208 
R2 (within)  0.655 0.477 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑏4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡over the period 2005-2012 where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value of firm i three months following 
the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity per share for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡is the reported 
earnings per share of firm i over the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. Crisis is a dummy variable coded 1 for the 
years of crisis period (2008-2012) and zero otherwise. Panel A shows the statistics for the entire sample of financial firms and 
Panel B reports those of the sub-sample of banks. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings on the first empirical part that addresses the 
impact of IFRS adoption and the financial crisis on the value relevance of accounting information. 
Particularly, it tests whether there has been an improvement in the overall value relevance of 
book value of equity and earnings of financial firms following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
in 2005. Then, it evaluates whether the value relevance shifts from earnings to equity book values 
when the financial crisis evolves. Finally, the valuation of book value of equity and earnings 
during the crisis period is assessed as a function of both the institutional environment and 
corporate governance. 
The results of this study support the view that the value relevance of accounting information has 
increased following mandatory IFRS adoption. The explanatory power of the price model is 
significantly higher for the IFRS adoption period compared to the pre-IFRS adoption period. The 
results are consistent for the whole sample of financial firms (which includes banks) and the 
separate sub-sample of banks. Theses empirical findings are in line with those obtained by prior 
studies reporting an increase in accounting information quality after mandating IFRS (e.g. Filip, 
2010; Devalle et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011).  
With regard to the impact of the financial crisis, the valuation coefficient on the interaction 
between the financial crisis and book value of equity is positive and statistically significant, while 
that on the interaction between the crisis and earnings is significantly negative for both the main 
sample of financial firms and the sub-sample of banks. In other words, the findings suggest that 
the value relevance of book value of equity increases, whereas that of net income decreases when 
the financial crisis hit the countries under investigation. These results are comparable to those of 
previous research showing that there is a change in the valuation roles of the balance sheet and 
the income statement as a function of firm’s financial health and the deterioration in the economic 
environment (Barth et al., 1998a; Graham et al., 2000; Davis-Friday et al., 2006). In a further 
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analysis, the valuation of the book value of equity and earning in the crisis period is tested as a 
function of the institutional environment. The results show that a weak institutional environment 
is associated with more value relevant book value of equity during the financial crisis. The impact 
on earnings appears to be marginal. In the same spirit, the valuation of equity book value and 
earning in the crisis period is examined as a function of firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms. The findings suggest that investors tend to place higher valuation weight on the 
book value of equity during the crisis period for firms with weak corporate governance 
mechanisms, whereas the impact of corporate governance on earnings tend to be insignificant. 
Overall, there is a consistency in the results from the whole sample of financial firms and the sub-
sample of banks. 
As an additional analysis, the whole sample of financial firms is partitioned into small and large 
firms based on total assets. For the small firms, the value relevance of accounting information, 
measured by the explanatory power of the price model, appears to be unchanged after IFRS 
adoption. The results for large firms confirm the general pattern of increasing value relevance of 
accounting information following mandatory IFRS adoption. With regard to the impact of finical 
crisis, the increase (decrease) in the value relevance of book value of equity (net income) seems 
to be more apparent for small financial firms. 
In a second segmentation the subsample of banks is partitioned into low and high Tier 1 ratio 
banks. For both groups, the value relevance of financial statement information significantly 
increases after mandating IFRS. Interestingly, while the low Tier 1 ratio group confirms the 
general pattern of increase in the value relevance of equity book value as opposite to decrease in 
the value relevance of net income when the financial crisis hit, the results for banks with higher 
Tier 1 ratios suggest no significant change in the value relevance of both book value of equity 
and net income.  
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Finally, the main results are largely robust to alternative scaling method and to use market value 
of equity six months after the end of fiscal year as a dependent variable. Also, the main findings 
tend to be confirmed when using the return model in examining the impact of IFRS adoption, as 
well as after including the voluntary IFRS adopter in evaluating the effect of the financial crisis. 
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Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion on the Value Relevance 
of Fair Value Hierarchy 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to present and discuss the findings on the second empirical part of this 
thesis which addresses the value relevance of fair value hierarchy under IFRS 7. The chapter 
starts with Section 5.2 showing the descriptive statistics on the variables used to test the 
hypotheses. Then, Section 5.3 presents the results on testing the value relevance of the three levels 
of fair value. Section 5.4 provides the empirical findings on the impact of a country’s institutional 
environment as well as a firm’s corporate governance attributes on the value relevance of fair 
value hierarchy. Section 5.5 offers additional analyses and robustness checks of the main 
empirical findings. Finally, section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 provides the descriptive statistics on the variables used to evaluate the value relevance 
of fair value hierarchy. For the sake of comparison with previous studies, Panel A presents the 
summary statistics on the relative size of fair value assets and liabilities (rather than fair value net 
assets as used in the analysis). On average, 71.85 % of a firm’s total assets and 90.58% of total 
liabilities are non-fair value assets and liabilities. Put differently, less than 29% of total assets and 
10% of total liabilities are measured at fair value. This percentage of assets measured at fair value 
is higher than that recently reported for US financial firms; for example the sample of Goh et al. 
(2015) reports that the average relative size of assets marked at fair value is less than 22% over 
the period 2008-2011. In addition, the sample of European financial firms in this study shows 
that, on average, level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair value assets comprise 15.19%, 10.22% and 
2.74% of the total assets of financial firms, respectively. That is, unlike the case of US financial 
firms where the fair value amounts based on level 2 inputs account for the majority of fair 
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values,94 most of the fair value assets of EEA and Swiss firms are classified as level 1 assets. 
Moving to the liabilities, the average of relative fair value liabilities is less than 10%,95 which is 
higher than the percentages for US firms, 0.37% and 1.95% as reported by Song et al. (2010) and 
Goh et al. (2015), respectively. Furthermore, the sample of European financial firms in this thesis 
shows that the mean of relative level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair value liabilities are 1.56%, 7.35%, 
and 0.52% of total liabilities, respectively. This indicates that the majority of fair value liabilities 
are measured using level 2 valuation inputs, which is line with the descriptive statistics in the US 
context (i.e. Song et al., 2010). Examples of level 2 fair values are when an asset (liability) is 
measured using quoted prices of comparable items traded in active markets or quoted prices of 
identical assets (liabilities) traded in inactive markets. 
Panel B shows the means relative size of fair value assets and liabilities (as well as relative non-
fair value assets and liabilities) for each year from 2009 to 2012. The average of total non-fair 
assets (liabilities) slightly decreases from 72.69% (90.74%) in 2009 to 70.59% (90.44%) in 2012, 
suggesting a marginal change in the use of fair value accounting over the sample period. The 
relative size of level 1 and 3 fair values increases in 2012 relative to the first year in the sample. 
In contrast, the mean relative level 2 fair value assets (liabilities) slightly decreases from 10.98% 
(7.79%) to in 2009 to 10.48% (7.15%) in 2012, indicating a marginal decrease in in firms’ 
holdings of level 2 financial instruments.  
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for the fair value figures and earnings on a per share 
basis as used in the model. To mitigate the influence of outliers on our inferences, all the variables 
are winsorised at 1% and 99%. The mean of non-fair value net assets per share is -42.71 indicating 
that, on average, non-fair value liabilities are greater than non-fair assets.  
 
                                                          
94 See Table 2 in Song et al. (2010) and Table 2 in Goh et al. (2015). 
95 This is because 90.58% of total liabilities are not marked at fair value. 
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Table 5. 1 Descriptive Statistics on fair value hierarchy 
Panel A: Relative size of fair value assets and liabilities (pooled data, 2009-2012) 
Variables 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Non-FVA/Total Assets 699 71.85% 24.02% 59.57% 78.57% 89.02% 
FVA1/Total Assets 699 15.19% 19.29% 3.83% 9.48% 17.62% 
FVA2/Total Assets 699 10.22% 13.19% 0.95% 5.22% 13.57% 
FVA3/Total Assets 699 2.74% 9.53% 0.07% 0.41% 1.38% 
Non-FVL/Total Liabilities 699 90.58% 15.76% 87.95% 97.84% 99.80% 
FVL1/Total Liabilities 699 1.56% 6.68% 0.00% 0.00% 0.53% 
FVL2/Total Liabilities 699 7.35% 12.25% 0.12% 1.60% 9.68% 
FVL3/Total Liabilities 699 0.52% 5.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 
  
Panel B The mean relative size of fair value assets and liabilities over the sample period 
 
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Non-FVA/Total Assets 72.69% 71.74% 72.46% 70.59% 
FVA1/Total Assets 14.25% 15.50% 14.85% 16.07% 
FVA2/Total Assets 10.98% 9.69% 9.81% 10.48% 
FVA3/Total Assets 2.07% 3.06% 2.88% 2.87% 
Non-FVL/Total Liabilities 90.74% 90.94% 90.23% 90.44% 
FVL1/Total Liabilities 1.26% 1.47% 1.73% 1.73% 
FVL2/Total Liabilities 7.79% 7.01% 7.46% 7.15% 
FVL3/Total Liabilities 0.22% 0.58% 0.57% 0.68% 
 
Panel C Fair value net assets, non-fair value net assets and earnings (on a per share basis) 
 
Variables 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
P 699 16.07 38.85 1.21 3.63 15.18 
NFVNA 699 -42.71 271.54 -13.05 -1.07 0.71 
FVNA1 699 37.83 108.39 0.46 4.28 21.42 
FVNA2 699 10.14 50.83 0.00 0.22 5.20 
FVNA3 699 10.16 91.73 0.00 0.10 0.74 
EPS 699 1.04 9.20 0.02 0.19 0.92 
 
Panel D Correlation matrix 
 
 P NFVNA FVNA1 FVNA2 FVNA3 EPS 
P 1      
       
NFVNA (0.001) 1     
 0.9879      
FVNA1 0.6308 -0.3653 1    
 (0.000) (0.000)     
FVNA2 0.1472 -0.5075 0.0322 1   
 0.0001 (0.000) 0.3951    
FVNA3 0.0879 -0.7025 0.0785 0.3931 1  
 0.0202 (0.000) 0.0381 (0.000)   
EPS 0.4814 -0.1606 0.3143 0.2492 0.1256 1 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.0009  
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Notes: Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the relative size of fair value assets and liabilities by level under IFRS7. FVA1, 
FVA2, and FVA3 indicate fair value of level 1, level 2 and level 3 assets. Similarly, FVL1, FVL2, and FVL3 are fair values of 
level 1, level 2 and level 3 liabilities. Non-FVA and Non-FVL are non-fair value assets and liabilities, respectively.  
Panel B provides the mean of the relative size of fair value assets and liabilities by level as well as non-fair value assets and 
liabilities for each year from 2009 to 2012. 
Panel C provides descriptive statistics on the variables that are used in this study, where all the variables are scaled by the number 
of outstanding common share. P is the market value of equity and NFVNA is non-fair value net assets. FVNA1, FVNA2 and 
FVNA3 are fair value of level 1, level 2 and level 3 net assets. Finally, EPS is the reported net income. 
Panel D shows Pearson correlation coefficients among P, FVNA1, FVNA2, FVNA3 and EPS. The numbers in parentheses are p-
values. 
 
The mean fair value net assets using level 1 valuation inputs (FVNA1), level 2 inputs (FVNA2), 
and level 3 inputs (FVNA3) are 37.83, 10.14, and 10.16, respectively. Level 1 fair value net assets 
amount for most of fair value net assets. These summary statistics on net assets per share basis 
are comparable to those reported by Kolev (2009); however for US firms level 2 fair values 
represent most of fair value net assets.  
Panel D in Table presents the Pearson correlation among the variables used in testing the value 
relevance of fair value hierarchy. As shown in the table, the correlation between market value of 
equity (P) and FVNA3 is lower than the corresponding correlations between P and FVNA1 and 
between P and FVNA2. In Specific, P has Pearson correlation of 0.6308, 0.1472 and 0.0879 with 
FVNA1, FVNA2 and FVNA3, respectively. These correlations indicate that the market value of 
equity is positively associated with fair value net assets and the association tends to be weaker 
for level 3 fair values than for level 1 and level 2 fair values.  
Table 5.2 provides the mean values of the five institutional environment factors used in the second 
set of analyses. The institutional environment variables are: Efficacy of corporate boards, 
Strength of auditing and reporting standards, Protection of minority interests, Regulation of 
securities exchanges and Judicial independence.96 As pointed out in Chapter 3, the institutional 
variables are coded in the Global Competitiveness Report from 1, indicating weak institutional 
setting, to 7, which presents strong institutional environment. In terms of Efficacy of corporate 
                                                          
96 The institutional environment variables and their expected impact on the quality of accounting information are 
discussed in details in Section 3.2.4.  
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boards, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria appear to have the lowest scores under 4, while Sweden, 
Norway and Finland have the highest scores, equal or more than 5.50.  
 
Table 5. 2 The mean values of institutional environment variables 
country 
Efficacy of  
corporate boards 
Strength  
of auditing & reporting 
Standards 
Protection 
 of minority interests 
Regulation of  
securities exchanges 
Judicial  
independence 
Austria 5.13 5.78 4.99 4.75 5.65 
Belgium 5.11 5.63 4.97 4.96 5.26 
Bulgaria 3.99 4.30 3.60 3.62 2.93 
Cyprus 4.05 5.56 5.15 4.83 5.29 
Denmark 5.32 5.64 5.39 5.47 6.37 
Finland 5.50 6.20 5.95 5.80 6.43 
France 5.10 5.50 4.75 5.25 4.85 
Germany 5.23 5.55 5.08 4.88 6.05 
Greece 3.96 4.64 4.72 4.22 3.42 
Hungary 4.42 5.28 4.06 4.80 3.82 
Ireland 4.63 4.63 4.68 4.15 6.80 
Italy 3.93 4.18 3.58 4.23 3.72 
Lithuania 4.92 5.04 3.96 4.50 3.52 
Luxemburg 5.28 5.83 5.10 5.75 5.95 
Malta 4.55 5.93 5.23 5.45 5.05 
Netherland 5.35 5.93 5.25 5.35 6.35 
Norway 5.55 6.00 5.75 5.83 6.27 
Poland 4.42 5.13 4.17 4.98 4.23 
Portugal 4.28 4.90 4.48 4.85 4.20 
Romania 4.30 4.33 3.85 3.73 3.10 
Slovakia 4.66 4.55 3.96 3.99 2.85 
Slovenia 4.13 5.00 3.55 4.10 3.83 
Spain 4.36 4.85 4.25 3.78 3.94 
Sweden 5.83 6.15 5.90 5.83 6.45 
Switzerland 5.33 5.60 4.82 5.65 6.37 
UK 5.26 5.84 5.18 5.07 6.16 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2009 – 2012 issued by World Economic Forum. 
Notes: Efficacy of corporate boards measures how corporate governance is characterised by investors and boards of directors in 
a country [1 = management has little accountability to investors and boards; 7 = investors and boards exert strong supervision of 
management decisions). Strength of auditing and reporting standards measures how financial auditing and reporting standards is 
assessed regarding company financial performance [1 = extremely weak; 7 = extremely strong]. Protection of minority interests 
assesses to what extent the interests of minority shareholders are protected by the legal system [1 = not protected at all; 7 = fully 
protected]. Regulation of securities exchanges is an assessment for the regulation and supervision of securities exchanges [1 = 
ineffective; 7 = effective]. Judicial independence measures to what extent the judiciary is independent from influences of 
members of government, citizens, or firms [1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent].  
 
Concerning Strength of auditing and reporting standards, Italy (4.18), Bulgaria (4.30) and 
Romania (4.33) show the lowest values, whereas Norway, Sweden and Finland have values equal 
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or more than 6. Slovenia (3.55), Italy (3.58) and Bulgaria (3.60) seem to have the lowest level of 
Protection of minority interests in Europe. At the other extreme, Finland (5.95), Sweden (5.90) 
and Norway (5.75) have the strongest Protection of minority interests. Moving to Regulation of 
securities exchanges, Bulgaria (3.62), Romania (3.73), and Spain (3.78) report the lowest scores, 
while Norway (5.83), Sweden (5.83) and Finland (5.80) have the highest scores. Finally, Slovakia 
and Bulgaria tend to have the least independent judiciary in the countries under study with scores 
less than 3, whereas Ireland (6.80), Sweden (6.45), Finland (6.43) have the highest level of 
Judicial independence. Noticeably, Norway, Sweden and Finland consistently appear at the top 
of countries list in terms of the strength of institutional environment. 
Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics on governance factors used in examining the impact of 
corporate governance on the value relevance of fair value hierarchy. Using firms’ annual reports 
and corporate governance reports, the data are hand-collected for fives variables. Firstly, Board 
meeting is the number of annual meetings held by the board of directors and its average is 10.99 
meetings per year. The board meetings range from 3.50 to 29.25 meetings per annum.  
Table 5. 3 Descriptive statistics on corporate governance variables 
VARIABLES 
Mean Std. Dev. Min 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile Max N 
Board meeting 10.99 5.65 3.5 6.75 9.75 14.25 29.25 539 
Audit size 4.05 1.2 2 3 4 5 9.75 539 
Audit meeting 6.48 3.82 1 4 5.5 7.75 26.25 539 
No of block 2.29 1.4 0 1 2 3 6.75 539 
Audit fees 6687.84 13902.08 0.82 337.5 1199.49 3976.9 74452.5 539 
Notes: Board meeting is the number of annual board meetings. Audit size is the total numbers of directors who serve on the audit 
committee. Audit meeting is the number of annual audit committee meetings. No of block is the number of shareholders who hold 
more than 0.05 of voting rights. Audit fees is the audit fees paid by a firm to external auditors, presented in thousands of euros. 
All the variables are the average of its annual values over the period 2009-2012. 
 
Audit size is the number of directors serving on the audit committee and it ranges from 2 to 9.75, 
with a mean of 4.05 members. Audit meeting is the number of annual meetings held by the audit 
committee. The average number of audit committee meetings is 6.48, with a minimum of one 
meeting and a maximum of 26.25 meetings per year. No of block is the number of shareholders 
holding 5% or more of the voting rights and ranges from 0 to 6.75, with an average of 2.29 
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blockholders. Finally, audit fees is the audit fees paid to external auditors with an average of 
€6687.84 ranging from €0.82 to €74452.50 (in thousands). 
5.3 The value relevance of fair value hierarchy 
The value relevance of an accounting amount is measured by the valuation coefficient on that 
amount after controlling for other financial statement information. A significant coefficient 
indicates that the accounting information is relevant to investors and reliable enough to be 
reflected in share prices (Barth et al., 2001; Barth and Landsman, 2010). Panel A of Table 5.4 
reports the results from the regression of market value of equity on the three levels of fair value 
hierarchy net assets (FVNA1, FVNA2 and FVNA3), in addition to non-fair value net assets 
(NFVNA) and reported earnings (EPS).  
Non-fair value net assets are considered value relevant to investors when the coefficient on 
NFVNA is positive and statistically significant. Similarly, if investors consider the reported fair 
value amounts as value relevant, the valuation coefficients on FVNA1, FVNA2, and FVNA3 will 
be positive and significantly different from zero. Table 5.4 reveals that the estimated coefficient 
on non-fair value net assets is positive and statistically different from zero (𝑏1 = 0.112), indicating 
their value relevance. Moving to the coefficients of interest, the valuation coefficients on level 1, 
2 and 3 fair value net assets are 0.287, 0.223 and 0.182, respectively, and all are significant at the 
0.01 level. This suggests that investors deem the three levels of fair value as relevant for valuation 
purposes; yet there is a decline in the valuation weight on fair value net assets as we move down 
the three levels of fair value hierarchy. Finally, the coefficient on earnings per share is positive 
and statistically significant, indicating their relevance for equity valuation. Noticeably, the 
standard errors of the estimated coefficient on level 3 fair value net assets are larger than those 
of level 1 fair values, demonstrating that the mark-to-model fair value estimates are noisier than 
the mark-to-market fair values.  
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In chapter 3 the thesis discusses that one would expect that the valuation coefficients on the 
components of book value of equity of financial firms to be close to one, especially for level 1 
and level 2 fair values (see section 3.2.3). However, Table 5.4 reveals that the coefficients on the 
components of book value of equity in general tend to deviate considerably from one. One reason 
for this deviation could be the scaling method adopted. As a robustness check the thesis uses 
lagged total assets as an alternative scaling method, which is used in previous studies, such as 
Marquardt and Wiedman, (2004); O'Hanlon and Taylor (2007) and Manganaris et al. (2015).  As 
reported in Table 5.10 later in this chapter, using lagged total assets to scale the accounting and 
market variables shows consistent results with those reported based on the number of outstanding 
shares and the coefficient of the components of book value of equity appear to be close to one, 
especially for level 1 fair values (i.e. 𝑏2).
97 
In the right hand side of Table 5.4, Panel B provides the results of testing whether the valuation 
coefficients across fair value levels are equal. The empirical analysis shows that coefficient on 
FVNA1 is significantly greater than that on FVNA3 (F-statistics: 5.48). It also reveals that the 
valuation coefficient on FVNA1 is marginally different from that of FVNA2 (F-statistics: 3.47). 
The valuation coefficients on FVNA2 is higher than that on FVNA3, but the difference is not 
statistically different (F-statistics: 0.49). Overall, these results suggest that investors in EEA and 
Swiss financial firms price mark-to-model fair values net assets (level 3) lower than mark-to-
market fair values (i.e. level 1). In particular, investors appear to perceive significant reliability 
concerns with regard to the valuation of level 3 fair value instruments in comparison to level 1 
fair values. The valuation of level 2 fair values fall between those on level 1 and level 3 fair 
values. However, the difference between the valuation on level 2 and level 3 fair value is not 
statistically significant. Compared to level 3, level 2 fair value measurements are based on 
                                                          
97 Section 4.3 provides a discussion on the different scaling methods.  
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observable market inputs, and hence they are more reliable. However, investors may not be able 
to identify how managers use market inputs for level 2 fair values directly. 
These findings based on a sample from the EEA countries and Switzerland provide support to 
those obtained in the United States (US) context suggesting that the value relevance of level 1 
fair value amounts is significantly higher than that of level 3 fair values, and the value relevance 
of level 2 fair values falls between those of level 1 and level 3 fair values (i.e. Kolev, 2009; Song 
et al., 2010; Goh et al., 2015). It is worth mentioning that the results in previous studies are less 
clear-cut for level 2 fair values. For example, Goh et al. (2015) report a significant difference 
between the coefficients on level 1 and level 2 fair values, while Kolev (2009) and Song et al. 
(2010) find no such significant difference. 
As an additional analysis, this study tests whether the coefficients on each of the fair value levels, 
on the one hand, and non-fair value amounts, on the other hand, are equal. Table 5.4 shows that 
the estimated coefficient on each of the three levels of fair values is significantly  
Table 5. 4 Value relevance of fair values hierarchy under IFRS7 
Panel A Panel B 
VARIABLES Coeff.          Test F-stat p-value 
      
NFVNA 𝑏1 0.112*** FVNA1= FVNA3 5.48 0.0196** 
  (0.0203)    
FVNA1 𝑏2 0.287*** FVNA1= FVNA2 3.47 0.0631* 
  (0.0296)    
FVNA2 𝑏3 0.223*** FVNA2= FVNA3 0.49 0.4860 
  (0.0363)    
FVNA3 𝑏4 0.182*** FVNA1= NFVNA 35.73 0.0001*** 
  (0.0411)    
EPS 𝑏5 0.958** FVNA2= NFVNA 7.94 0.0050*** 
  (0.373)    
Constant 𝑏0 5.324*** FVNA3= NFVNA 7.20 0.0074*** 
  (1.653)    
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes    
      
Observations  699    
No of firms  185    
R-squared  0.696    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the OLS estimation of the following equation 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡. where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share of firm i three months following the end 
of fiscal year t. 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 are fair value of level 1, level 2 and level 3 net assets for firm i as reported at 
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the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the reported net income of financial firm i for the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable for 
year t. All accounting information is scaled by the number of outstanding common share. The sample includes 699 firm-year of 
185 distinct firms from the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland over 2009-2012. Panel A shows the results of the 
regression, while Column B offers F-statistics testing the differences between the estimation coefficients. 
 
greater than that on non-fair value net assets. That is, fair value amounts are more value relevant 
to investors relative to non-fair value assets and liabilities. This is in line with earlier studies 
showing that fair value accounting is, in general, more value relevant than other measurement 
basis (e.g. Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Carroll et al., 2003). 
In sum, the findings of this empirical test suggest that mark-to-model fair value net assets, which 
is measured based on unobservable inputs (i.e. level 3 fair values), are priced lower than level 1 
and level 2 fair values – although the difference is not statistically significant for level 2 – for a 
sample of European financial firms. This confirms the first hypothesis, H1B, which asserts that 
the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values is higher than that of level 3 fair values. 
However, the valuation coefficient on level 2 fair values is not statistically different from that on 
level 3 fair values. Taken into consideration the absence of active market98 and higher information 
risk associated with level 3 fair values relative to mark-to-market net assets, it appears that 
investors price these fair value values lower given that they are potentially less reliable. The 
results also show that the valuation coefficients are higher for fair value net assets compared to 
non-fair value items. In the next section, this study investigates the value relevance of fair values 
as a function of institutional environment and corporate governance mechanisms. 
5.4 The effect of institutional environment and corporate governance  
The results in the previous section indicate that the three levels of fair value hierarchy under IFRS 
7 are value relevant to investors. The information asymmetry between managers and investors is 
more likely to be higher for level 3, given the absence of actively traded markets for financial 
instruments under measurement. Therefore, the second hypothesis testes whether investors place 
                                                          
98 Level 2 fair values could be measured based on observable inputs from active markets of similar, rather than 
identical, financial instruments.  
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differential valuation weight on fair value levels depending on country-level institutional 
environment.  
The five institutional measures introduced in the previous section are used to investigate the 
impact of the institutional environment on the value relevance of fair values. Prior studies show 
that that firms domiciled in countries with strong institutional environment tend to produce higher 
quality accounting information (see Jaggi and Low, 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Anandarajan et al., 
2011; Houqe et al., 2012).  
Table 5.5 Panel A provides the correlation coefficients among institutional environment 
measures. As detailed in Chapter 3, the principle component factor analysis is used to extract a 
standardised score (INSSCORE) summarising the underlying institutional features of each 
country. In this context, Panel B shows the factor loading after varimax rotation, reflecting the 
weights used for each institutional measure to generate the standardised score. All institutional 
measures are positively loaded in calculating INSSCORE and the analysis results in a factor with 
the eigenvalue of 4.4335 accounting for about 89 percent of the total variance in the original 
variables. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (Kaiser 1974) has a 
mean of 0.8994 (greater than the critical value of 50), indicating that INSSCORE well captures 
the underlying common factor of the institutional variables (Stewart, 1981). Based on 
INSSCORE, firms are ranked into deciles and the order is reversed and scaled by 9 to form 
INSRANK. INSRANK ranges from 0, associated with the highest values of INSSCORE (i.e. strong 
institutional environment), to 1, which reflects the lowest values of INSSCORE (i.e. weak 
institutional environment). 
The third hypothesis addresses the impact of corporate governance mechanism on the value 
relevance of the three levels of fair value. Prior studies indicate that firms with strong corporate 
governance tend to report higher quality accounting numbers (e.g. Xie et al., 2003; Kent et al., 
2010; Song et al., 2010; Bhat, 2013).  
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Firm-level corporate governance characteristics are summarised by GOVSCORE based on the 
principle component factor analysis of the five governance variables introduced in the preceding 
section (5.2) and the correlation coefficients among them are shown in Panel A of Table 5.6. As 
seen in Panel B, all the governance variables are positively loaded to calculate GOVSCORE with 
the exception of the number of blockholders (No of Block). As previously discussed, large 
shareholders may use their control rights to expropriate minority investors. 
The generated factor has an eigenvalue of 1.7228, which explains more than 34 percent of the 
total variations in the governance variables. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy is 0.5274 and above the critical value of 0.50, suggesting that GOVSCORE well 
represents the underlying common factor of the original variables (Kaiser 1974; Stewart 1981). 
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Table 5. 5 Principal component analysis of institutional environment variables 
Panel A Correlations 
 
Efficacy of 
corporate 
boards 
Strength 
of auditing & 
reporting 
Protection 
of minority 
interests 
Regulation of 
securities 
exchanges 
Judicial 
independence  
Efficacy of corporate boards 1     
      
Strength of auditing & 
reporting 0.9055 1    
 (0.000)     
Protection of minority 
interests 0.8649  0.9171  1   
 (0.000) (0.000)    
Regulation of securities 
exchanges 0.8251  0.8451  0.8012 1  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Judicial independence 0.8922 0.85666  0.8545 0.8073 1 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Panel B Institutional environment factor score analysis and sample adequacy 
 
Variables 
Factor Loading 
Coefficients 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy99 
Efficacy of corporate boards 0.9538 0.8935 
Strength of auditing & reporting 0.9638 0.8559 
Protection of minority interests 0.9431 0.8920 
Regulation of securities exchanges 0.9073 0.9553 
Judicial independence 0.9392 0.9137 
Variation Explained 89% Mean KMO =0.8994 
Eigenvalue 4.4335  
 
Panel C Descriptive statistics of institutional environment score and ranking 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile Max 
INSSCORE 699 0.00 1.00 -1.94 -.083 0.39 0.68 1.46 
INSRANK 699 0.46 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.44 0.78 1.00 
Notes: (1) Efficacy of corporate boards, (2) Strength of auditing and reporting standards, (3) Protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests, (4) Regulation of securities exchanges, and (5) Judicial independence are institutional environment factors extracted 
from Global Competitiveness Report, reported as a mean for the period 2009-2012. As defined in the notes of Table 5.2, these 
measures are coded on a scale from 1 to 7, where a value of 1 is associated with weak institutional environment and 7 indicates a 
strong institutional environment. Panel A shows Pearson correlation coefficients among institutional variables. The numbers in 
parentheses are p-values. Panel B reports factor loading coefficients as well as Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index of sampling adequacy 
for institutional factors using the five institutional environment variables of interest. Panel D presents the descriptive statistics on 
INSSCORE and INSRANK. INSCORE is the standardised score calculated using the factor analysis n Panel B. INSRANK is the 
descending decile rank of INSSCORE with a range from 0 (strong institutional environment) to 1 (weak institutional environment). 
 
 
                                                          
99 “The KMO statistic for an individual variable is the sum of the squared correlation coefficients between this 
variable and all other variables (but not with itself) divided by this value added to the sum of the squared partial 
correlation coefficients. The KMO statistic for multiple variables is the sum of these statistics computed for all 
variables in the analysis” (Hutcheson and Sofroniou1999: 224). KMO statistics measures the extent to which the 
underlying variables belong together and hence suitable for factor analysis. Kaiser (1974) suggests the threshold of 
KMO = 0.50 under which it is considered that there is little variation shared between variables to be meaningfully 
explained using principle component factor analysis.  
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Table 5. 6 Principal component analysis of corporate governance variables 
Panel A Correlations 
 Board Meeting Audit Size Audit Meeting No of Block Audit Fees 
Board Meeting 1 
    
 
     
Audit Size 0.0159 1 
   
 (0.712) 
    
Audit Meeting 0.5888 0.1048 1 
  
 (0.000) (0.015) 
   
No of Block -0.107 -0.045 -0.1608 1 
 
 (0.013) (0.297) (0.000) 
  
Audit Fees 0.0337 0.2869 0.1535 -0.1092 1 
 (0.435) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
 
 
Panel B Corporate governance factor score analysis and sample adequacy 
Variables 
Factor Loading 
Coefficients 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy 
Board Meeting 0.7715 0.5075 
Audit Size 0.3229 0.5426 
Audit Meeting 0.8458 0.5196 
No of block -0.3832 0.7344 
Audit Fee 0.4016 0.5421 
Variation Explained 0.3446 Mean KMO =0.5274 
Eigenvalue 1.7228  
 
Panel C Descriptive statistics of corporate governance score and ranking 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile Max 
GOVSCORE 539 0.00 1.00 -1.85 -0.73 -0.28 0.50 3.90 
GOVRANK 539 0.50 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.44 0.78 1.00 
Notes: The number reported for five firm-level corporate governance variables are the means over the period 2009-2012. The 
variables include (1) Board Meeting is the number of annual board meeting, (2) Audit Size is the number of directors serving in 
the audit committee, (3) Audit Meeting is the number of annual audit committee meetings, (4) No of Block is the number of 
shareholders that hold 0.05 or more of voting rights, and (5) Audi Fees is the natural logarithm of audit fees as a proxy of audit 
quality. Panel A report the Pearson correlation coefficients among corporate governance variables. The numbers in parentheses 
are p-values. Panel B shows the factor loading coefficients as well as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for 
the governance score generated based on the five firm-level corporate governance variables. Panel D presents the descriptive 
statistics on GOVSCORE and GOVRANK. GOVSCORE is the standardised score calculated using the factor analysis and 
GOVRANK is the descending decile rank of the residuals from the regression of GOVSCORE on country dummy variables, 
COUNTRY. GOVRANK ranges from 0 (strong corporate governance) to 1 (weak corporate governance).  
 
Firm-level corporate governance is highly associated with country-specific characteristics (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Verriest et al., 2013). As such, the corporate governance, GOVSCORE, is 
regressed on country dummy variables. Based on the residuals from this regression, a decile rank 
from 0 to 9 is created and then scaled by 9 to form GOVRANK. GOVRANK ranges from 0, 
associated with strong corporate governance mechanisms, to 1 for firms with weak corporate 
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governance mechanisms. Panel D of Table 5.6 presents the descriptive statistics of GOVSCORE 
and GOVRANK.  
Table 5.7 reports the results of testing the impact of institutional environment and corporate 
governance, respectively, on the value relevance of fair value hierarchy.  
Firstly, Panel A presents the results of the effect of country-level institutional environment on the 
valuation weight placed on the three levels of fair value. The non-fair value net assets, NFVNA, 
appear to be value relevant (𝑏1= 0.105). The valuation coefficients on the three levels of fair value 
hierarchy are statistically significant, indicating that the fair values of financial instruments are 
value relevant to investors in firms domiciled in countries characterised by strong institutional 
environment. The coefficient on level 3 fair values, 𝑏4, is 0.200, slightly lower in magnitude than 
that on level 1 fair values (𝑏2 = 0.209) and, interestingly, is moderately higher than that on level 
2 fair values (𝑏3= 0.175). Hence, level 3 fair values reported by firms in strong institutional 
settings are likely to be as value relevant as those classified as level 1 and level 2 fair values. One 
possible reason for these results could be that managers have private information on the true 
economic value of financial instruments and in strong institutional information they use it to 
credibly report level 3 fair value estimates.  
The coefficients on the interaction between INSRANK and fair values are the incremental 
valuations for moving from the lowest decile (strong institutional environment) to the highest 
decile (weak institutional environment) of INSRANK. The interaction terms are positive for level 
1 and level 2 fair values, however they are not statistically significant. This suggests no significant 
changes in the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values depending on the strength of 
institutional environment. The valuation coefficient on the interaction term between institutional 
environment and level 3 fair values is negative and statistically different from 0, indicating lower 
value relevance of level 3 fair values for firms in countries with weak institutional environment.  
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Table 5. 7 The impact of institutional environment and corporate governance on value relevance of fair 
values  
Panel A The Impact of Institutional Environment Panel A The Impact of Corporate Governance 
VARIABLES Coeff.  VARIABLES Coeff.  
      
NFVNA 𝑏1 0.105*** NFVNA 𝑏1 0.0822** 
  (0.0158)   (0.0415) 
FVNA1 𝑏2 0.209*** FVNA1 𝑏2 0.184*** 
  (0.0431)   (0.0285) 
FVNA2 𝑏3 0.175*** FVNA2 𝑏3 0.206*** 
  (0.0393)   (0.0401) 
FVNA3 𝑏4 0.200*** FVNA3 𝑏4 0.211*** 
  (0.0300)   (0.0791) 
FVNA1* INSRANK 𝑏5 0.138 FVNA1* GOVRANK 𝑏5 -0.00278 
  (0.0901)   (0.0571) 
FVNA2* INSRANK 𝑏6 0.123 FVNA2* GOVRANK 𝑏6 0.0226 
  (0.150)   (0.0386) 
FVNA3* INSRANK 𝑏7 -0.502*** FVNA3* GOVRANK 𝑏7 -0.300*** 
  (0.0690)   (0.0976) 
EPS 𝑏8 0.762** EPS 𝑏8 0.625** 
  (0.374)   (0.310) 
INSRANK 𝑏9 -3.910 GOVRANK 𝑏9 12.39*** 
  (2.426)   (2.266) 
Constant 𝑏0 8.177*** Constant 𝑏0 1.840 
  (1.954)   (1.545) 
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes 
      
Observations  699 Observations  539 
No of firms  185 No of firms  140 
R-squared  0.741 R-squared  0.432 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the OLS estimation of the following equation 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡. where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share of firm i three months following the end 
of fiscal year t. 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 are fair value of level 1, level 2 and level 3 net assets for firm i as reported at 
the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the reported net income of financial firm i for the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable for 
year t. All accounting information is scaled by the number of outstanding common share. The sample includes financial firms 
listed in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland over the period 2009-2012. Column (A) offers the regression 
results of testing the impact of institutional environment on the value relevance of fair value net assets for the whole sample. 
INSRANK is institutional rank ranging from 0 (weak institutional environment) to 9 (strong institutional environment), which is 
constructed based on the factor score, INSSCORE, using principal-component factor analysis of five institutional variables 
collected over the period 2009-2012: (1) Efficacy of corporate boards, (2) Strength of auditing and reporting standards, (3) 
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests, (4) Regulation of securities exchanges, and (5) Judicial independence. The 
institutional environment variables are defined in the notes of Table 5.2. Column (B) shows the result of evaluating the impact of 
firm-level corporate governance on the value relevance of the three levels of fair values. Governance rank, GOVRANK is 
constructed based on governance score, GOVSCORE, using the principle component analysis of five variables of the period 2009-
2012: (1) Board Meeting, (2) Audit Size, (3) Audit Meeting, (4) No of Block, and (5) Audi Fee. These variables are explained in 
the notes of Table 5.3. To filter country-specific variations, GOVSCORE is regressed on dummy variables for countries and the 
residuals are used to from a decile governance rank, GOVRANK. GOVRANK ranges from 0 (weak corporate governance) to 9 
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(strong corporate governance), and then scaled by 9. The number of observations in this analysis drops to 539 firm-year 
observations (related to 140 firms) due to missing data on corporate governance. 
This confirms the predication of the second hypothesis, H2B, that the institutional environment 
has a greater impact on the value relevance of level 3 fair values than on the value relevance of 
level 1 or level 2 fair values.  
Secondly, Panel B provides the results of testing whether investors place differential weights 
across the three levels of fair values based on firm-level corporate governance. The coefficient 
on non-fair value net assets is positive, 𝑏1= 0.0822, and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
The valuation coefficient on level 3 fair values, 𝑏4= 0.211, is slightly higher than those of level 
1 and level 2 fair values, 𝑏2= 0.184 and 𝑏3= 0.206, respectively, suggesting that level 3 fair value 
estimates are at least as value relevant as level 1 and level 2 fair values. It is also noteworthy that 
the coefficient on level 2 fair values is greater than that on level 1 fair value net assets. That is, 
for firms with strong corporate governance, there is an increase in the valuation weight that 
investors place on fair values with the greater use of unobservable inputs for fair value 
measurement. One possible explanation for this could be that the analysis is conducted during the 
financial crisis that hit the economies of the countries under study. During the crisis period, 
market prices become poor indicators of the long-term value of financial assets and liabilities. At 
the same time, managers have a significant information advantage to report the fundamental 
values of level 3 fair value estimates. This is particularly true for firms with strong corporate 
governance mechanisms, which mitigate the information asymmetry problem between managers 
and shareholders.  
The interaction between corporate governance rank and level 1 fair values is positive, while the 
corresponding interaction with 2 fair values is negative, and both are not statistically significant. 
This indicates that the market pricing of level 1 and level 2 fair values, which are measured based 
on observable inputs, is not significantly affected by variation in firms’ corporate governance 
mechanisms. On the other hand, the interaction between corporate governance and level 3 fair 
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values is negative, as expected, and statistically different from 0 at the 0.01 level. That is, 
investors appear to place less valuation weight on level 3 fair values for firms with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms. The findings support the third hypothesis, H3B, that the firm-level 
corporate governance mechanism has a greater impact on the value relevance of level 3 fair values 
than on the value relevance of level 1 or level 2 fair values. These results are comparable to those 
reported by Song et al. (2010) that show that the value relevance of level 3 fair values is greater 
for firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms. Also, they are in line with the study of 
Bhat (2013) reporting that investors in firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms 
perceive fair value gains and losses as more relevant and reliable.  
Overall, these empirical findings suggest that fair value amounts are value relevant to investors 
in firms operating in countries characterised by strong institutional environment and in firms with 
strong corporate governance mechanisms. More importantly, they reveal that the value relevance 
of level 3 fair values, which is based on managerial expectations and projections, are more 
affected by the strength of country-level institutional environment and firms’ corporate 
governance mechanisms, in comparison to level 1 and level 2 fair values. In particular, investors 
appear to place less valuation weight on level 3 fair values, associated with higher information 
asymmetry, for firms in countries characterised by weak institutional environment as well as for 
firms with weak governance practices.  
5.5 Additional analyses and robustness checks 
As pointed out by Song et al. (2011), the differences in the value relevance across firms could 
reflect differences in firm-specific characteristics, such as asset size, rather than differences in 
fair value levels. This might be the case if, for example, large firms tend to hold level 1 and level 
2 fair values, while small firms rely more on level 3 fair values. Therefore, as a robustness check, 
this study tests the value relevance of fair value hierarchy for two sub-samples: small and large 
firms. Another reason for this segmentation is that information asymmetry between managers 
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and shareholders is likely to be higher for small firms (Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987). The small 
group was defined as firms with average total assets less than the whole sample median and large 
firms as those with average total assets greater than the sample median, which corresponds to 94 
financial firms (349 observations) in the former group and 91 financial firms (350 observations) 
in the latter. 
As shown in Table 5.8 Panel A for small firms, the estimated coefficients on non-fair values as 
well as level 1 and level 2 fair values are statistically significant, indicating their value relevance. 
Unlike the entire sample, the valuation coefficient on level 3 fair values is not statistically 
different from 0. That is, investors in small firms do not perceive fair value estimates based on 
unobservable inputs as relevant for valuation purposes. One possible reason for this result could 
be the higher information asymmetry associated with small firms. The valuation coefficients on 
both level 1 and level 2 fair values are higher than that on level 3 fair values, suggesting that 
investors in small firms depend more on fair value amounts with observable inputs for valuation 
purposes. The valuation coefficients on both level 1 and level 2 are significantly higher than non-
fair value net assets. Finally, the valuations of non-fair values and level 3 fair values are not 
statistically different. Moving to Panel B on large firms, both non-fair value and fair value 
amounts are value relevant to investors. In terms of the differences in the value relevance across 
fair value levels, large firms show a pattern comparable to that of the entire sample: the valuation 
coefficient on level 1 fair values is significantly higher than that on level 3 fair values, whereas 
it is not statistically different from that on level 2 fair values. The valuation of level 2 fair values 
is higher than that of fair values at level 3, however the difference is not statistically significant. 
The three levels of fair values are more value relevant than non-fair value amounts. 
For additional insight into the results on the value relevance of fair value hierarchy, this thesis 
also partitions the banks in the main sample into two groups: high versus low Tier 1 capital ratio 
banks. This partition is based on the findings of prior research indicating that managerial 
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discretion in banking industry is used to avoid violating regulatory capital requirements (Ramesh 
and Revsine, 2001; Shrieves and Dahl, 2003; Paananen et al., 2012). Interestingly, Nissim (2003) 
shows that banks with low Tier 1 ratios tend to overstate, to a large extent, their fair values of 
loans in order to affect the market perception of their risk and performance. Investors might 
consider the potential unreliability of fair values in valuing banks with low capital ratios.  
Relating to fair value hierarchy, Song  et al. (2010) posit that the differences in capital ratio might 
be correlated with managers’ choice of fair value valuation levels. Furthermore, Goh et al. (2015) 
argue that banks with lower capital adequacy might be forced to liquidate their positions, even 
though their assets might be sold at fire-sale prices. This is particularly the case in times of 
financial crisis, which is the study period in this thesis. Investors are more likely to discount the 
fair value estimates given the greater likelihood of being forced to sell their assets at unfavourable 
prices, especially those measured based on unobservable inputs (Goh et al., 2015). 
This additional analysis is limited to financial firms engaging in traditional banking activities 
(138 banks in the whole sample) since the regulatory capital requirement are relevant only to 
banks. Banks are classified as low Tier 1 group (69 banks, and 262 observations) when having 
Tier 1 ratio below the sample median, and as high Tier 1 banks (69 banks with 263 observations) 
when their Tier 1 ratio is greater than the sample median.100 
Table 5.9 Panel A shows that results for banks with low Tier 1 ratios. The valuation coefficients 
on non-fair values in addition to level 1 and level 2 fair values are statistically significant, 
suggesting their value relevance to investors. The valuation coefficient on level 3 fair values is 
not statistically significant. That is, investors consider level 3 fair values reported by banks with 
low Tier 1 ratios as not sufficiently reliable to be reflected in firm value. The valuations of level 
1 and level 2 fair values are significantly higher than that of fair values at level 3. This might be 
explained by reliability concerns about fair value estimates for banks close to the minimum 
                                                          
100 The average Tier 1 ratio of each bank over the period 2009-2012 is used to calculate the sample median. 
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regulatory capital ratio (Nissim, 2003; Paananen et al., 2012). Moreover, the valuations of the 
three levels of fair value are significantly different from those of non-fair value amounts. Turning 
to the results for banks with high Tier 1 ratios in Panel B of Table 5.9, the estimated coefficients 
on both non-fair value and fair value amounts are significantly different from 0, indicating their 
value relevance to investors. Interestingly, the valuations across the three levels of fair value are 
not statistically different. This suggests that investors in banks with high capital ratios perceive 
fair values based on unobservable inputs as value relevant as those measured using observable 
inputs. One explanation could be the lower incentive for managers to use accounting discretion 
for the purpose of capital management (Ahmed et al., 1999; Nissim, 2003; Vyas, 2011).101 
Finally, with the exception of level 2 fair values, the valuation coefficients on fair value amounts 
are significantly greater than that on non-fair values.  
                                                          
101 However, some have argued that the impact of fair value adjustments alone on determining banks’ regulatory 
capital ratio is limited (e.g. Barth and Landsman, 2010; Laux,and Leuz, 2009).  
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Table 5. 8 Value relevance of fair values hierarchy for large versus small firms 
Panel A Small Firms Panel B Large Firms 
VARIABLES Coeff.  Test F-stat p-value VARIABLES Coeff.  Test F-stat p-value 
            
NFVNA 𝑏1 0.181*** FVNA1= FVNA3 4.69 0.0311** NFVNA 𝑏1 0.105*** FVNA1= FVNA3 8.37 0.0041*** 
  (0.0428)      (0.0263)    
FVNA1 𝑏2 0.361*** FVNA1= FVNA2 0.16 0.6931 FVNA1 𝑏2 0.296*** FVNA1= FVNA2 2.28 0.1323 
  (0.0661)      (0.0424)    
FVNA2 𝑏3 0.315*** FVNA2= FVNA3 4.48 0.0349** FVNA2 𝑏3 0.228*** FVNA2= FVNA3 0.99 0.3207 
  (0.0667)      (0.0519)    
FVNA3 𝑏4 -0.199 FVNA1= NFVNA 4.03 0.0454** FVNA3 𝑏4 0.164*** FVNA1= NFVNA 34.21 0.0001*** 
  (0.237)      (0.0477)    
EPS 𝑏5 -0.484 FVNA2= NFVNA 4.29 0.0391*** EPS 𝑏5 2.640*** FVNA2= NFVNA 6.74 0.0098*** 
  (0.822)      (0.965)    
Constant 𝑏0 6.329*** FVNA3= NFVNA 2.53 0.1129 Constant 𝑏0 4.029 FVNA3= NFVNA 4.94 0.0270** 
  (1.674)      (2.664)    
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes    Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes    
            
Observations  349    Observations  350    
No of firms  94    No of firms  91    
R-squared  0.769    R-squared  0.656    
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectively. The table reports the OLS estimation of the 
following equation 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share of firm i three months following the end of 
fiscal year t. 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 are fair value of level 1, level 2 and level 3 net assets for firm i as reported at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the reported net income of financial 
firm i for the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable for year t. All accounting information is scaled by the number of outstanding common share. This table shows the regression results of 
partitioning the sample by total assets of firms. Financial firms are classified into small or large firms based on the median value of total asset for the entire sample. The sum of observations in the 
two sub-samples (349 + 350 = 699) equals the total number of observations shown in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5. 9 Value relevance of fair values hierarchy for low versus high tier 1 banks 
Panel A Banks with low Tier 1 Ratio Panel B Banks with High Tier 1 Ratio 
VARIABLES Coeff.  Test F-stat p-value VARIABLES Coeff.  Test F-stat p-value 
            
NFVNA 𝑏1 0.0829*** FVNA1= FVNA3 32.03 0.0001*** NFVNA 𝑏1 0.204*** FVNA1= FVNA3 0.31 0.5784 
  (0.0126)      (0.0297)    
FVNA1 𝑏2 0.328*** FVNA1= FVNA2 0.41 0.5215 FVNA1 𝑏2 0.342*** FVNA1= FVNA2 1.44 0.2317 
  (0.0496)      (0.0347)    
FVNA2 𝑏3 0.367*** FVNA2= FVNA3 30.47 0.0001*** FVNA2 𝑏3 0.260*** FVNA2= FVNA3 3.44 0.0649* 
  (0.0652)      (0.0529)    
FVNA3 𝑏4 -0.0436 FVNA1= NFVNA 36.20 0.0001*** FVNA3 𝑏4 0.376*** FVNA1= NFVNA 9.71 0.0020*** 
  (0.0327)      (0.0512)    
EPS 𝑏5 1.082** FVNA2= NFVNA 32.98 0.0001*** EPS 𝑏5 2.561*** FVNA2= NFVNA 1.53 0.2172 
  (0.484)      (0.889)    
Constant 𝑏0 2.612 FVNA3= NFVNA 15.93 0.0001*** Constant 𝑏0 6.133* FVNA3= NFVNA 32.34 0.0001*** 
  (1.819)      (3.326)    
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes    Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes    
Observations  263    Observations  262    
No of firms  69    No of firms  69    
R-squared  0.768    R-squared  0.764    
Notice: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectively. The table reports the OLS estimation of the 
following equation 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡. where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share of firm i three months following the end of 
fiscal year t. 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 are fair value of level 1, level 2 and level 3 net assets for firm i as reported at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the reported net income of financial 
firm i for the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable for year t. All accounting information is scaled by the number of outstanding common share. This table provides the regression results of 
partitioning the banks in the sample by Tier 1 ratio. Banks are classified to either low or high Tier 1 ratio based on the median value of Tier 1 ratio for the entire sample. The sum of observations in 
the two sub-samples (263 + 262 = 525) is lower than the total number of observations (699) shown in Table 5.4, because the analysis in this table is restricted to financial firms whose primary 
business is to engage in traditional banking activities and have data on Tier 1 ratio in BankScope. 
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As a sensitivity test, this study re-estimates the main model to test the value relevance of fair 
hierarchy and scales all the variables using lagged total assets in lieu of the number of shares 
outstanding. A number of accounting studies use lagged total assets to mitigate the potential scale 
related-effect of the price model (see, for example, Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; O'Hanlon 
and Taylor, 2007; Manganaris et al., 2015). As shown in Table 5.10, both non-fair value and fair 
value amounts are value relevant to investors since their estimated coefficients are significantly 
different from 0. Furthermore, the valuation coefficients on FVNA1 and FVNA2 are statistically 
different from that FVNA3 (F-statistics: 4.58, F-statistics: 4.80, respectively). In other words, the 
empirical analysis after scaling all the variables by the total assets indicates that the value 
relevance of level 3 fair values, based on managerial projections and other unobservable inputs, 
is significantly lower than that on level 1 and level 2 fair values, measured using observable 
inputs. The valuation of level 1 fair values is not different from that of level 3 fair value net assets. 
Unlike the main model results, the valuation coefficients on fair value amounts appear to not 
significantly differ from that on non-fair values. Overall, Table 5.10 shows that the main results 
hold to a large extent after scaling the variables by lagged total assets in the model employed. 
Finally, the present study runs the regression to test whether investors place differential weights 
across the three levels of fair value using the market value of equity six months after the end of 
the fiscal year. Some prior studies use stock prices six months after fiscal year-end as the 
dependent variable in the price model (e.g. Liu et al., 2011; Barth et al., 2012). Table 5.11, the 
main findings of the empirical analysis are not substantially altered after employing the market 
value six months, rather than three month, following the end of fiscal year. 
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Table 5. 10 Value relevance of fair values hierarchy using alternative scaling method 
  Pane A Panel B 
VARIABLES Coeff.  Test F-stat p-value 
      
NFVNA 𝑏1 0.807*** FVNA1= FVNA3 4.58 0.0326** 
  (0.152)    
FVNA1 𝑏2 0.986*** FVNA1= FVNA2 0.78 0.3788 
  (0.158)    
FVNA2 𝑏3 0.856*** FVNA2= FVNA3 4.80 0.0288** 
  (0.162)    
FVNA3 𝑏4 0.475** FVNA1= NFVNA 2.61 0.1069 
  (0.206)    
EPS 𝑏5 3.846*** FVNA2= NFVNA 0.49 0.4849 
  (1.453)    
Constant 𝑏0 -1.448 FVNA3= NFVNA 3.60 0.0582* 
  (52.76)    
Year Dummy  Yes    
      
Observations  699    
No of firms  185    
R-squared  0.713    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the OLS estimation of the following equation 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡. where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value of firm i three months following the end of fiscal 
year t. 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 are fair value of level 1, level 2 and level 3 net assets for firm i as reported at the end 
of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the reported net income of financial firm i for the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable for year t. In 
this form of the model all the market and accounting variables are scaled by lagged total assets (i.e. total assets for firm i as 
reported at the end of fiscal year t-1). While Panel A shows the results of the regression, Panel B offers F-statistics testing the 
differences between the estimation coefficients.  
 
In particular, both non-fair values and the three levels of fair values are value relevant to investors. 
The valuation coefficient on level 1 fair values is significantly greater than that on level 3 fair 
values. Again, this indicates that investors place less valuation weight on level 3 fair values, 
which is subject to potential managerial manipulation and measurement error in comparison to 
level 1 fair values measured based on observable inputs from active markets of identical assets 
or liabilities. The valuation coefficient on level 2 fair value is greater than that on level 3 fair 
values, yet the difference is not statistically significant. The valuation coefficient on each of three 
fair value levels is higher in magnitude than that on non-fair value net assets, suggesting that they 
are more value relevant than non-fair value amounts. 
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In sum, the results are largely unaffected when the estimation of the value relevance of fair value 
hierarchy employs the market value of equity six months after the end of the fiscal year as a 
dependent variable.  
Table 5. 11 Value relevance of fair values hierarchy using six months market value 
  Panel A Panel B 
VARIABLES Coeff.  Test F-stat p-value 
      
NFVNA 𝑏1 0.0584*** FVNA1= FVNA3 19.18 0.0001*** 
  (0.0115)    
FVNA1 𝑏2 0.190*** FVNA1= FVNA2 3.91 0.0484** 
  (0.0173)    
FVNA2 𝑏3 0.144*** FVNA2= FVNA3 2.22 0.1365 
  (0.0249)    
FVNA3 𝑏4 0.0979*** FVNA1= NFVNA 77.33 0.0001*** 
  (0.0220)    
EPS 𝑏5 1.694** FVNA2= NFVNA 14.13 0.0002*** 
  (0.708)    
Constant 𝑏0 5.778*** FVNA3= NFVNA 8.07 0.0046*** 
  (1.246)    
Year Dummy  Yes    
      
Observations  699    
No of firms  185    
R-squared  0.574    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. . The table reports the OLS estimation of the following equation 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡. where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value per share of firm i six months following the end 
of fiscal year t. 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 are fair value of level 1, level 2 and level 3 net assets for firm i as reported at 
the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the reported net income of financial firm i for the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable for 
year t. All accounting information is scaled by the number of outstanding common share. The sample includes 699 firm-year of 
185 distinct firms in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland over the period 2009-2012. While Panel A shows the 
results of the regression, Panel B offers F-statistics testing the differences between the estimation coefficients. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The second empirical part of this thesis examines the value relevance of the three levels of fair 
values as disclosed under IFRS 7. In particular, it examines whether there are variations in the 
valuation weight placed by investors on fair value net assets across the three levels of fair value 
hierarchy. In a further analysis, it investigates whether the value relevance of the three levels of 
fair value hierarchy depends on the country-level institutional environment and firm-level 
corporate governance mechanisms.  
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The results of this study suggest that investors place a higher valuation weight on mark-to-market 
fair values net assets, based on observable inputs, relative to mark-to-model fair values, estimated 
based on unobservable inputs. In particular, the valuation coefficient on level 3 fair value is lower 
in magnitude than that on level 1 and level 2 fair values; yet the difference is statistically 
significant only for level 1. Overall, these results are comparable to the empirical findings of prior 
accounting studies focusing on US markets (Kolev, 2009; Song et al., 2010; Goh et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, the value relevance of fair value hierarchy is examined as a function of the 
institutional environment and corporate governance. The results reveal that the value relevance 
of level 3 fair values tend to be lower for firms domiciled in countries characterised by weak 
institutional environment and for firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms. The impact 
of the institutional environment and corporate governance on the value relevance of level 1 and 
level 2 fair values appear to be statistically insignificant. These findings provide support to the 
view that both the institutional environment and corporate governance play a significant role in 
mitigating information asymmetry problem associated with fair value amounts estimated based 
on managerial projections and private information.  
As a further analysis, the entire sample is split using the sample median of total assets into two 
groups: small and large firms. The results for small firms show that level 3 fair values are not 
value relevant to investors, and the valuations of both level 1 and level 2 fair value net assets are 
significantly higher than that on level 3 fair values. For the group of large firms, the results of the 
whole sample tend to be confirmed; the valuations on level 1 and level 2 fair value net assets are 
greater than that on level 3 fair values, the difference is significant only for level 1.  
Additionally, using the sample mean of capital Tier 1 ratio, the banks in the sample are classified 
into: low Tier 1 versus high Tier 1 ratio banks. The results for banks with lower Tier 1 ratios 
show that the valuation coefficient on level 3 fair values is not statistically significant and 
significantly lower than those on level 1 and level 2 fair values. Interestingly, the valuations on 
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the three levels of fair values hierarchy are not significantly different in magnitude for the sub-
sample of banks with high Tier 1 ratios.  
Finally, the main results are largely robust to alternative scaling method and to use market value 
of equity six months after the end of fiscal year as a dependent variable.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis aims at investigating the value relevance of IFRS and the effect of the financial crisis 
on European financial firms. The empirical work is divided into two main parts. The first part 
aims to investigate the impact of IFRS adoption and of the financial crisis on the value relevance 
of accounting information of financial firms. The second part seeks to examine the value 
relevance of fair value hierarchy as disclosed under IFRS 7 by financial firms.  
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 provides concluding remarks on the impact of IFRS 
adoption and the financial crisis on value relevance, after which Section 6.3 provides concluding 
remarks on the value relevance of fair value hierarchy. Section 6.4 presents implications of the 
findings obtained in this thesis. Finally, Section 6.5 discusses the study limitations and offers 
some directions for future research. 
6.2 Conclusion on the impact of IFRS and the crisis on value relevance  
Since 2005, listed firms in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland102 are required 
to prepare their financial statements under IFRS in lieu of local accounting standards. The impact 
of mandatory IFRS adoption on accounting information quality in general has been extensively 
investigated in prior research; however, little attention has been given to the financial sector. 
Besides, the specific characteristics of financial firms, such as holding a considerable percentage 
of their assets and liabilities measured at fair value, make them ideally suited to examine the 
impact of the financial crisis on the valuation roles of the balance sheet and the income statement.  
                                                          
102 In Switzerland, listed firms are required to prepare their financial statements using either IFRS or the US GAAP 
since 2005. 
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Based on a sample of financial firms listed on the EEA and Switzerland stock markets over the 
period 1999-2012, the first empirical part examines four research questions related to IFRS 
adoption and the financial crisis. 
The first research question examines whether the value relevance of accounting information 
increases following mandatory IFRS adoption by financial firms. The findings show that the 
combined value relevance of book value of equity and earnings, measured by the explanatory 
power of the price model, has increased following IFRS adoption for both the entire sample of 
financial firms and the sub-sample of banks. Specifically, the explanatory power of the price 
model is significantly higher during the IFRS adoption period (2005-2012) relative to the pre-
IFRS adoption period (1999-2004). This suggests that mandatory IFRS adoption results in an 
increase in accounting information quality of financial firms.  
The second research question addresses whether the value relevance of equity book value 
increases, while the value relevance of net income decreases for financial firms as the financial 
crisis evolves. The study finds that the valuation coefficient on the interaction between the crisis 
and the book value of equity is positive in the price model, while the coefficient on the 
corresponding interaction with earnings is negative. This indicates that when the financial crisis 
hit in 2008 investors in financial firms placed more valuation weight on book value of equity, the 
primary summary measure of the balance sheet, and less weight on net income, the summary 
measure of the income statement. This in turn supports the view that the balance sheet and the 
income statement fulfil distinctive valuation roles.  
The third research question asks if during the crisis the value relevance of equity book value 
increases and that of net income decreases in countries characterised by a weak institutional 
environment. Country-level institutional factors are found to have significant impact on the value 
relevance of book value of equity, but not on that of earnings. In particular, book value of equity 
190 
 
tends to be more value relevant in countries with weak institutional environment during the 
financial crisis.  
Finally, the fourth research question in the first part is whether the value relevance of equity book 
value increases and that of net income decreases for firms with weak corporate governance. The 
results suggest that firm-level corporate governance mechanisms have a significant impact on the 
value relevance of equity book value, but not on earnings. Firms with weak corporate governance 
mechanisms appear to have more value relevant book value of equity. Overall, the findings 
provide partial support for the hypotheses that during the crisis period the value relevance of book 
value of equity and earnings is related to the country-level institutional environment and firm-
level corporate governance mechanisms. All the results reported are consistent for both the entire 
sample of financial firms and the sub-sample of banks.  
As a further analysis to examine the impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting 
information, the sample is partitioned, according to total assets, into two sub-samples: small and 
large financial firms. The results for the group of small financial firms suggest that there is an 
increase in the combined value relevance of book value of equity and earnings after IFRS 
adoption; yet the change is not statistically significant. For large financial firms, the results show 
a significant increase in the overall value relevance of equity book value and earnings. In sum, 
the findings suggest that the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption is much more pronounced for 
large financial firms compared to small financial firms. Also the sub-sample of banks is split into 
high versus low Tier 1 ratio banks. Banks might use managerial discretion over financial 
reporting in order to avoid violating regulatory capital requirements (Ahmed et al., 1999; Wilson 
et al., 2010). For both low and high Tier 1 ratio banks, the overall value relevance of book value 
of equity and earnings significantly increases following the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005.  
Similarly, the impact of the financial crisis on the valuation roles of the balance sheet and the 
income statement is examined for subsamples partitioned by financial firm size, as well as bank 
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Tier 1 capital ratio. The findings suggest that the interaction between the crisis and book value of 
equity (earnings) is positive (negative) for both small and large financial firms; however, it is 
statistically significant only for the former. Similarly, the increase (decrease) in the value 
relevance of book value of equity (earnings) as the crisis evolved is statistically significant only 
for banks with low Tier 1 ratio. This suggests that the effect of the financial crisis on the valuation 
roles of the balance sheet and income statement is more pronounced for smaller financial firms 
in comparison to large financial firms, as well as for banks with low capital ratio in comparison 
to those with high capital ratio.  
Finally, the main results are largely robust to alternative scaling method and to use market value 
of equity six months after the end of fiscal year as a dependent variable. Also, the main findings 
tend to be confirmed when using the return model in examining the impact of IFRS adoption, as 
well as after including the voluntary IFRS adopters in evaluating the effect of the financial crisis. 
6.3 Conclusion on value relevance of fair value hierarchy 
Under IFRS 7, firms are required to disclose the fair value of financial instruments by levels, 
where these levels reflect the valuation inputs to estimate fair values. In this fair value hierarchy, 
a financial instrument is classified as level 1 when the fair value is measured using quoted prices 
for identical instruments traded in active market; level 2 when fair values is measured based on 
observable market inputs other than those used in level 1 (e.g. quoted price for comparable 
financial instruments); or level 3 when the valuation inputs are not observable (i.e. using 
managerial projections and assumptions).  
The second empirical part uses data from listed firms in the EEA and Switzerland over 2009-
2012 to answer three research questions related to fair value hierarchy disclosure under IFRS 7. 
The first research question examines whether the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values 
is higher than the value relevance of level 3 fair values. The findings show that all fair value 
levels are value relevant to investors. The valuation coefficient on level 3 fair value net assets is 
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lower in magnitude than those on level 1 and level 2 fair values (the difference is statistically 
significant only for level 1 fair values). These findings indicate that investors tend to place less 
valuation weight on less reliable fair value information at level 3 that is associated with greater 
information asymmetry due to inherent measurement error and potential managerial manipulation 
(or optimism). 
The second research addressed is whether the institutional environment has a greater impact on 
the value relevance of level 3 fair values than on the value relevance of level 1 or level 2 fair 
values. The study finds that for firms domiciled in countries characterised by strong institutional 
environment, the valuation coefficients on the three levels of fair value hierarchy are statistically 
significant, suggesting they provide value relevant information to investors. Moreover, the 
valuation of level 3 fair value is slightly lower (higher) than that on level 1 (level 2) fair values. 
This indicates that fair value estimates that are based on unobservable inputs and reported by 
firms in strong institutional settings are likely to be as value relevant as those measured using 
observable inputs. The coefficient on the interaction between institutional environment and fair 
values is significant (and negative) for those at level 3 only. Hence, the institutional environment 
characteristics have a significant impact on the value relevance of level 3 fair value net assets, 
but not on that of fair values at level 1 and level 2.  
The final research question in the second part asks if corporate governance mechanisms have a 
greater impact on the value relevance of level 3 fair values than on the value relevance of level 1 
or level 2 fair values. The findings show that the three levels of fair value are value relevant to 
investors in firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms. Interestingly, the valuation 
coefficient on level 3 fair values is slightly higher than the coefficients of level 1 and level 2 fair 
values, suggesting that fair values estimated using internally generated inputs are at least as value 
relevant as those measured based on observable inputs. The interaction between corporate 
governance mechanisms and fair values is statistically significant (and negative) for those marked 
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as level 3 fair values only, indicating that firm-level governance mechanisms have a significant 
influence on the value relevance of fair values categorised as level 3 only.  
As an additional analysis, the sample of financial firms is divided into small and large firms based 
on total assets. The findings for the sub-sample of small firms reveal that the valuation coefficient 
on level 3 fair value is not statistically significant. This suggests that the fair value estimates 
based on unobservable inputs reported by small financial firms are not value relevant. The 
valuation coefficients on both level 1 and level 2 are statistically higher than that on fair values 
classified at level 3. The results for the large financial firms are in line with those reported for the 
entire sample. The valuation coefficient on level 1 fair value is greater than that on fair values at 
level 2 and level 3 (the difference is significant only for level 3 net assets). The valuation of level 
2 fair values is greater than that of level 3 fair value, however the difference is not statistically 
significant.  
A further analysis is carried out by partitioning the banks in the sample into low and high Tier 1 
ratio banks. The sub-sample of banks with low Tier 1 ratios shows that the valuation coefficient 
on level 3 fair values is not statistically significant. These results indicate that fair value estimates 
measured using unobservable inputs which are reported by banks with low Tier 1 ratios are not 
value relevant. The valuation of level 1 and level 2 fair values are higher than the valuation of 
fair values at level 3. For banks with high Tier 1 ratio the valuation coefficients across the three 
fair value levels are significant and not statistically different in magnitude.  
Finally, the main results are generally robust to the use of lagged book value of equity as 
alternative scaling method and to the use of market value of equity six months after the end of 
fiscal year as a dependent variable in the price model.  
6.4 Implications 
Standard-setters can use the empirical findings from value relevance research to provide feedback 
on whether a change in accounting standards has improved the quality of financial statement 
194 
 
information. This thesis provides insights relevant to standard-setters, especially IASB, by 
evaluating the effect of IFRS adoption on the quality of accounting information presented by 
firms from a specific sector, and herein financial firms. The thesis provides empirical evidence 
which suggests that the value relevance of financial statements has increased following the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 by financial firms with their own specific characteristics 
(e.g. holding a substantial proportion of financial instruments in their financial statements, in 
addition to being heavily regulated). This complements the empirical evidence from previous 
studies showing an improvement in the value relevance of accounting information based on 
samples from a wide spectrum of industries. The study also provides some findings on the impact 
of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting information over relatively longer periods 
of time compared to previous empirical evidence, i.e. from the early years of adoption. In 
addition, the results obtained in this study concerning the changes in the value relevance of 
accounting information after IFRS adoption are relevant to accounting jurisdictions that consider 
IFRS adoption as well as to accounting standard setters considering the convergence of their 
standards with IFRS (such as FASB). 
Understanding the effects of economic crises on the value relevance of accounting numbers is of 
potential interest to accounting regulators and security commissions, when preparing and 
adopting accounting standards that seek to reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders, improve the quality of financial statement information and enhance the disclosure 
in light of the crisis. Also, the results of the thesis might be useful for policy makers (i.e. bank 
regulators) when adopting defence mechanisms against financial and sovereign debt crises. For 
example, reported accounting figures are used to calculate the capital adequacy ratios and thus 
they might be used by managers for capital management purposes. It is essential therefore for 
bank regulators to have an insight into how market participants perceive this information when 
market conditions deteriorate.  The results suggest that the value relevance of book value of equity 
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increases, while that of earnings decreases as the crisis strikes. More importantly, the focus of 
this thesis is on financial firms which have been at the heart of the financial crisis. This might 
provide some insight on the impact of fair value accounting on the valuation characteristics of 
the two main financial statements, the balance sheet and the income statement, in times of 
financial crisis.  
The empirical findings from testing the value relevance of fair value should be of particular 
interest to standard setters who can assess whether fair value hierarchy disclosure provides useful 
information to investors for valuation purposes. When IASB issued amendments to IFRS 7 in 
2009, it had the objective of improving information disclosure to help information users in 
evaluating the significance of financial instruments for the firms’ financial position and 
performance. The results of this study indicate that investors attach different valuation weights 
to fair value amounts based on the valuation inputs information provided by firms, confirming 
the potential valuation benefits from the new disclosure requirements. In addition, these findings 
are of potential interest to financial statement preparers, i.e., financial firms’ managers, as well 
as financial analysts. They give an indication on how market participants perceive fair value 
accounting information and how the valuation of this information varies with inputs to fair value 
measurements.  
The results should also be of interest to accounting scholars, especially those who focus on fair 
value accounting. The findings show that the characteristics of the institutional environment, in 
addition to firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, play a role in determining the valuation 
roles of the balance sheet and the income statement of financial institutions whose financial 
statements are more exposed to fair value accounting in comparison to other industries. 
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Furthermore, they appear to have an important role in mitigating reliability concerns relating to 
financial assets and liabilities for which active markets do not exist. As such, firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms as well as the country-specific characteristics with regard to the legal 
and investment environment should be taken into consideration when examining fair value 
accounting in multi-country contexts.  
6.5 Research limitations and avenues for future research  
As with all research, this thesis is unquestionably subject to several limitations. The study is 
limited to the firms domiciled in European countries. This may limit the generalisability of the 
findings to non-European countries. Whether similar findings are obtained in a non-European 
context, with different institutional, political, and cultural environments is a matter for future 
research.  
This study covers eight years of IFRS adoption, which is a longer period of time compared to that 
covered by several previous studies, which address the early years of IFRS adoption (e.g. 
Agostino et al., 2011). Still, the time frame is relatively short. Therefore, it would be interesting 
to revisit the effect of IFRS implementation on the overall value relevance of book value of equity 
and net income reported by financial firms over the long run. Also, the findings concerning the 
differences in the value relevance across the three levels of fair value hierarchy may vary after 
2012 because of the adoption of IFRS 13. IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement is mandatory for 
fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2013 (i.e. following the end of the study period). 
IFRS 13 provides more detailed guidance on fair value disclosure, especially for level 3 fair 
values, which might have an influence on the value relevance of fair values.  
Five corporate governance measures are used to proxy for corporate governance mechanisms at 
firm level. Although these governance measures are collected over the five years of the study 
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period,103 rather than only from one year as in several prior studies (e.g. Davis-Friday et al., 2006; 
Vyas, 2011), they capture only five dimensions of corporate governance. The accounting 
literature introduces more measures of corporate governance that can affect the quality of 
accounting information (Garcia Lara et al., 2007; Larcker et al., 2007; Verriest et al., 2013). 
Future research could extend the analysis by using a broader set of corporate governance 
indicators.  
Another area of concern is related to the efficiency issues of the capital markets in some of the 
countries under investigation. This is particularly true for emerging markets in Eastern and 
Central Europe in comparison to those in Western Europe. Some authors have raised concerns 
about the interpretation of the results obtained by the value relevance studies conducted in 
possibly inefficient capital markets (e.g. Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Aboody et al., 2002). On 
the other hand, Barth et al. (2001) point out that market value of equity in value relevance models 
reflects the investors’ consensus about the underlying economic value of equity, which is not 
necessarily equal to the underlying economic value itself. In such settings, the assumption of 
market efficiency becomes unnecessary. The present study, therefore, does not derive theoretical 
benchmarks for the valuation coefficients on accounting numbers, and neither does it test their 
deviations from any theoretical values. Future research may address the impact of market 
efficiency on the value relevance of accounting variables employed in this study, for example the 
three levels of fair value.  
In evaluating the impact of the financial crisis on the valuation roles of the balance sheet and 
income statement, this thesis uses the two statements’ summary measures, equity book value and 
net income, respectively. The valuation coefficients on the components of the book value of 
equity and net income might differ (see, for example, the different valuation coefficients on non-
fair value net assets and the three levels of fair value obtained in this thesis). Additional research 
                                                          
103 Corporate governance data are collected for four years when investigating the value relevance of fair value 
hierarchy. 
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could be carried out to evaluate the impact of the financial crisis on the components of the balance 
sheet and income statement.  
Finally, future studies can investigate whether the effects of IFRS adoption and of the financial 
crisis on the value relevance of accounting information vary across other industries, compared to 
financial institutions. 
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Appendix I 
Literature review on the impact of IFRS and the crisis on value relevance 
-Value relevance of IFRS 
-Single country studies 
Author (s)  Research objective Sample  Methodology Primary findings 
Gjerde et al. (2008) To evaluate whether 
IFRS adoption results 
in higher value 
relevance accounting 
information 
A sample of 145 firms 
listed on Oslo stock 
Exchange in 2005.  
The price and 
return models 
The analysis reveals little 
evidence of increased 
value-relevance after the 
mandatory adoption of 
IFRS in 2005. 
Morais and Curto 
(2008) 
To evaluate whether 
IFRS adoption results 
in higher value 
relevance accounting 
information 
A sample of 34 
Portuguese listed over 
the period from 1994 
to 2006 
The price model  They find a decrease in the 
value relevance of 
accounting information 
over the two years of IFRS 
(2005-2006) compared to 
the period of domestic 
GAAP (1995-2004) 
Paananen (2008) To evaluate whether 
IFRS adoption results 
in higher value 
relevance accounting 
information 
A sample of 376 firms 
over the period 2003-
2006 in Sweden. 
The price model The findings suggest a 
decrease in the value 
relevance of accounting 
information, but the 
difference is not 
statistically significant. 
Filip (2010) To evaluate whether 
mandatory IFRS 
adoption in 2001 
results in higher value 
relevance accounting 
information 
A sample of 280 firm-
year observations 
(related to 48 firms) 
over the period 1997-
2004 in Romania 
The return model The value relevance of 
accounting information is 
significantly higher in the 
period of IFRS adoption 
(2001-2004) compared to 
pre-IFRS adoption period. 
Dobija and Klimczak 
(2010) 
To evaluate whether 
the introduction of 
new Polish  
accounting in 2000 
and IFRS in 2005 
result in higher value 
relevance accounting 
information 
A sample of 856 
Polish firm-year 
observations over the 
period 1997-2008 in 
Poland. 
The return model There is no improvement 
in the value relevance of 
accounting information 
following the two periods 
of interest (the new Polish 
accounting standards and 
IFRS adoption).  
 
Oliveira et al. (2010) To examine whether 
the value relevance of 
book value of equity, 
earnings and 
recognised intangible 
assets increase after 
the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. 
A sample of 354 
Portuguese non-
financial listed firms 
over the period 1998-
2008. 
The price model They report a decrease in 
the value relevance of 
earnings compared to no 
effect on that of equity 
book value following the 
implementation of IFRS in 
2005. 
Chalmers et al. (2011) To evaluate whether 
IFRS adoption results 
in higher value 
relevance accounting 
information 
A sample of 20,025 
Australian firm-year 
observations over the 
period 1990-2008. 
The price model They find a little evidence 
of increase in the value 
relevance of accounting 
information after the 
mandatory IFRS adoption 
in 2005 
Liu et al. (2011) To examine whether 
IFRS adoption results 
in higher value 
relevance accounting 
information. 
A sample of 870  
firms over the period 
2005-2008 in China. 
The price and 
return models 
Their findings indicate an 
increase in the value 
relevance of accounting 
information following 
IFRS mandatory adoption. 
Also, there is an increase in 
the value relevance of 
reported earnings but not in 
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that of book value of 
equity. 
Karampinis and  
Hevas (2011), 
To examine whether 
there has been an 
improvement in the 
value relevance of 
accounting 
information and 
conditional 
conservatism after 
IFRS adoption 
A sample of 869 
Greek firm-year 
observations over the 
period 2002-2007. 
The price and 
return models. To 
proxy for 
conditional 
conservatism, 
income is 
regressed on 
returns interacted 
the sign of 
returns. 
The study report that there 
is not significant 
improvement in the quality 
of accounting information 
(value relevance and 
conditional conservatism) 
following IFRS adoption in 
Greece. 
Tsalavoutas et al. 
(2012) 
To evaluate whether 
there has been an 
improvement in the 
value relevance of 
accounting 
information after 
IFRS adoption. 
A sample of 
1,861Greek firm-year 
observations over the 
period 2001-2008. 
The price and 
return models 
They report no significant 
change in the value 
relevance of financial 
reporting after the 
mandatory introduction of 
IFRS. Furthermore, the 
results show a significant 
increase (decrease) in the 
coefficient of equity book 
value (net income) 
 
 
- Multi-country studies 
Author (s)  Research objective Sample  Methodology Primary findings 
Morais and Curto 
(2009) 
To examine whether 
there has been any 
improvement in the 
value relevance of 
accounting 
information following 
the mandatory 
introduction of IFRS 
A sample of 6,977 
European listed 
companies from 14 
different countries in 
the EEA over 2001-
2005. 
The price model The results suggest that the 
value relevance of 
financial statements over 
the first year of mandatory 
IFRS adoption is higher in 
comparison to those 
reported in the period of 
domestic accounting 
standards. 
Devalle et al. (2010) To investigate 
whether there has 
been any 
improvement in the 
value relevance of 
accounting 
information after 
mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
A sample of 3,721 
companies listed on 
five European stock 
exchanges from 2002 
to 2007. 
The price and 
return models 
They report that there has 
been an increase in the 
value relevance after IFRS 
adoption. Also, the value 
relevance of net income 
has increased in 
comparison to a decrease 
in value relevance of book 
value of equity. 
Aubert and 
Grudnitski (2011) 
To examine whether 
there has been any 
improvement in the 
value relevance of 
accounting 
information after 
mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
a sample of 3,530 
firms in 14 EEA 
countries and 
Switzerland in 2005 
A regression of 
stock return on 
reported net 
income 
The results show a positive 
association between 
earnings and stock return 
for the entire sample. 
Country by country 
provides inconclusive 
findings 
Clarkson et al. (2011) To evaluate whether 
IFRS adoption results 
in higher value 
relevance accounting 
information. 
A sample of 3,488 
firms in 15 EU 
countries in 2005 
The price model The results report no 
improvements in the value 
relevance for both sub-
samples of code law and 
common law countries. 
County-by-country 
analysis shows mixed 
results 
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- IFRS adoption and financial firms 
Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas 
(2011) 
To investigate 
whether there is any 
change in the use of 
loan loss provisions 
(LLPs) as a tool for 
earnings management 
and capital 
management after 
IFRS adoption. 
A sample of 90 banks 
listed in 12 European 
countries over the 
period from 2000 to 
2007. 
Loan loss 
provisions (LLPs) 
are regressed on 
the determinates of 
LLPs. 
The results suggest that the 
introduction of IFRS in 
2005 results in less 
earnings management 
behaviour of European 
banks and the effect is less 
pronounced for banks from 
countries characterised by 
stricter bank supervision, 
widely dispersed bank 
ownership and for banks 
that are cross-listed in the 
US. 
Leventis et al. (2011)  To examine the 
change in earnings 
management 
behaviour using LLPs 
following IFRS 
adoption.  
A sample of 910 
bank-year 
observations related 
to 91 European banks 
over 1999-2008 
Loan loss 
provisions (LLPs) 
are regressed on 
the determinates of 
LLPs 
IFRS adoption period 
appears to result in a 
decline in earnings 
management behaviour by 
European banks. 
Agostino et al. (2011) To investigate 
whether there has 
been any 
improvement in the 
value relevance of 
accounting 
information 
following the 
mandatory 
introduction of IFRS 
A sample of 1,201 
bank-year 
observations in 15 
EEA countries over 
the period 2002-
2006. 
The price model They report an increase in 
the value relevance after 
IFRS adoption. Also, the 
value relevance of 
earnings increased 
following IFRS adoption 
for the different sub-
samples used. For equity 
book value, the results are 
less clear-cut. 
Manganaris et al. 
(2015) 
To examine the 
changes in the value 
relevance of 
accounting 
information 
following IFRS 
adoption, and 
examine its 
relationship to 
conditional 
conservatism. 
A sample of 2,223 
firm-year 
observations related 
to 178 financial 
institutions from 15 
EEA countries  over 
1998-2011. 
The price and 
return models. 
 
There is a significant 
increase (decrease) in the 
value relevance of 
earnings (book value) after 
mandating IFRS. The shift 
in the value relevance 
depends on institutional 
environment. Conditional 
conservatism is positively 
(negatively) related to 
value relevance prior to 
(post) mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
 
 
- Value relevance and the financial crisis 
Author (s)  Research objective Sample  Methodology Primary findings 
Barth et al. (1998) To investigate the 
impact of firms’ 
financial health on the 
pricing coefficients on 
of equity book value 
as well as net income. 
A sample of 396 US 
firms that bankrupted 
and delisted over the 
period 1974-1993. 
The price model The results show that the 
valuation coefficient of 
equity book value 
increases over the period of 
five years before 
bankruptcy, whereas the 
estimated coefficient on 
net income tends to 
decrease over the same 
period. 
Graham et al. (2000). To evaluate the 
impact of Asian 
financial crisis in 
1997 on the value 
A sample of 8,116 
firm-quarter 
observations in 
The price model Whereas the incremental 
value relevance of equity 
book value increases, that 
of net income decreases 
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relevance of book 
value of equity and 
net income. 
 
Thailand over the 
period 1992-1998. 
following the financial 
crisis in Asia 
Davis-Friday et al. 
(2006) 
To evaluate the 
impact of Asian 
financial crisis in 
1997 on the value 
relevance of book 
value of equity and 
net income. 
A sample of 1,035 
firms listed in 
Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia or 
Thailand. 
The price model Their results indicate 
different effect of financial 
crisis in different countries. 
Further analysis shows that 
the institutional 
environment plays a role in 
the extent of changes in the 
value relevance. 
Fen et al. (2010) To evaluate whether a 
financial crisis affects 
the value relevance of 
specific components 
of the balance sheet 
and income statement. 
4102 firm-quarter 
observations in 
Taiwan from the first 
quarter of 2007 to the 
first quarter of 2009. 
The price model The results show a 
significant decrease in the 
value relevance of net 
income components. The 
results for book value are 
less clear-cut as it varies 
based on industry 
classification. 
 
Choi et al. (2011) To investigate the 
changes in the value 
relevance of reported 
net income and its 
components around 
the Asian financial 
crisis 1997-1998. 
A sample of 10,406 
firm-years from nine 
Asian countries from 
1995 to 2000 
The regression of 
stock return on 
the different 
components of 
earnings. 
They report a significant 
decline in the value 
relevance of discretionary 
accruals but no significant 
change in that of non-
discretionary components.  
Filip and Raffournier 
(2012) 
To examine the 
impact of financial 
crisis in 2008 and 
2009 on the 
accounting 
information quality. 
A sample of 8,266 
firms in 16 European 
countries over the 
period 2006-2009 
Earnings 
management 
models. 
The findings suggest a 
decrease in earnings 
management during the 
financial crisis. However, 
this is not the case for all 
the countries represented in 
their sample. 
Iatridis and Dimitras 
(2013) 
To examine whether 
there has been any 
change in the value 
relevance and 
earnings management 
during the financial 
crisis. 
A sample of 582 firms 
listed in five 
European countries 
over the period 2005-
2011.  
The price model 
and earnings 
management 
models 
The effect of financial 
crisis on the accounting 
information quality, 
measured by earnings 
management and value 
relevance, varies across 
five European countries. 
Vyas (2011) To examine the 
timeliness of write-
downs reporting by  
US financial firms 
during the crisis 
period. 
A sample of 66 U.S. 
financial firms that 
reported write down 
in the period 2007-
2008. 
 A model to 
compare the 
timing of actual 
write downs to 
the devaluation 
that is implied in 
exposure-specific 
credit indices 
such the ABX 
Actual write-downs are 
generally less timely 
compared to the 
devaluation implied by 
credit indices. Also the 
timeliness of write-downs 
tend to vary across banks. 
Cohen et al. (2014) To evaluate the 
earnings management 
behaviour by banks 
surrounding the 
financial crisis. 
A sample of US banks 
that operate during the 
1997 through 2009. 
The regression of 
crash risk on the 
level of earnings 
management 
Their findings suggest that 
earnings management by 
banks has little effect on 
downside risk during pre-
crisis period, but appears to 
have a big impact during a 
financial crisis. 
Beccalli et al. (2015) To examine earnings 
management 
behaviour using LLPs 
by European banks 
A sample of 487 
bank-quarter 
observations related 
to 55 banks domiciled 
Earnings 
management is 
measured by the 
residuals from a 
The findings suggest that 
banks tend to engage in 
earnings management 
activities via LLPs before 
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during the financial 
crisis. 
in 14 Europe 
countries over 2004-
2008. 
regression of 
LLP on the 
business 
activities that 
determinate 
LLPs 
the crisis but not in the 
crisis period. 
 
- Value relevance and institutional factors 
Author (s)  Research objective Sample  Methodology Primary findings 
Black and White 
(2003) 
To examine the 
variation in the 
relative value 
relevance of equity 
book value and net 
income across 
countries. 
A sample of 36,143 
firm-year 
observations for firms 
listed in Germany, 
Japan and US over the 
period 1986-1998. 
The price model  They report a variation in 
the value relevance of 
equity book value and net 
income across three 
countries 
Prather-Kinsey et al. 
(2008) 
To investigate the 
value relevance of 
book values and 
earnings before and 
after IFRS adoption in 
addition to cost of 
capital in common 
law and code law 
countries as well  
A sample of 157 
European listed 
companies over 2004 
and 2006, 
The price model 
and cost of 
capital model 
The findings show a 
stronger effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption 
on the value relevance of 
accounting information as 
well as cost of capital for 
code law group. 
Lourenço and Curto 
(2008) 
To assess whether 
accounting 
information quality is 
higher for common 
law countries before 
IFRS adoption and 
whether the value 
relevance varies 
across countries after 
IFRS adoption. 
A sample of 348 firms 
listed in six European 
countries from 2003 
and 2008 
The price model Accounting information 
tend to be higher in 
common law countries 
before IFRS adoption. 
There is an increase in the 
value relevance of 
accounting information 
after IFRS adoption in 
European countries with 
the exception of Germany 
and Italy. 
Clarkson et al. (2011) To evaluate the 
changes in the value 
relevance of 
accounting 
information following 
IFRS adoption. 
A sample of 
3,488firms in 15 EU 
in 2004. 
The price model There has been no 
improvement in the value 
relevance for both sub-
samples of code law and 
common law countries, and 
county-by-country analysis 
shows mixed results. 
Fonseca and Gonzàlez 
(2008) 
To examine the 
determinants of 
income smoothing 
using LLPs.  
A sample of 3,221 
bank-year 
observations from 40 
countries 
LLPs are 
regressed on 
previous LLPs, 
earnings before 
taxes and LLP, 
change in total 
loans, loan-
losses allowance, 
bank capital and 
GDP in addition 
to the 
explanatory 
variables of 
interest. 
The study documents that 
the level of income 
smoothing is determined 
by investor protection, 
disclosure quality, bank 
regulation and supervision, 
financial structure and 
development. 
Anandarajan et al. 
(2011) 
To analyse the impact 
of institutional 
environment and firm-
specific characteristics 
on the value relevance 
A sample of 813 
financial firms from 
38 countries over the 
period 1993-2004. 
The price model Their results suggest that 
institutional environment 
and firm-specific 
characteristics have an 
impact on the value 
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of accounting 
information 
relevance of accounting 
information of financial 
firms. 
Curico and Hasan 
(2015) 
To investigate 
earnings management 
using LLPs for Euro 
area banks versus 
non-Euro area credit 
institutions. 
A sample of 491 
banks in Europe over 
the period from 1996 
to 2006. 
Loan loss 
provisions 
(LLPs) are 
regressed on the 
determinates of 
LLPs 
The study reports 
differences in the use of 
LLPs by banks across 
Eurozone versus non-
Eurozone banks. 
 
- Value relevance and corporate governance 
Author (s)  Research objective Sample  Methodology Primary findings 
Frankel et al. (2002) To evaluate whether 
there is an association 
between auditor fees 
and earnings 
management as well 
as the market reaction 
to the disclosure of 
auditor fees. 
A sample of 3,074 US 
firms in the year 2001 
Earnings 
management 
models 
The findings indicate a 
significant positive relation 
between non-audit fees and 
the likelihood of reporting 
a small earnings and there 
is a negative association 
between audit fees and the 
level of earnings 
management 
Klein (2002) To examine the 
relationship between 
the percentage of 
independent directors 
in the board of 
directors as and the 
audit committee, and 
the level of earnings 
management 
A sample of 692 firm-
year observations 
from the firms listed 
on the S&P 500 in 
1992 and 1993. 
Earnings 
management 
models 
The result suggests a 
negative association 
between the percentage of 
independent directors and 
earnings management. 
Xie et al. (2003) To evaluate the role of 
the board of directors 
and the audit 
committee as well as 
the executive 
committee in reducing 
earnings management 
behaviour. 
A sample of 282 firm-
year observations for 
firms from S&P 500 
index and have data 
for the years, 1992, 
1994 and 1996. 
Earnings 
management 
models 
More independent directors 
in the board as well as the 
presence of corporate 
executives and investment 
bankers on audit 
committees are associated 
with lower level of 
earnings management. The 
same results for more 
meeting held by board of 
directors and audit 
committee. 
Park and Shin (2004) To examine the 
impact of board 
composition on 
earnings management 
behaviour. 
A sample of 539 firm-
year observations over 
the period 1991-1997. 
Earnings 
management 
models 
The number of directors 
from financial 
intermediaries as well as 
the board representation of 
active institutional 
shareholders tend to be 
associated with lower 
earnings management. 
Larcker et al. (2007) To evaluate the 
association between a 
large set of corporate 
governance factors 
and various 
accounting and 
economic measures 
A sample of 2,106 
firms that are from the 
US and their fiscal 
year end between 
June 2002 and May 
2003. 
The price model 
in addition to 
other measures 
for accounting 
information 
quality 
The afflicted position of 
director in the board of 
director and audit 
committee is associated 
with lower value relevance, 
while the existence of old 
directors is associated with 
higher level of value 
relevant accounting 
information. 
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Kent et al. (2010) To analyse the 
association between 
the characteristics of 
board of directors as 
well as audit 
committee, and 
earnings management. 
A sample of 392 firm-
year observations in 
Australia over the 
period 2001-2005. 
Earnings 
management 
models 
Strong corporate 
governance is related with 
higher quality discretionary 
and innate accruals.  
Verriest et al. (2013) To study the 
association between 
first time IFRS 
adoption quality as 
well as disclosure and 
corporate governance 
strength. 
A sample of 223 
European firms 
located in 15 
countries and adopted 
IFRS in 2005 for the 
first time 
IFRS adoption 
quality and 
disclosure 
measures are 
regressed on 
corporate 
governance 
factors 
Firms with stronger 
corporate governance 
provide more transparent 
IFRS restatements in the 
Moreover, the strong 
corporate governance 
results in more extensive 
information disclosure. 
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Appendix II 
Literature review on value relevance of Fair Value hierarchy 
- Fair value studies before SFAS No. 157 and IFRS 7 
- US literature 
Author (s)  Research objective Sample  Methodology Primary findings 
Barth (1994) To examine whether 
the disclosed fair 
value estimates (and 
fair value gains and 
loss) of banks 
investment securities 
are reflected in share 
price (return) , in 
comparison to 
historical cost. 
Over the period from 
1971 to 1990 for a 
sample of US banks. 
100 banks for price 
model and 87 for 
return mode.  
The price and the 
return models in 
addition to the 
difference between 
fair values and book 
values of investment 
securities.   
The results suggest 
that fair value 
estimates of 
investment securities 
are statistically 
associated with equity 
market value. For 
securities fair value 
gains and losses the 
results are mixed. 
Barth et al. (1995) To examine how fair 
value measures affect 
earnings volatility is 
reflected in market 
value of equity.  
Over the period from 
1971 to 1990 for a 
sample of US banks. 
Unbalanced sample 
over the years of 
study. 
Stock price is 
regressed on net 
income before 
securities gains and 
losses conditional on 
the standard 
deviations of 
historical cost and fair 
value net income.   
The fair value 
components of net 
income are more 
volatile than the part 
of historical cost, and 
stock price does not 
reflect this 
incremental volatility.  
Ahmed and Takeda 
(1995) 
To evaluate how 
investors value 
realised and 
unrealised gains and 
losses of investment 
securities held by 
banks.  
3,276 US bank-
quarter observations 
over the period 1986-
1991. 
Stock return is 
regressed on net 
income component 
and control variabels. 
The results reveal a 
significant association 
between unrecognised 
gains and losses and 
firm stock return.  
 
Nelson (1996) To examine whether 
the fair value 
disclosures under 
SFAS No 107 are 
value relevant to 
investors. 
sample of 146 (133) 
US banks in 1992 
(1993) 
Market value of 
equity is regressed on 
the book value of 
equity plus difference 
between fair value 
estimates and book 
value of investment 
securities.  The return 
model plus the 
changes in fair value 
estimates.  
The study findings 
suggest that only fair 
value measures of 
investment securities 
is reflected in share 
price but not those of 
net loans, deposits, 
long term debt, and 
off balance sheet 
financial instruments 
Eccher et al. (1996) To examine whether 
the fair value 
disclosures under 
SFAS No 107 are 
value relevant to 
investors. 
The sample comprises 
of 296 (328) US bank 
holding companies in 
1992 (1993). 
Market value of 
equity is regressed on 
the book value of 
equity and difference 
between fair value 
estimates and book 
value of investment 
securities. 
Results show that fair 
value measures of 
investment securities 
are value relevant. 
The fair value 
estimates of other 
financial instruments 
are value relevant in 
limited settings. 
Barth el al. (1996) To examine whether 
the fair value 
disclosures under 
SFAS No 107 are 
value relevant to 
investors. 
The sample consists 
of 136 US banks over 
the two years 1992 
and 1993. 
Market value of 
equity is regressed on 
the book value of 
equity plus difference 
between fair value 
estimates and book 
value of investment 
The findings suggest 
that the fair value 
disclosures of 
investment securities, 
loans, and long term 
debt are incrementally 
value relevant to their 
book values but not 
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securities as well as 
control variables. 
for deposits and off-
balance sheet items. 
Venkatachalam 
(1996) 
To examine whether 
the  disclosures of 
derivatives as off 
balance sheet items 
are value relevant 
(under SFAS No. 
119) 
99 US bank holding 
companies over the 
two years 1993 and 
1994. 
Market value of 
equity is regressed on 
the book value of 
equity plus fair value 
disclosures of 
derivatives, and the 
other off-balance 
sheet items. 
Fair value disclosures 
on derivatives provide 
value relevant 
information to 
investors, which is 
incremental relative to 
fair value on-balance 
sheet items. 
Seow and Tam (2002) To evaluate the 
disclosed fair values 
of derivatives based 
on SFAS No. 107 and 
119. 
The sample comprises 
of 106 US firm-year 
observations over the 
period 1990-1996. 
The return model in 
addition to variables 
for the recognised and 
disclosed amount of 
derivatives. 
The empirical 
findings indicate that 
the disclosure is value 
relevant to investors. 
Carroll, et al. (2003) To examines the 
value-relevance of 
fair value accounting 
relative 
to historical cost 
accounting for 
investment securities 
held by closed-end 
mutual funds. 
Using a sample of 143 
US closed-end mutual 
funds over the period 
1982-1997 
Market value of 
equity is regressed on 
the book value of 
equity plus difference 
between fair value 
estimates and book 
value of investment 
securities. Return 
model plus the 
changes in fair value 
estimates. 
The results report 
significant association 
between market value 
of equity (stock 
return) and the fair 
value of investment 
securities (fair value 
securities gains and 
losses). 
Ahmed et al.(2006) To examine the value 
relevance of 
mandatory 
recognition rather 
than disclosure of 
derivative fair values. 
146 US bank over the 
period 1995-2000 
Market value of 
equity is regressed on 
the book value of 
equity and recognised 
and disclosed fair 
values of derivatives 
The recognised fair 
values of derivatives 
are value relevant but 
disclosed fair values 
are not. 
 
 
 
- Non –US studies 
Author (s)  Research objective Sample  Methodology Primary findings 
Bernard et al. (1995) To examine the 
reliability of mark-to-
market accounting for 
price adjustment on 
investments and some 
off-balance sheet 
positions as well as 
loan loss provisions. 
The sample includes 
1,035 Danish bank-
year observations 
over the period 1976-
1989. 
The variables under 
study are regressed on 
their lagged values, so 
related adjustments 
over time are 
considered as sign of 
manipulations. 
The empirical 
findings reveal some 
evidence of 
manipulating loan loss 
allowance but not for 
price adjustments of 
investments and off-
balance sheet items. 
Drago et al. (2013) To evaluate whether 
the fair value 
estimates for banks 
loans are value 
relevant to investors.  
Using a sample of 83 
banks listed on stock 
exchanges in Europe 
between 2005 and 
2008. 
The price model plus 
the difference between 
book value and fair 
value of loans and a 
set of control 
variables. 
The estimated fair 
values of loans 
disclosed in the 
footnotes of are 
incrementally value 
relevant to investors.  
Fiechter and 
Novotny-Farkas 
(2014) 
To examines the value 
relevance of three 
categories of financial 
instruments reported 
based on fair values in 
accordance to IAS 39. 
They use a sample of 
999 bank-year 
observations listed on 
50 countries over the 
period 2006-2009. 
The price model. The empirical 
findings reveal a 
lower value relevant 
of financial 
instruments 
designated at fair 
value compared to 
held for maturity. 
Bank-based countries 
are found to be 
associated with lower 
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value relevance of fair 
values. 
Barth et al. (2014) To assess whether the 
reconciliation 
adjustments for net 
income are value 
relevant to investors.  
 
Based on a sample of 
1,021 listed firms in 
15 EEA countries 
The market value of 
equity is regressed on 
the book value of 
equity and net income 
under local GAAP in 
addition to the 
adjustment for net 
income to IFRS  
The reconciliation 
adjustments provide 
relevant information 
to investors for 
valuation purposes. 
Adjustments related to 
IAS 39 are significant 
only for financial 
firms. 
 
- Literature review on fair value hierarchy  
- Literature review on SFAS No. 157 
Author (s)  Research objective Sample  Methodology Primary findings 
Kolev (2009) To evaluate the value 
relevance of fair value 
hierarchy under SFAS 
No. 157 
Sample of 349 US 
financial firm- year 
observations over the 
first two quarters of 
2008 
The price model 
where the book value 
of equity is 
disaggregated based 
on fair value hierarchy 
and non-fair value 
items. 
Valuation coefficients 
on level 1 and 2 fair 
values are lower than 
corresponding 
coefficient on fair 
value at level 1.  
Song et al. (2010) To evaluate the value 
relevance of fair value 
hierarchy under SFAS 
No. 157 
Sample of 1,260 US 
financial firm-year 
observations over the 
first three quarter of 
year 2008. 
The price model 
where the book value 
of equity is 
disaggregated based 
on fair value hierarchy 
and non-fair value 
items. 
Higher value relevant 
level 1 & 2 fair values 
in comparison to level 
3. Strong corporate 
governance decreases 
the information 
asymmetry associated 
with fair values 
classified at level 3. 
Goh et al. (2015) To evaluate the value 
relevance of fair value 
hierarchy under SFAS 
No. 157. 
A sample of 6,893 
firm-quarter 
observations for 
financial firms listed 
on the US stock 
markets listed over 
2008-2011. 
The price model 
where the book value 
of equity is 
disaggregated based 
on fair value hierarchy 
and non-fair value 
items. 
The coefficient on 
level 3 fair values is 
significantly lower 
than those on level 1 
and 2. Moreover, the 
differences between 
the valuation 
coefficients tend to 
reduce over time 
Fiechter, and Meyer 
(2010) 
To investigate 
whether the discretion 
the managerial 
discretion inherent in 
fair value is used for 
the purpose of big 
bath accounting 
during the crisis 
period 
A sample of  552 U.S. 
bank holding 
companies over the 
period from the first 
quarter of 2008 to the 
first quarter of 2009. 
The nondiscretionary 
level 3 gains or losses 
is measured by the 
residual of reported 
level 3 gains and 
losses on a number of 
explanatory variables. 
In times of financial 
crisis, financial firms 
with poor pre-
manager performance 
appear to report 
higher discretionary 
Level 3 losses, 
compared to a control 
group.  
Riedl and Serafeim 
(2011) 
To investigate 
whether level 3 fair 
value assets tend to be 
associated with 
greater information 
risk and, hence, 
higher cost of capital, 
A sample of 952 US 
financial firm-quarters 
from the second 
quarter of 2007 to the 
second quarter of 
2008. 
An implied asset betas 
are regressed on the 
three levels of fair 
value assets as well as 
non-fair value assets.  
 
Higher cost of capital 
is related to level 3 
fair values and firms’ 
information 
environments can play 
role in mitigating 
information risk 
across the fair value 
estimates. 
Liao et al. (2013) To assess the 
association between 
the three levels of fair 
value hierarchy based 
A sample of 2,856 US 
bank-quarter 
observations from 
The bid-ask spread is 
regressed on the three 
levels of fair values 
Bid–ask spreads is 
lowest for Level 1 fair 
values  
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on SFAS No. 157 and 
information 
asymmetry 
Quarter 1 2008 to 
Quarter 4 2009. 
with a set of control 
variables 
and highest for Level 
3 fair values. 
Huang et al. (2015) To examine the 
association between 
cost of equity capital  
and the three levels of 
fair value. 
A sample of 814 US 
financial firm-year 
observations over the 
two financial years 
2008 and 2009. 
The regression of cost 
of capital on the three 
levels of fair value in 
addition to a set of 
control variables 
Firms’ cost of capital 
tends to be positively 
associated with level 3 
fair values. Also the 
positive association 
between level 3 fair 
values and cost of 
capital is lower for 
firms with strong 
governance. 
 
- Literature review on IFRS 7 
Bischof (2009) To investigate 
whether there has 
been any 
improvement in 
disclosure quality 
after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS 7  
A sample of 171 
banks from 28 
European countries in 
2007. 
Disclosure quality is 
measured both 
quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  
The study shows that 
there has been an 
improvement in 
disclosure quality 
after IFRS7 and 
disclosure quality 
varies across 
European countries. 
 
- Institutional environment, corporate governance and fair value  
Beaver and 
Venkatachalam 
(2003) 
To investigate the 
valuation coefficients 
on the different 
components of loan 
fair values 
A sample of 869 US 
bank-year 
observations over the 
period 1992-1995. 
Market value of equity 
is regressed on fair 
value assets and 
liabilities where loan 
fair values are 
disaggregated into 
components. 
The discretionary 
component that is 
attributed as for 
signalling 
(opportunism) is 
positively (negatively) 
priced and statistically 
significant.  
Aboody et al. (2006) To examine whether 
firms understate 
option value estimates 
and, thus, stock-based 
compensation expense 
disclosed under SFAS 
123. 
A sample of 3,368 US 
firm-year 
observations over the 
period 1996-2001. 
The estimated values 
of option by firms are 
regressed on 
calculated values and 
other variables.  
Evidence of 
understating option 
expense, and this 
tends to be higher for 
firms having greater 
incentives as well as 
opportunity to do so. 
Hodder et al. (2006) To examine the 
factors that drive 
managers’ use of 
employee stock 
option model inputs 
A sample of 1,748 
firm-year 
observations related 
to firms in Standard & 
Poor's (S&P) 1500 
over 1995-1998. 
The difference 
between model inputs 
estimates against 
benchmarks (historic 
experience and 
industry benchmarks). 
The study shows that 
managers exercise 
discretion over all the 
models to estimate the 
fair values of stock 
option. 
Bartov et al. (2007) To examine whether 
firms understate 
option value estimates 
(stock-based 
compensation 
expense) disclosed 
under SFAS 123 
A sample of 9,185 US 
firm-years 
observation from 
1996 to 2004 
The estimated values 
of options by firms are 
regressed on historical 
stock-price volatility 
and calculated implied 
volatility. 
Evidence of 
understating option 
expense and it is 
highly associated with 
managerial incentives 
and/or ability to do so.  
 
Bischof (2009) whether there has 
been any 
improvement in 
disclosure quality 
after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS 7  
A sample of 171 
banks from 28 
European countries in 
2007. 
Disclosure quality is 
measured both 
quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  
The study shows that 
there has been an 
improvement in 
disclosure quality 
after IFRS7 and 
disclosure quality 
varies across 
European countries. 
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Fiechter and Novotny-
Farkas (2014) 
To examine the value 
relevance of three 
categories of financial 
instruments reported 
based on fair values in 
accordance to IAS 39 
They use a sample of 
999 bank-year 
observations listed on 
50 countries over the 
period 2006-2009. 
The price model. The empirical 
findings reveal a 
lower value relevant 
of financial 
instruments 
designated at fair 
value compared to 
held to maturity. 
Bank-based countries 
are found to be 
associated with lower 
value relevance of fair 
values. 
Song et al. (2010) To evaluate the value 
relevance of fair value 
hierarchy under SFAS 
No. 157 
Sample of 1260 US 
financial firm-year 
observations over the 
first three quarter of 
year 2008. 
Ohlson model where 
the book value of 
equity is 
disaggregated based 
on fair value 
hierarchy 
Higher value relevant 
level 1 & 2 fair values 
in comparison to level 
3. Strong corporate 
governance decreases 
the information 
asymmetry associated 
with fair values 
classified at level 3. 
Verriest et al. (2013) To study the 
association between 
first time IFRS 
adoption quality as 
well as disclosure and 
corporate governance 
strength. 
A sample of 223 
European firms 
located in 15 
countries and adopted 
IFRS in 2005 for the 
first time 
IFRS adoption quality 
and disclosure 
measures are 
regressed on corporate 
governance factors 
Firms with stronger 
corporate governance 
provide more 
transparent IFRS 
restatements in the 
Moreover, the strong 
corporate governance 
results in more 
extensive disclosure. 
Bhat (2013) To examine whether 
the association 
between the value 
relevance of fair value 
gains and losses risk 
management 
disclosure as well as 
corporate governance. 
A sample of 176 listed 
US banks over the 
period 2001-2009 
Stock return is 
regressed on net 
income, other 
compressive income 
and fair value gain 
and loss. 
The results show a 
positive association 
between corporate 
governance and the 
level of risk 
disclosure and 
between the level of 
disclosure and the 
market pricing of fair 
value gains and 
losses. 
Huang et al. (2015) To examine the 
association between 
cost of equity capital 
and the three levels of 
fair value. 
A sample of 814 US 
financial firm-year 
observations over the 
two financial years 
2008 and 2009. 
The regression of cost 
of capital on the three 
levels of fair value in 
addition to a set of 
control variables 
Firms’ cost of capital 
tends to be positively 
associated with level 
3 fair values. Also the 
positive association 
between level 3 fair 
values and cost of 
capital is lower for 
firms with strong 
governance. 
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Appendix III 
GDP growth and changes in non-performing loans to total loans 
Table 1 GDP growth % 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 2.14 3.35 3.62 1.55 -3.80 1.88 3.07 0.88 
Belgium 1.89 2.63 3.00 0.95 -2.62 2.50 1.64 0.09 
Bulgaria 5.96 6.47 6.91 5.75 -5.01 0.66 1.98 0.49 
Cyprus 3.91 4.13 5.13 3.63 -1.67 1.30 0.40 -2.40 
Czech Republic 6.44 6.88 5.53 2.71 -4.84 2.30 1.96 -0.81 
Denmark 2.44 3.80 0.82 -0.72 -5.09 1.63 1.15 -0.66 
Finland 2.78 4.06 5.18 0.72 -8.27 2.99 2.57 -1.46 
France 1.61 2.37 2.36 0.20 -2.94 1.97 2.08 0.33 
Germany 0.71 3.71 3.27 1.05 -5.64 4.09 3.59 0.38 
Greece 0.89 5.82 3.54 -0.44 -4.39 -5.45 -8.86 -6.57 
Hungary 4.26 3.96 0.51 0.88 -6.55 0.79 1.81 -1.48 
Iceland 6.00 4.23 9.72 1.15 -5.15 -2.93 2.13 1.15 
Ireland 5.67 5.47 4.93 -2.61 -6.37 -0.28 2.77 -0.31 
Italy 0.95 2.01 1.47 -1.05 -5.48 1.71 0.59 -2.27 
Lithuania 7.80 7.84 9.84 2.93 -14.74 1.33 6.00 3.70 
Luxembourg 4.12 4.88 6.46 0.49 -5.33 5.14 2.61 -0.16 
Malta 3.67 2.22 4.28 3.90 -2.80 4.30 1.40 1.10 
Norway 2.59 2.30 2.65 0.07 -1.63 0.48 1.34 2.90 
Netherlands 2.25 3.82 4.20 2.08 -3.30 1.07 1.66 -1.59 
Poland 3.55 6.19 7.20 3.92 2.63 3.70 4.76 1.76 
Portugal 0.77 1.55 2.49 0.20 -2.98 1.90 -1.83 -3.32 
Romania 4.29 8.72 6.26 7.86 -6.80 -0.94 2.31 0.35 
Slovenia 4.00 5.66 6.94 3.30 -7.80 1.22 0.61 -2.64 
Slovak Republic 6.54 8.26 10.68 5.45 -5.29 4.83 2.70 1.60 
Spain 3.72 4.17 3.77 1.12 -3.57 0.01 -0.62 -2.09 
Sweden 2.82 4.69 3.40 -0.56 -5.18 5.99 2.66 -0.29 
Switzerland 3.04 4.01 4.14 2.28 -2.13 2.95 1.80 1.11 
United Kingdom 2.81 3.04 2.56 -0.33 -4.31 1.91 1.65 0.66 
  Source: The World Bank 
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Table 2 changes in non-performing loans to total loans (%) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria -3.7 5.3 -18.1 -15.1 18.3 25.8 -4.4 3.9 
Belgium -13.0 -36.0 -9.1 43.2 87.0 -9.1 18.2 13.4 
Bulgaria 10.0 0.0 -4.5 14.5 167.2 85.5 25.6 11.0 
Cyprus - - - - 25.5 23.8 71.8 94.2 
Czech Republic -2.5 -7.7 -34.3 18.6 63.2 17.7 -3.1 0.4 
Denmark -71.4 50.0 100.0 100.0 175.0 23.3 -10.1 62.6 
Finland -25.0 -33.3 50.0 33.3 50.0 0.0 -16.7 0.0 
France -16.7 -14.3 -10.0 4.4 42.7 -6.5 14.2 0.1 
Germany -17.3 -15.8 -22.3 7.5 16.1 -3.3 -5.3 -5.6 
Greece -10.0 -14.3 -14.8 1.6 48.8 31.1 58.3 61.3 
Hungary 27.8 13.0 -11.5 29.7 124.7 46.4 36.4 17.8 
Iceland - - - - - 29.8 -36.6 -45.7 
Ireland - 11.5 17.6 205.6 409.6 27.3 29.3 52.5 
Italy 6.0 -6.1 -12.0 8.7 50.4 6.2 17.1 17.1 
Lithuania -72.7 66.7 0.0 508.4 294.3 -2.7 -19.2 -21.4 
Luxembourg -33.3 -50.0 300.0 50.0 11.8 -63.1 53.5 -61.6 
Malta 38.2 -21.0 -17.1 -7.3 13.3 20.5 -1.6 11.9 
Netherlands - - - - 90.4 -11.5 -4.3 14.3 
Norway -30.0 -14.3 -16.7 44.7 76.8 18.9 10.8 -10.2 
Poland -26.2 -32.7 -29.7 -45.7 51.9 14.6 -5.1 11.6 
Portugal -25.0 -13.3 117.5 27.7 33.7 7.7 44.6 30.5 
Romania -82.7 28.6 43.6 6.2 187.3 50.2 20.9 27.3 
Slovenia -16.7 0.0 -28.0 134.2 37.4 41.8 43.8 28.5 
Slovak Republic 92.3 -36.0 -21.9 -0.6 112.9 10.3 -3.8 -7.0 
Spain -0.8 -11.7 28.0 213.0 46.8 13.3 28.7 24.6 
Sweden -27.3 -86.9 -21.9 463.5 80.5 -6.1 -16.5 7.0 
Switzerland -44.4 -40.0 0.0 195.5 16.6 -17.2 -5.5 -4.6 
United Kingdom -47.4 -10.0 0.0 73.0 125.4 12.7 0.2 -7.6 
  Source: The World Bank 
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Appendix IV 
Table 1 Country Break Down to test H2A a 
 Financial firms (incl. Banks) Banks only 
Country Firms Obs. Percent Firms Obs. Percent 
Austria 5 40 2.60 5 40 3.42 
Belgium 3 23 1.50 3 23 1.97 
Denmark 14 109 7.10 14 109 9.33 
Finland 5 40 2.60 2 16 1.37 
France 30 240 15.63 22 176 15.07 
Germany 7 56 3.65 4 32 2.74 
Greece 11 80 5.21 11 80 6.85 
Iceland 2 16 1.04 2 16 1.37 
Ireland 4 32 2.08 4 32 2.74 
Italy 21 168 10.94 19 152 13.01 
Luxemburg 2 16 1.04 2 16 1.37 
Netherland 6 44 2.86 3 20 1.71 
Norway 17 136 8.85 15 120 10.27 
Poland 11 88 5.73 11 88 7.53 
Portugal 4 32 2.08 4 32 2.74 
Spain 9 72 4.69 9 72 6.16 
Sweden 9 72 4.69 5 40 3.42 
Switzerland 3 24 1.56 - - - 
UK 31 248 16.15 13 104 8.90 
 194 1536 100 148 1168 100 
 
Table 2 Country Break Down to test H3A 
 Financial firms (incl. Banks) Banks only 
Country Firms Obs. Percent Firms Obs. Percent 
Austria 5 25 2.62 5 25 3.45 
Belgium 3 14 1.47 3 14 1.93 
Denmark 14 67 7.02 14 67 9.25 
Finland 5 25 2.62 2 10 1.38 
France 30 150 15.72 22 110 15.19 
Germany 7 35 3.67 4 20 2.76 
Greece 11 47 4.93 11 47 6.49 
Iceland 2 10 1.05 2 10 1.38 
Ireland 4 20 2.10 4 20 2.76 
Italy 21 105 11.01 19 95 13.12 
Luxemburg 2 10 1.05 2 10 1.38 
Netherland 6 26 2.73 3 11 1.52 
Norway 17 85 8.91 15 75 10.36 
Poland 11 55 5.77 11 55 7.60 
Portugal 4 20 2.10 4 20 2.76 
Spain 9 45 4.72 9 45 6.22 
Sweden 9 45 4.72 5 25 3.45 
Switzerland 3 15 1.57 - - - 
UK 31 155 16.25 13 65 8.98 
 194 954 100 148 724 100 
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Table 3 Country Break Down to test H4A  
 Financial firms (incl. Banks) Banks only 
Country Firms Obs Percent Firms Obs Percent 
Austria 2 10 2.13 2 10 3.13 
Belgium 2 9 1.91 2 9 2.81 
Denmark 3 15 3.19 3 15 4.69 
Finland 4 20 4.26 2 10 3.13 
France 8 40 8.51 6 30 9.38 
Germany 2 10 2.13 1 5 1.56 
Greece 2 6 1.28 2 6 1.88 
Ireland 2 10 2.13 2 10 3.13 
Italy 14 70 14.89 12 60 18.75 
Luxemburg 2 10 2.13 2 10 3.13 
Netherland 4 20 4.26 2 10 3.13 
Norway 7 35 7.45 5 25 7.81 
Poland 6 30 6.38 6 30 9.38 
Portugal 3 15 3.19 3 15 4.69 
Spain 4 20 4.26 4 20 6.25 
Sweden 6 30 6.38 5 25 7.81 
Switzerland 2 10 2.13 - - - 
UK 22 110 23.40 6 30 9.38 
 95 470 100 65 320 100 
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Appendix V 
Table 1 The impact of IFRS adoption on value relevance (using lagged book value of equity)  
  Financial firms (incl. Banks) Banks (only) 
  Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
VARIABLES Coeff. (1998-2004) (2005-2012) (1998-2004) (2005-2012) 
      
BVPS 𝑏1 2.160*** 1.535*** 2.052*** 1.486*** 
  (0.408) (0.116) (0.543) (0.0981) 
EPS 𝑏2 2.761*** -0.0391 2.003 -0.153 
  (0.954) (0.150) (1.382) (0.127) 
Constant 𝑏0 -0.127 0.730*** -0.0736 0.721*** 
  (0.491) (0.155) (0.562) (0.139) 
      
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1,092 1,341 832 1,019 
No of firms  194 194 148 148 
R2 (within)  0.438 0.591 0.392 0.644 
Difference  0.153**  0.252***  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of the price model as follows: 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝑏2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+ δ𝐷𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value of firm i three months following the end of fiscal year t. 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of 
equity for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported earnings of firm i over the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable 
for year t. 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡, and 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 are scaled by book value of equity at the beginning of year t.  
The difference in the value relevance of accounting information between pre-IFRS adoption period (1998-2004) and IFRS 
adoption period (2005-2012) is measured by the difference in the within explanatory power of price model, within𝑅2, over the 
two periods.The significance of the difference in within 𝑅2 is tested based on Z statistics = (𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒
2 )/ (𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 + 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 )^0.5 
where 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2
2 and 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒2
2 are the variance of coefficients of determinations of the within-group estimator using bootstrap methods 
following Agostino et l. (2011: 444). The results are reported for the entire sample of financial firms and for a sub-sample of 
banks. 
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Table 2 The impact of the crisis on value relevance (scaled by lagged book value of equity) 
VARIABLES Coeff. Financial Firms (incl. Banks) Banks (only) 
    
Crisis 𝑏1 -0.739*** -1.017*** 
  (0.277) (0.233) 
BVPS 𝑏2 1.585*** 1.226*** 
  (0.214) (0.174) 
Crisis* BVPS 𝑏3 -0.158 0.227 
  (0.263) (0.218) 
EPS 𝑏4 1.454** 2.980*** 
  (0.592) (0.986) 
Crisis* EPS 𝑏5 -1.652*** -3.228*** 
  (0.586) (0.974) 
Constant 𝑏0 0.393* 0.485*** 
  (0.213) (0.181) 
Year dummy 𝐷𝑡  Yes  
    
Observations  1,341 1,019 
Number of firms  194 148 
R2 (within)  0.607 0.671 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the fixed effect estimation of 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑏4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡over the period 2005-2012, where Crisis is a dummy variable coded 1 for the years of 
crisis period (2008-2012) and zero otherwise. 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value of firm i three months following the end of fiscal year t. 
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the book value of equity for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the reported earnings of firm i over the fiscal year 
t and 𝐷𝑡 are year dummy variables. 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡, and 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 are scaled by book value of equity at the beginning of year t. The 
results are reported for the entire sample of financial firms and for a sub-sample of banks. 
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Table 3  Value relevance of fair values hierarchy using lagged book value of equity as an alternative 
scaling method 
  Pane A Panel B 
VARIABLES Coeff.  Test F-stat p-value 
      
NFVNA 𝑏1 0.312*** FVNA1= FVNA3 10.45 0.0013*** 
  (0.0802)    
FVNA1 𝑏2 0.893*** FVNA1= FVNA2 7.28 0.0071*** 
  (0.125)    
FVNA2 𝑏3 0.383** FVNA2= FVNA3 0.31 0.5752 
  (0.154)    
FVNA3 𝑏4 0.444*** FVNA1= NFVNA 22.15 0.0001*** 
  (0.121)    
EPS 𝑏5 3.804* FVNA2= NFVNA 0.51 0.4761 
  (2.080)    
Constant 𝑏0 -0.363 FVNA3= NFVNA 6.67 0.0100** 
  (0.339)    
Year Dummy  (4.248)    
      
Observations  685    
No of firms  184    
R-squared  0.722    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
tailed), respectively. The table reports the OLS estimation of the following equation 𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑏3𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡+ 𝑏4𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + δ𝐷𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡. where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the market value of firm i three months following the end of fiscal 
year t. 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑉𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑡 are fair value of level 1, level 2 and level 3 net assets for firm i as reported at the end 
of fiscal year t. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the reported net income of financial firm i for the fiscal year t and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable for year t. In 
this form of the model all the market and accounting variables are scaled by lagged book value (i.e. book value of equity for firm 
i as reported at the end of fiscal year t-1). Due to missing data on the lagged book value of equity, the number of observations 
drops to 685 firm-year observations related to 184 distinct firms listed in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland 
over the period 2009-2012. While Panel A shows the results of the regression, Panel B offers F-statistics testing the differences 
between the estimation coefficients. 
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